Cook v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 01 August 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 59743
• Parties: Alice COOK, as Administratrix of the Estate of Glover Cook, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Gloria Gaines, and Alvin Samuel, Defendants-Appellees. 125 Mich.App. 724, 337 N.W.2d 277
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 277

337 N.W.2d 277

Alice COOK, as Administratrix of the Estate of Glover Cook Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Gloria Gaines, and Alvin Samuel Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 59743.

125 Mich.App. 724, 337 N.W.2d 277

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 8, 1982.

Decided May 17, 1983.

Released for Publication Aug. 1, 1983.

[125 MICHAPP 726] Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian by [125 MICHAPP 727] George J. Bedrosian and Elizabeth Gleicher, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles W. Anderson, III, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

Before RILEY, P.J., and KAUFMAN and WALSH, JJ.

KAUFMAN, Judge.

Plaintiff, Alice Cook, as administratrix for the estate of Glover Cook, filed suit on August 1, 1978, against defendants, the City of Detroit and Detroit police officers James Duff, Gloria Gaines, and Alvin Samuel. Prior to the selection of the jury, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit. James Duff was voluntarily dismissed from the suit on motion of plaintiff. The jury reached a verdict of no cause of action in favor of the remaining defendants, Gloria Gaines and Alvin Samuel. On August 14, 1981, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

This lawsuit arose out of an incident which occurred on July 9, 1978. Police officers from the City of Detroit were called to the home of plaintiff and the decedent Glover Cook, at approximately 6:22 p.m. When they arrived, the officers found Cook running between his home and the adjoining house, which was owned by a cousin. Cook was extremely violent. When the officers attempted to restrain him, Cook jumped several times through a glass door, pulling an officer through with him. Cook also wrestled with several officers, injuring them in the process. When Cook was finally restrained, he was placed in the back of Officers Gaines' and Samuel's patrol car. He attempted to kick out the windows of the vehicle. Cook was covered with blood but did not appear to the [125 MICHAPP 728] officers to be severely injured. During the course of the officers' attempts to subdue him, they were informed that earlier in the day Cook had beaten his wife, plaintiff, and had locked his cousins' child in a freezer.

Pursuant to the police department's general orders regarding treatment of persons with mental problems, Officers Gaines and Samuel were instructed to transport Cook to Detroit General Hospital. Other hospitals in the past had refused to admit such persons unless the person was shot and there was no other option available. Because of rerouting due to closed freeway exits, the drive to the hospital took from 20 to 25 minutes. Upon arrival at the hospital, it was approximately 20 minutes before a stretcher could be located upon which to transport Cook inside. Cook was pronounced dead at 7:56 p.m. The cause of death was later determined to have been acute myocarditis, which had probably been aggravated by strenuous activity and loss of blood. The 80? weather on the date in question was probably also a contributing factor.

I

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit on the ground that plaintiff did not state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983?

"A motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) tests only the legal, not the factual, sufficiency of the pleadings." Attorney General v. Michigan National Bank, 110 Mich.App. 106, 116, 312 N.W.2d 405 (1981), quoting Dillon v. Tamminga # 2, 64 Mich.App. 305, 307-308, 236 N.W.2d 718 (1975). On review, we accept as true all of plaintiff's[125 MICHAPP 729] factual allegations as well as any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the allegations.

In her complaint, plaintiff made the following allegations:

"5. That on or about July 9, 1978, the Defendants, and each of them, while acting under color of law did violate the civil rights of Plaintiff's-Decedent under 42 USC 1983 by depriving Decedent of his life without due process.

* * *

"9. That at all times herein mentioned, the Defendant City of Detroit owed to Plaintiff the following duties and obligations, among others:

"(a) To select, train and supervise the officers of its police department in such a manner and in such a way so as to avoid injury to others, and particularly to Plaintiff's-Decedent herein;

"(b) To avoid the employment and use of police officers it knew or should have known were dangerous, negligent and/or incompetent, so as to avoid injury to others, and particularly to Plaintiff's-Decedent herein;

"10. Notwithstanding the aforementioned duties and obligations, Defendant City of Detroit did wilfully, wantonly and recklessly violate each and every one, among others."

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 provides:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively [125 MICHAPP 730] to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia." ¹

Even though a suit upon a federal statute is brought in a state court, the interpretation of that statute is a question of federal law. Breish v. Ring Screw Works, 397 Mich. 586, 248 N.W.2d 526 (1976). The courts of Michigan are bound by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court on issues of federal law arising in state courts. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Additionally, Michigan courts adhere to the view that a state court is bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts upon federal questions. If there is no decision by the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts disagree on the interpretation of a federal act, this Court will adopt a view which appears most appropriate under the circumstances. See Schueler v. Weintrob, 360 Mich. 621, 633-634, 105 N.W.2d 42 (1960).

In Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding governmental immunity, municipalities were "persons" for purposes of Sec. 1983. However, a municipality could not be found liable under the statute by reason of respondeat superior. The municipality could only be held liable if a constitutional right was violated by "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers". In addition, a municipality could be found liable if constitutional rights were violated by customs "so permanent and well settled as to [125 MICHAPP 731] constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law". 436 U.S. 690-691, 98 S.Ct. 2035-36.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Monell failed to articulate the full extent of municipal liability under Sec. 1983. However, several federal lower courts have attempted to do so. As explained in Zmija v. Baron, 119 Mich.App. 524, 535, 326 N.W.2d 908 (1982):

"Numerous decisions subsequent to Monell, * * * have indicated that proof of mere negligence is insufficient to recover from a local governmental body under Sec. 1983. The applicable standard has been variously described as deliberate indifference, Leite v Providence, 463 F Supp 585 (D RI, 1978), gross negligence, Hild v Bruner, 496 F Supp 93 (D NJ, 1980), recklessness, Spriggs v Chicago, 523 F Supp 138 (ND Ill, 1981)." ²

The Zmija Court went on to adopt, in the context of a Sec. 1983 claim against a city which was based on alleged inadequacies in the training and supervision of the city's police officers, the "deliberate indifference" standard of Leite v. Providence, supra. ³ Zmija, p. 535, 326 N.W.2d 908. In formulating this standard, the Court in Leite v. Providence, supra, pp. 590-591 had stated:

"Although a city cannot be held liable for simple negligent training of its police force, the city's citizens do not have to endure a 'pattern' of past police misconduct before they can sue the city under section 1983. If a municipality completely fails to train its police force, [125 MICHAPP 732] or trains its officers in a reckless or grossly negligent manner so that future police misconduct is almost inevitable, the municipality exhibits a 'deliberate indifference' to the resulting violations of a citizen's constitutional rights. In such a case, the municipality may fairly be termed as acquiescing in and implicitly authorizing such violations. In light of the responsibility, authority, and force that police normally wield, a municipality is fairly considered to have actual or imputed knowledge of the almost inevitable consequences that arise from the nonexistent or grossly inadequate training and supervising of a police force. If the plaintiff's injury results from the complete lack of training or grossly inadequate training of a police force, such an injury is not the result of mere negligence but the result of a deliberate and conscious indifference by the city. The training and supervising of these police officers must be so inadequate and the resulting misconduct so probable, that the city can fairly be considered to have acquiesced in the probability of serious police misconduct."

We agree with the Court in Zmija that the "deliberate indifference" standard is the proper one to be applied to Sec. 1983 actions under circumstances such as those involved herein. Applying that standard to plaintiff's allegation that the City of Detroit wilfully failed to properly select, train, and supervise its police officers, we conclude that plaintiff's complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, we...