Bremer v. Haag (In re Bremer's Estate)
Decision Date | 07 June 1911 |
Parties | IN RE BREMER'S ESTATE. BREMER v. HAAG. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Bremer County; J. J. Clark, Judge.
The defendant is the executor of the estate of William Bremer. The plaintiff filed a claim against the estate for damages in the sum of $8,000 for breach of an alleged contract. The defendant, executor, disapproved the claim, and the same was brought on for trial. The trial was had before the court without a jury. The plaintiff's claim was dismissed at his cost and he has appealed. Affirmed.Dawson & Wehrmacher, for appellant.
Hagemann & Farwell, for appellee.
William Bremer died in June, 1908. His wife died in 1905. The plaintiff was their adopted son and was their only heir at law. The decedent left a will which was duly probated, and which distributed his estate among many different beneficiaries of which the plaintiff was one. The plaintiff's claim is that, in 1904, the decedent promised to give him a certain farm of 240 acres located in Minnesota on condition that he should continue to reside in the town of Sumner as long as his foster father should live. At the time of this alleged agreement the plaintiff owned and occupied a home in Sumner and had been a resident therein for some years. It is claimed, however, that he was proposing to move to Minnesota and to occupy the farm in question, and that this was the occasion of the agreement. The answer of the executor denies such agreement, and pleads its invalidity in various forms which can be noticed later.
1. The principal point urged upon us by the appellant is that the alleged agreement was established by undisputed testimony, and that the finding of the trial court is contrary to the evidence. The only witness who testified directly to the alleged agreement was the wife of the plaintiff. Her direct evidence was as follows:
[1][2] We are not prepared to concede that this evidence disclosed sufficient facts to constitute a binding and valid contract. Passing that question, however, it is sufficient to say that the evidence at best is meager and not persuasive in its circumstances. Some corroborating evidence was introduced. Such corroboration consists of some admissions of the elder Bremer to the effect that the farm was his son's and that he was going to give it to him. It is urged that the testimony of the wife was uncontradicted and that the court was bound therefore to accept it as true. This contention cannot be sustained. The alleged conversation to which she testified had no other witness than herself. In the nature of the case, therefore, it could not be contradicted by direct denial. It was the duty of the court nevertheless to scan it carefully and to weigh it in the light of all the circumstances appearing in evidence. This point is discussed at some length in Holmes v. Connable, 111 Iowa, 299, 82 N. W. 780, and we need not add to such discussion. Weighing this testimony in the light of all the circumstances appearing in evidence, we think the trial court was justified in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not proved. The after conduct of both father and son was not consistent with any claim of ownership of such farm on the part of the son. And this seems to have been the controlling consideration with the trial court in rejecting plaintiff's claim. It appears in evidence that the father and son had been in partnership in the implement business. This business was traded for the land in question. The title was taken in the name of the father. There is some suggestion in the testimony that this was done because it was his money that was invested in the implement business. At least, there is no claim made by the plaintiff that the title was held in trust for the firm. In September, 1907, the father and son had a settlement of the partnership...
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