Bremer v. Williams

• Decision Date: 29 November 1911
• Citation: 96 N.E. 687,210 Mass. 256
• Parties: BREMER et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

210 Mass. 256

96 N.E. 687

BREMER et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

November 29, 1911

COUNSEL

Clifton L. Bremer, pro se.

F. W Grinnell, K. Howes, and J. M. Maguire, for defendants.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This is a suit in equity brought on November 21, 1910, by trustees under the will of Francis W. Sayles against trustees under the will of Thomas Haviland. Its purpose is to recover $886.60 paid from moneys of the Sayles trust on July 15 1902, by Charles F. Berry, who was then trustee under each will, for taxes due from the Haviland trust. Berry was an embezzler from several estates of which he was trustee. His wrongdoing was not discovered until March, 1905. But it is alleged in the bill that the plaintiffs did not know of the fraudulent use of the money of the Sayles trust for the taxes of the Haviland trust until late in the year 1906. The defendants demur for lack of equity, the statute of limitations and laches.

I. The bill is framed in substance upon Newell v. Hadley, 206 Mass. 335, 92 N.E. 507, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 908, and avoids the ground upon which Craft v. South Boston Railroad, 150 Mass. 207, 22 N.E. 920, 5 L. R. A. 641 was decided. The facts of the present case are indistinguishable in their essence from those on which in Newell v. Hadley relief in equity was given. That case was decided after great consideration, and the principle there established must be taken to be the law of this commonwealth. That principle is that where a trustee of several estates steals money from one, with which to pay the debts of another, the latter, having been unjustly enriched at the expense of the former, may be required in equity to make restitution. On the authority of Newell v. Hadley the bill is not demurrable for want of equity.

II. It is plain that the liability of the Haviland trust to the Sayles trust grows out of an implied or constructive obligation, and does not rest upon an express trust. To such an obligation the statute of limitations is a bar in equity as well as at law. Farnam v. Brooks, & Pick. 212. It is an underlying principle in the application of the statute of limitations that before it can begin to run there must be some one in existence, by whom, and a different person, against whom, the claim may be enforced. The statute implies that such persons are in being, and if they are not there is no room for its operation. It is the general rule that, where one person represents both sides of conflicting claims the statute does not run. Burrell v. Egremont, 7 Beav. 205-235; Topham v. Booth, 35 Ch. Div. 607-611; In re Hawes, 62 L. J. Ch. 463; Lister v. Pickford, 34 L. J. C. 582; Mills v. Bostwick, 35 L. J. Ch. 31; Gray v. Quicksilver Mining Co. (C. C.) 68 F. 677; See [1902] 2 K. B. 318-333 to 335. Berry represented both estates from 1902 to 1905. The beneficiaries under the trusts during this period could not have instituted proceedings in the name of the estates. Berry held the legal title to the several...