Brennan v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 22 September 1978
• Parties: Joseph E. BRENNAN, Attorney General v. Bert O. JOHNSON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 337

391 A.2d 337

Joseph E. BRENNAN, Attorney General v. Bert O. JOHNSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 22, 1978.

Steven F. Wright (orally), Leon V. Walker, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

T. R. Downing (orally), Student Atty., Judy R. Potter, Supervising Atty., Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

NICHOLS, Justice.

In July, 1977, Attorney General Joseph E. Brennan filed a complaint in the court below seeking an order that the Appellant, Bert O. Johnson, show cause why he should not be barred from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state, pursuant to the provisions of Maine's statutes relating to habitual offenders of motor vehicle laws (29 M.R.S.A. § 2271 Et seq.). He asserted that the Appellant had been convicted in 1973 of leaving the scene of an accident (29 M.R.S.A. § 891) and that he had been twice convicted in 1976 of operating a motor vehicle after suspension of his operator's license (29 M.R.S.A. § 2241).

At the hearing below ¹ the Appellant did not challenge the facts of these three convictions but proposed instead to offer evidence in mitigation of each offense. The presiding justice excluded such evidence, ruling that under the statute the court could not go beyond the fact of convictions. From an order finding him to be a habitual offender, directing him to surrender his license and not to operate a motor vehicle on Maine highways until further order of court, ² the Appellant brings this appeal.

We deny the appeal.

The Appellant initially contends that while three convictions of such motor vehicle violations are a condition precedent to being adjudged a habitual offender, the court nevertheless may, in its discretion, conclude that the individual so convicted is not a habitual offender because of the circumstances of the particular cases. Such a construction would be inconsistent with the policy expressly set forth in this statute:

It is declared to be the public policy of Maine:

1. Safety. To provide maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways of the State; and

2. Privileges denied. To deny privilege of operating motor vehicles on such highways to persons who by their conduct and record have demonstrated their indifference for the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of the State of Maine and for the orders of Maine courts and administrative agencies; and

3. Discourage repetition. To discourage repeated violations by individuals and to impose increased and added deprivation of the privilege to operate motor vehicles upon habitual offenders who repeatedly violate traffic laws. 29 M.R.S.A. § 2271.

The Appellant contends that the use of the word "conduct" in subsection 2, Supra, denotes a legislative intent that at each show cause hearing thereunder the court review the "conduct" of the particular respondent which resulted in his several convictions to ascertain whether those specific offenses "demonstrated his indifference for the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of the State of Maine . . . ."

The plain language of the statute refutes that argument. A precise definition of a habitual offender is set forth as follows:

An habitual offender shall be any person, resident or non-resident, whose record, as maintained in the office of the Secretary of State, shows that such person has accumulated the convictions or adjudications for separate and distinct offenses described in subsections 1, 2 and 3, committed within a 5-year period . . . . 29 M.R.S.A. § 2272.

The word "conduct" is used only in the declaration of policy quoted from the statute above, and then it is employed in conjunction with the word "record."

To determine legislative intent consideration must be given to the whole statutory system of which the section at issue forms a part, and all legislation on the same subject matter must be viewed in its entirety so that a harmonious result may be reached. Finks v. Maine State Highway Commission, Me., 328 A.2d 791, 795 (1974); In Re Belgrade Shores, Inc., Me., 359 A.2d 59, 61 (1976).

The plain language of this statute indicates that the legislature intended to establish an expeditious procedure for removing from the State's highways motor vehicle operators repeatedly guilty of certain violations of law. We conclude that this statute, in its entirety, cannot be construed to permit a review of the circumstances attendant upon those violations.

In the alternative, the Appellant contends that a construction of the statute which prevents the court from hearing mitigating evidence is violative of due process.

The State must observe procedural due process whenever it moves to deprive a person of his motor vehicle operator's license. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). However, habitual offender statutes have been found to be constitutionally sound so long as certain safeguards are maintained. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-116, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). Under our Maine statute, suspension or revocation of one's operator's license follows, and does not occur prior to, a judicial hearing.

The hearing in the court below was adequate to avoid the risk of erroneous deprivation by determining whether this Appellant is the individual who was convicted of the specified motor vehicle offenses, and whether the offenses underlying these convictions were embraced by this statute.

Accordingly,...