Brenneman Martin & Co. v. Edwards
Decision Date | 17 December 1880 |
Citation | 7 N.W. 621,55 Iowa 374 |
Parties | BRENNEMAN, MARTIN & Co. v. EDWARDS |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Dubuque Circuit Court.
ACTION upon a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in the State of Pennsylvania. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case, involved in the question decided, appear in the opinion.
REVERSED.
Fouke & Lyon, for appellant.
Hurd & Daniels, for appellees.
I.
The judgment upon which suit was brought was rendered in 1854. The plaintiffs allege in their petition, in order to take the case out of the operation of the statute of limitations, that defendant in writing within ten years admitted that the debt is unpaid and promised to pay it. In an amended petition written instruments relied upon to defeat the statute are set out by copy. The court instructed the jury that these writings, if the jury found they referred to the judgment in suit, "contain an admission sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of limitations and entitle plaintiffs to judgment for the amount due." An objection made by defendant to this instruction presents a question, the decision whereof is decisive of the case.
II. The instruments set out in the amended petition, and referred to in the instructions to the jury, are two letters to the lawyers of defendant holding the claim for collection, and are in the following language:
The testimony shows that these letters refer to the claim based upon the judgment in suit, and that they were written in response to letters making a proposition for compromise or settlement for a sum less than was claimed to be due upon the judgment.
The statute provides that Code, § 2539.
We are to determine whether these letters contain a promise or admission contemplated by this statute. It is very plain that not one word admitting the debt to be unpaid is found in the letters. Discussion cannot make this proposition plainer. It is equally clear that the letters contain no promise to pay the debt. There is a promise "to make some arrangements" with the attorneys; but this is clearly a promise, not to pay the debt, but to compromise it by payment of a part of it. Such a promise, we believe, cannot be regarded as a promise to pay the debt, which will take the case out of the operation of the statute of limitations. See Angell on Limitations, pages 227, 232, sections 219, 231, and cases there cited. We do not understand that this position is disputed. We believe the rule to be, without any exception that a party shall never be prejudiced or estopped to deny a claim against him by an offer to compromise. It may be that, at a time when the courts looked with disfavor upon the statute of limitations, decisions not in accord...
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