Brent v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs Debt Mgmt. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 11 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-cv-2446-TLP-dkv,19-cv-2446-TLP-dkv |
| Parties | H. BRENT, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DEBT MANAGEMENT CENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
On July 11, 2019, the plaintiff, H. Brent ("Brent"), filed a pro se "Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983" against the defendant, the Department of Veterans Affairs Debt Management Center ("the DMC"). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Also, on July 11, 2019, Brent filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 2), which the court granted on July 12, 2019, (ECF No. 7). Brent thereafter filed an amended complaint on July 18, 2019. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.) Subsequently, Brent filed a motion to compel, (ECF No. 14), a motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 21), and a motion to amend, (ECF No. 22).
Now before the court is the DMC's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 24.) Brent did not file a response. This case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and recommendation as appropriate. (Admin. Order 2013-05, Apr. 29, 2013.)
For the following reasons, it is recommended that the DMC's motion to dismiss be granted and that, in light of the court's recommendation, Brent's motion for summary judgment be denied as moot. Additionally, Brent's motion to compel and motion to amend are denied as moot.
This case arises out of a series of communications between Brent and the DMC regarding Brent's pension benefits from and financial obligations to the Department of Veterans Affairs (the "VA"). Although difficult to ascertain, from what the court can glean from Brent's original complaint and amended complaint, he alleges that the DMC misled him, intentionally conspired against him, defamed him, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, and defrauded him. (Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.)
According to Brent, on May 24, 2019, he made a phone call to a toll-free number to inquire about his payments from the VA. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1; Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 8.) Brent alleges that he spoke to a representative who asked Brent whether hereceived a letter dated May 2, 2019. (Id.) Brent responded by stating that he did not receive a letter dated May 2, 2019. (Id.) The May 2, 2019 letter - attached to the DMC's motion to dismiss - explained to Brent that his countable income exceeded the income limit for a veteran with no dependents and that, as a result, the VA had paid him too much and would need the excess money to be repaid. (May 2 Letter, ECF No. 24-1.) The letter also refers to a previous letter dated December 4, 2018 which allegedly stated that the DMC was proposing to stop his pension benefits in response to his excess income. (Id.)
Brent further alleges that, although he did not receive the May 2, 2019 letter, he received another letter on May 24, 2019, dated May 20, 2019, which is what prompted him to make his first phone call to the DMC. (Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 8.) According to Brent, the content of the letter dated May 20, 2019 "stated clearly that nothing was going to take place with [his] pay" so long as he completed and sent VA Form 0748 within thirty days. (Id.) The May 20, 2019 letter - also attached to the DMC's motion to dismiss - states Brent was overpaid by $23,798.14 and that the DMC would withhold $428.83 until the amount was recouped. (May 20 Letter, ECF No. 24-2.) The letter also states that withholding was scheduled to begin in August of 2019. (Id.) Contrary to Brent's contention, the letter simply states that if he wishes, he may dispute the debt or request a waiver and that it was "important topay this debt within thirty days of the letter or tell [the DMC] which option [Brent wanted to choose]." (Id.)
Brent contends that on May 31, 2019, the first payment had already been reduced. (Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 8.) Brent subsequently called the same toll-free number again. (Id.) According to Brent, the representative was unhelpful, and Brent called his attorney who "fired off a letter to the [DMC]." (Id.) Brent essentially alleges that this was all part of a plot to mislead him by allowing him to believe he had more time to respond to the DMC's May 20, 2019 letter. (Id.; Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Brent states that "two different letter[s] [were mailed] to two different people [i]n two different states." (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Brent claims that the first letter - the May 2, 2019 letter - was mailed from the DMC office in St. Paul, Minnesota, to his attorney Paul Jennings in Lacey, Washington, on May 2, 2019. (Id. at 4.) According to Brent, this was a "decoy" to mislead him and his attorney. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.) Brent additionally makes a vague allegation that the May 20 letter was "done by someone else," apparently insinuating that there was a larger plot between employees at the DMC. (Id.)
Moreover, Brent contends that the DMC "conspired against him and fraudulently share[d] . . . information with each other through mail and wire communication." (Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 8.) Additionally, Brent contends that the alleged conduct by the DMCalso resulted in his credit score dropping from a 771 to a 602. (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) In his amended complaint, Brent also makes various other allegations such as that the DMC defamed him and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. (Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 8.) Lastly, Brent contends that he is bringing a civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and criminal fraud claims against the DMC. (Id. at 1.) According to the amended complaint, Brent seeks actual damages in the amount of $7 million and punitive damages in the amount of $19.5 million dollars. (Id. at 2.)
Aside from the two May 2019 letters, attached to the DMC's motion to dismiss are a letter dated November 6, 2019 addressed to Brent and a declaration of E. Douglas Bradshaw, Jr. ("Bradshaw"), the Chief Counsel, Torts Law Group, in the Office of General Counsel, for the VA. The November 6, 2019 letter states that Brent's request for waiver of his pension debt has been approved by the Committee on Waivers and Compromises. (November Letter, ECF No. 24-4.) Additionally, the letter explains that the granting of the waiver forgives the indebtedness and thus, there is no need for Brent to take any further action. (Id.) In his declaration, Bradshaw states that there have been no administrative tort claims filed related to the allegations Brent makes in this action. (Bradshaw Decl., ECF No. 24-5.)
The DMC argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on three bases: mootness, the Veterans' Judicial Review Act (the "VJRA"), and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 24.) Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which a court must determine before reaching other issues. See Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990). "Federal Courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). "A party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists." Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008)(per curiam).
"Pro se complaints are to be held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed." Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Further, the courts are not required to act as counsel for a pro se litigant; nor are they required to sort through the pleadings to create a claim on behalf of the plaintiff. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)("[D]istrict judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants."); Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App'x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)("[A] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.")(internal quotation marks omitted). Requiring the court "to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of the pro se litigants . . . would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party." Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App'x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011). "While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue." Id.
The DMC argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Brent's claim because the issue is now moot. (Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 24.) To support this argument, the DMC explains that Brent, through his counsel, on May 23, 2019, requested a waiver of his debt. (Id.) At that time, the DMC ceased collection of the debt until the waiver was processed. (Id.) On September 23, 2019, a waiver of $23,798.14 was granted,(id.; Decision on Waiver, ECF No. 24-3), and on November 6, 2019, Brent received a letter stating that his request for a waiver had been approved and that there was no further action required, (November Letter, ECF No. 24-4). Accordingly,...
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