Breslin v. Somerville Horse R. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 September 1887
• Parties: BRESLIN v. SOMERVILLE HORSE R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

145 Mass. 64
13 N.E. 65

BRESLIN
v.
SOMERVILLE HORSE R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

September 24, 1887.

Tort for personal injuries. Trial in the superior court for Middlesex county, before BLODGETT, J., who ordered a verdict for the defendant, and reported the case for the determination of the supreme judicial court. The facts are stated in the opinion.

145 Mass. 65]G.A. Bruce and M.F. Farrell, for plaintiff.

The legislature, in granting the charter to the defendant, made it liable “for any loss or injury that any person may sustain by reason of any carelessness, neglect, or misconduct of its servants, in the management, construction, or use of said tracks, roads, or bridges.” Acts 1857, c. 250. The claim is that this charter liability has been avoided by the lease of its track to the Middlesex Railroad Company, and the approval thereof by the legislature. Unless the power granting the charter has consented that the defendant should be relieved from the liabilities imposed upon it, it must be liable in this action. We rely, in support of this position, upon two decisions by courts of the highest authority, where the precise question before this court has been decided. See Nelson v. Railroad Co., 26 Vt. 717. And the doctrine of that case has been followed by the courts of Illinois and Indiana. See Railroad Co. v. McCarthy, 20 Ill. 385; Railroad Co. v. Dunbar, Id. 624; Railroad Co. v. Whipple, 22 Ill. 337. The second case is Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445. The Massachusetts cases in support of the plaintiff's position are Langley v. Railroad, 10 Gray, 103; Ingersoll v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen, 438; Davis v. Railroad Co., 121 Mass. 134. The language of the lease shows that it was not the intention of the legislature, in ratifying them, to relieve the defendant corporation from its charter liability. The lease was made to the Middlesex Railroad Company in 1865, the assignment in 1869, and the ratification took place in 1876. The lease expresses that it was made “subject, however, to all the duties and liabilities imposed upon the Somerville Horse-Railroad Company by its charter.” That it was the expectation and intention of the parties to these contracts that the lessor corporation should remain liable to suits is apparent from the provision that the lessee should defend all suits brought against the lessor company, and pay all judgments recovered against it. If there is any doubt about the meaning of the language of these leases, it must certainly be construed against the defendant, for it is clearly against public policy to allow a corporation to relieve itself of a responsibility imposed by its charter, by acts of its own which are secrets to the public with whom it deals, and from whom it gains its revenue.

S. Hoar and W.H. Martin, for defendant.

No question can arise as to the power of the defendant to relieve itself, by its contracts and leases, of all liability for injuries such as the one here complained of; the legislature having confirmed the agreements and leases under

[13 N.E. 66

which the Union Railway Company operated the road at the time of the injury. The only question is, what is the legal effect of those contracts and leases? Quested v. Railroad Co, 127 Mass. 205. It is a well-settled principle in this court that the party having the exclusive direction and control of the servants running the train at the time of the accident is the one responsible for the negligence of those servants, irrespective of the ownership of the cars, the engines, or the road, unless the legislature, by the charter of...