Brest v. Comm'r of Ins.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1930
• Citation: 169 N.E. 657,270 Mass. 7
• Parties: BREST v. COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE. NICHOLS et al. v. SAME. CASASSA v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

270 Mass. 7

169 N.E. 657

BREST

v.COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE.

NICHOLS et al.

v.SAME.

CASASSA

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 7, 1930.

Case reserved from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County; Crosby, Judge.

Three separate suits by Ephraim A. Brest, by Malcom E. Nichols and others, and by Andrew A. Casassa, against the Commissioner of Insurance, consolidated and reserved on petitions and demurrers. Demurrers sustained.

F. S. Deland, Corp. Counsel, of Boston, for petitioners Nichols and others.

W. P. Murray, City Sol., of Boston, for petitioner Casassa.

R. Clapp, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

RUGG, C. J.

These suits, consolidated and reserved upon the petitions and demurrers for determination by this court, are brought to review the action of the defendant in establishing classifications of risks and the rates to be charged as premiums by companies in connection with compulsory motor vehicle insurance. The demurrers admit, for the purposes of this decision, the truth of all facts well pleaded in the several petitions, but not the averments of law. Therefore the allegations must be examined with care. The three petitions, although differing in details, are founded upon substantially the same allegations. They set out that the defendant has established and put in force a schedule of classification of risks and premium charges based upon a combination of two factors, (1) territorial districts, and (2) a group specified as ‘size, make, kind and structure’ of motor vehicle.

Although argument has been made to the effect that the second factor cannot be a proper basis for consideration in fixing premiums, it does not seem entitled to serious discussion. It appears to us plain that the insurance risk on motor vehicles may vary with size, make, kind and structure. These specifications well may include other subsidiary matters, as, for example, weight, power, capacity for speed, type, use. The premiums rightly and justly to be paid for the required insurance may be based in part upon the specifications composing the second factor. Weight has been given to matters of this nature for many years in establishing fees for registration and other statutory regulations of motor vehicles. We regard it as clear that in this respect no ground sufficient to require review of the action of the defendant is alleged.

The chief argument is directed against the first factor. The allegations in that particular in substance are that the defendant divided the commonwealth into eight so-called territories; that as to private passenger motor vehicles, territory I comprises the city of Chelsea, territory II the city of Revere, and territory III the city of Boston; that the other cities and towns of the commonwealth are grouped into five other territories; that the defendant further classified the risks based in part upon the territory in which the particular motor vehicle was garaged for the greater part of the calendar year preceding the date of the order. Incorporated in the allegations of the petitions by reference is the ‘Memorandum of Finding and Order Relative to the Classifications of Risks, and to the Schedule of Premium Charges for Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds,’ filed in his office by the defendant. This ‘Memorandum’ includes a complete schedule of classification of risks and premium charges of which complaint is made. In the ‘Memorandum’ is a brief recital that public hearings were held by the defendant in his official capacity on several days, at which protests were voiced in behalf of residents of Chelsea and Revere against continuance of rates based on a territorial basis theretofore established, and arguments presented for a flat rate throughout the commonwealth. Other contentions and arguments were offered and were considered by the defendant and discussed in the ‘Memorandum.’ With reference to the territorial basis for rates, it there was said: ‘The plan is based on the fact that the risk or hazard assumed by the insurer varies with the place where the insured cars are principally garaged. For example, the available experience shows that cars garaged in Boston are much more likely to be involved in accidents, resulting in loss to the insurers, than cars garaged in Springfield or Worcester. The rates in Boston are therefore higher than in the latter cities. There may of course be reasonable difference of opinion in respect to the number of territories which should be established, or the cities or towns which should be allocated to a given territory. These questions, however, can only be decided in the light of the experience as it develops from year to year. It was urged at the public hearing that the 1929 rates be re-established for 1930. On the experience now available certain reductions in the 1929 rates are warranted. It is also clear that because of the wide difference in the experience of certain municipalities grouped together in the 1929 territories a rearrangement of territories is required. While this re-arrangement causes increases in rates for some municipalities, the experience for 1927 and 1928 shows that reductions are merited in others. It would be obviously unjust to penalize whole communities by failing to carry out this re-arrangement.’ There is further discussion of contentions made at the hearings before the defendant, prior to the promulgation of the schedules, that the statistics on which were based the high rates proposed for Chelsea and Revere were unreliable in that fraudulent or excessively large settlements were made by insurers of claims against owners of motor vehicles garaged in those cities. Respecting that contention the finding of the defendant is stated in the ‘Memorandum’ as follows: ‘The evidence did not warrant the conclusion that there was fraud in connection with any of these claims; or that the companies had paid claims without due investigation or that they had paid out excessive sums in settlements.’

Thus it appears from the allegations that the defendant, by geographical groupings of the several municipalities, has divided the area of the commonwealth into eight territories and that the premium charges for insurance payable by the owner of any motor vehicle depend in considerable part upon the particular territory in which he keeps such motor vehicle, the premium charges varying with the different territories. It further appears that the division into territories was made gy the defendant after public hearings at which he found it to be ‘the fact that risk or hazard’ of liability ‘assumed by the insurer’ varies according to the locality where the insured motor vehicles are principally garaged.

The power and duty of the court with respect to petitions of this nature are prescribed in St. 1929, c. 166 (amending earlier statutes) in these words: ‘Any person or company aggrieved by any action, order, finding or decision of the commissioner under this section may,’ within a specified time, ‘file a petition in the supreme judicial court for the county of Suffolk for a review of such action, order, finding or decision. * * * The court shall have jurisdiction in equity to modify, amend, annul, reverse or affirm such action, order, finding or decision, shall review all questions of fact and of law involved therein and may make any appropriate order or decree. The decision of the court shall be final and conclusive on the parties.’ These words do not mean that by simple petition without more parties are entitled to ask the court to review the whole field covered by the commissioner and make its own finding. They import into the procedure for review the main features of equity pleading and practice. G. L. c. 214, § 12. The bill must contain allegations setting out with certainty, brevity and adequate degree of particularity the grounds upon which relief is sought. If in cases like the present findings of fact made by the commissioner are attacked, there must be set out in the bill specification of the findings and the grounds of alleged error. “Every material fact necessary to entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for must be contained in the stating part of the bill.' ‘This part of the bill must contain the plaintiff's case, and his title to relief; and every necessary fact must be distinctly and expressly averred, and not in a loose and indeterminate manner, to be explained by inference, or by reference to other parts of the bill.” Stevens v. Hayden, 129 Mass. 328, 332;Bartlett v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 221 Mass. 530, 539, 109 N. E. 452;Boston v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 237 Mass. 403, 415, 130 N. E. 390;Cram v. Cram, 262 Mass. 509, 513, 160 N. E. 337. Under St. 1929, c. 166, it would have been open to the plaintiffs by appropriate allegations to attack the findings of facts made by the defendant. Such findings are not assailed by the allegations of these bills. Those findings must be accepted as true. Therefore it is unnecessary to discuss the meaning and scope of the ‘review’vested in the court by said chapter 166. See Swan v. Justices of Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 547, 548, 111 N. E. 386;Mayor of Medford v. Judge of District Court, 249 Mass. 465, 471, 144 N. E. 397.

The bald question presented on this record and the one argued is whether a classification of motor vehicles for the purpose of fixing rates for the insurance premium charges according to the territory within which the motor vehicle is principally garaged can be lawful under the governing statute and controlling provisions of the state and Federal Constitutions.

The power and the duty of the defendant with respect to the matters here in issue are prescribed in section 113B, first inserted in G. L. c. 175 by St. 1925, c. 346, § 4, and finally amended as now in force by St. 1929, c. 166. (For intervening statutes see St. 1925, c. 346, § 4; St. 1927, c. 182; St. 1928, c. 381, § 6; St. 1929, c. 34, § 2.) The parts of that section here...