Brewer v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 20 September 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1206 (RC).
• Citation: 891 F.Supp.2d 126
• Parties: Willie BREWER, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

891 F.Supp.2d 126

Willie BREWER, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–1206 (RC).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Sept. 20, 2012.

Kerry J. Davidson, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Denise J. Baker, Office of the Attorney General for District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, District Judge.

Denying The Defendants' Motion To Dismiss

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiff is a teacher who worked for the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) before being dismissed from his employment pursuant to a reduction in force (“RIF”). He brings suit against the District of Columbia and the former DCPS Chancellor, Michelle Rhee (“defendant Rhee”),¹ alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 631– 34. The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that such claims are barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as well as by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and parallel litigation. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies the defendants' motion.

II. Factual Allegations & Procedural Background²

The plaintiff is a 53–year–old teacher who worked for DCPS for 28 years before being terminated in October of 2009 under a RIF, pursuant to the D.C. Municipal Regulations, 5–E DCMR §§ 1501, 1503. Compl. $ 4. The plaintiff claims that the defendants engaged in age discrimination and used the RIF as a pretext to remove 200 DCPS teachers—the vast majority of whom were over 40 years old-and replace them with younger teachers. Id. §§ 9–10. The defendants cited inadequate budgetary funds or poor performance when terminating the older teachers. Id. ¶ 10. In that vein, the plaintiff was subjected to the RIF after being adversely evaluated in a Competitive Level Documentation Form. Id. ¶ 7. Though he was an instrumental music teacher, his RIF competitive standing was governed by the standards for a vocal music teacher, a position that required a skill set different from his own. Id. §§ 7–8. As a result, the plaintiff was terminated. Id. §§ 5–7.

According to the plaintiff, former Chancellor Rhee “personally planned and directed the implementation of the RIF separations,” a “strategy” she chose after unsuccessful attempts to persuade the City Council to allow her to terminate DCPS employees without cause. Id. §§ 14–16. She then publicly commented that many of the RIF separations-an action justified on the basis of budget shortfalls-were necessary because the separatedteachers had been low performers, and continued carrying out the separations even after the D.C. Council obtained funds to address the budget shortfalls. Id. §§ 19–20.

Further, under the D.C. Municipal Regulations, an agency must maintain a list of employees who were separated under a RIF for one year after their terminations. Id. ¶ 11. If a qualified person on the list is available for an opening within his or her discipline, that person must have priority in filling the position over a new appointment, transfer, or former employee who is not on the list. Id. ¶ 12. Through the fall of 2010, however, the defendants hired hundreds of new DCPS teachers and employees, “most of whom were much younger than the plaintiff and were just beginning their careers.” Id. ¶ 13. Because the plaintiff never received priority appointment before the “new, transferred, or non-listed teachers who were hired for positions of his type,” the defendants either failed to maintain the requisite reemployment priority list, did not include the plaintiff on it, or did not use the list. Id. §§ 14–16.

The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission after he was terminated (“EEOC”). See Pl.'s Mot., Ex. A, at 1. In March of 2011, the EEOC issued him a right-to-sue letter, id., and he then filed an action in this court in June of 2011. The plaintiff alleges age-based discrimination in contravention of the ADEA. Id. §§ 23–24. In response, the defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim. The court now turns to the parties' arguments and the applicable legal standards.³

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). The motion does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits, but rather, whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The complaint is only required to set forth a short and plain statement of the claim, in order to give the defendants fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

A court considering this type of motion presumes the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C.2000). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), nor to plead law or match facts for every element of a legal theory, Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

The court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by facts set out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

B. Legal Standard for a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment

Because the court will rely on documents outside of the pleadings, the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 164 (D.C.Cir.2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). A “genuine dispute” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548;Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To determine which facts are “material,” a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. EEOC

The defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not timely file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Defs.' Mot. at 5. In response, the plaintiff has attached to his opposition a right-to-sue letter that he received from the EEOC. See Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. A, at 1. In order to bring an ADEA action in court, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discriminationwith the EEOC. Washington v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 160 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C.Cir.1998). Upon receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the plaintiff is allowed 90 days to file the ADEA action in court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). This period begins the day after the letter is received and expires on the 90th day thereafter. SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1); Akridge v. Gallaudet Univ., 729 F.Supp.2d 172, 178 (D.D.C.2010). Absent evidence indicating otherwise, courts generally assume that an EEOC right-to-sue letter was mailed on the date that it was issued. Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984); Lucas–Bolden v. Potter, 2005 WL 3273725, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept....