Brewer v. Gowin
Decision Date | 18 June 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 21512,21512 |
Parties | BREWER v. GOWIN. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Oscar S. Brewer, Kenneth M. Myers, Kansas City, for appellant.
Reed O. Gentry, and Rogers, Field & Gentry, all of Kansas City, for respondent.
BOUR, Commissioner.
This is a suit by a real estate broker, Merl L. Brewer, against defendant, Mrs. Thelma Gowin, for a commission alleged to have been earned by plaintiff in connection with the sale of certain real estate. Verdict and judgment were in favor of defendant, and plaintiff has appealed.
During the year 1947, plaintiff was engaged in the business of selling real estate, and Thomas G. Jay, a real estate salesman, was associated with plaintiff in that business and represented her in the matter here involved. On June 28, 1947, defendant called plaintiff's office by telephone and stated that the property described below was for sale. This property was owned and occupied by defendant and her husband. Jay went to the home, inspected the house, and talked with defendant. On the same day, defendant signed a listing contract the material parts of which are as follows:
The regular commission fixed by the Real Estate Board was five per cent of the sale price.
Jay was plaintiff's first witness. He testified: He testified that plaintiff paid for the advertisements and identified copies of advertisements which appeared in The Kansas City Star on the following dates: Friday, August 29, 1947; Saturday, August 30, 1947; and Sunday, August 31, 1947. The advertisements described the house, gave the address, and included the following:
Jay further testified that on the afternoon of Sunday, August 31, a number of people inspected the house, including David Talman; that he, Jay, showed Talman through the house and told him the sale price was $13,750.00, which was the price specified in the listing contract; that defendant was not there at the time; and that he had not seen Talman since that afternoon. Two days later, the owners agreed to sell the property to Talman and his wife for the price of $13,000. The contract of sale, dated September 2, 1947, was signed by defendant and her husband and by Talman and his wife.
Jay further testified that defendant called him by telephone on the morning of September 1, 1947, and told him that the Talmans had returned to the house Sunday night (August 31) after he left there, and that the Talmans 'had expressed a real interest in the house, if they could buy it with the real estate commission off, that they didn't want to pay a real estate commission'; that when he asked defendant what Talman would pay for the property she said he had offered $13,000, 'figuring that roughly' as the amount defendant would receive after paying a real estate commission of 5% on Jay's asking price of $13,750. Jay said that on the same day (September 1), he went to defendant's home and 'advised her to go ahead and sell the house to them at that as it was a good price on the house, fearing to go back to Mr. Talman and quote it to him at $13,000 through myself because he would then drop his price that much more'; that he also told defendant that he 'would assist her in every way possible in preparing the papers * * * and that we would be due our full commission after the sale was closed * * *, and she told me that she was going to sell and would pay us the full commission after the sale was closed'; that on two occasions during the following week he offered his services to defendant, but on each occasion she told him 'she was unable to talk (to him) about the transaction because of Mr. Gowin's illness.'
Jay testified on cross-examination that he would have received fifty per cent of the commission if it had been collected, and continued:
Defendant's testimony was in sharp conflict with that of Jay. She testified: She further testified that when Talman came to her home 'around' September 1, she showed him through the house, and that Jay was not in her house on that day; that she never left her home because she 'couldn't leave Mr. Gowin'; that Jay was not at her home on Saturday, August 30, or on Sunday, August 31; that the house was not open to the public on the days last mentioned because she 'wouldn't let people in that way'; that Jay was not present at any time when Talman was there; that Talman's name was not mentioned in any conversation she had with Jay prior to the sale of the property; and that her 'discussions with Mr. Talman about the purchase of the house' extended over a period of about two weeks after he first looked at it. She testified on cross-examination: She admitted that she signed the listing contract.
Mr. Gowin died on September 23, 1947. On September 29, 1947, defendant executed a deed conveying the property to Mr. and Mrs. Talman, which deed was recorded on October 1, 1947.
Plaintiff called David Talman as a witness in rebuttal. Talman said he read an advertisement in The Kansas City Star which stated that the property in question was for sale; that thereafter, and 'about the first of September, just before Labor Day,' he went to defendant's home where he found Jay, the defendant, and her husband; that he had never seen the property before; that he had never met defendant or her husband prior to that day; that Jay showed him through the house and 'pointed out its features.' He stated on cross-examination that he never saw Jay after his first visit to the house; that all 'discussions looking to the purchase of the house were carried on with Mrs. Gowin' and not with Jay; and continued:
We return to defendant's testimony. That part of her testimony set forth above was to the effect that plaintiff's agent, Jay, was not the procuring cause of the sale of the property. During the course of the direct examination of defendant, her counsel sought to elicit testimony tending to establish a second defense, namely, that defendant revoked the listing contract within one week after the expiration of the thirtyday period mentioned in the contract. The contract, dated June 28, 1947, contained the following provision: 'This authority to be for a period of 30 days and to continue until revoked by me.' Defendant's answer specifically denied the execution of the contract as alleged in plaintiff's petition; it did not set up the defense of revocation. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the testimony referred to above on the ground 'that the defense of revocation of a contract is in the nature of a confession and avoidance, and must be specially pleaded.' Whereupon, counsel for defendant amended the answer with permission of the court by adding the following: 'The defendant further states that at the time any sale of said property was made or concluded, if any was so made, that the contract, if any, as contained in plaintiff's petition was not in effect, and had been revoked by the defendant within one week after the expiration of the thirty-day period as contained within the contract.'
Defendant then testified that 'about the first week in August' 1947, she called the Merl Brewer agency by telephone and told some unidentified person who answered the call to take the property off the market; that her friend, Mrs. Juanita Haun, was with her at the time. This testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Haun who stated that she was at defendant's home when the call was made, and that the incident occurred during the first week of August, 1947, Defendant further testified that she told Jay to take the property off the...
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