Brewer v. PACCAR, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2019
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CT-451
• Citation: 124 N.E.3d 616
• Parties: Angela BREWER, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Rickey A. Brewer, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff) v. PACCAR, INC. d/b/a Peterbilt Motors Co., Appellee (Defendant)
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

124 N.E.3d 616

Angela BREWER, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Rickey A. Brewer, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff)

v.PACCAR, INC. d/b/a Peterbilt Motors Co., Appellee (Defendant)

Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CT-451

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: October 25, 2018

Filed June 17, 2019

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT, John P. Daly, Jr., Jared A. Harts, Golitko & Daly, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE, Jeffrey J. Mortier, Maggie L. Smith, Blake N. Shelby, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE INDIANA LEGAL FOUNDATION, Mark J. Crandley, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 55A05-1709-CT-2168

Rush, Chief Justice.

In Indiana, when an individual is injured by a defectively designed product, the Indiana Product Liability Act (IPLA) provides a basis for relief. The injured party may bring a defective-design claim against the manufacturers of a component part, as well as of the final product.

Today we address a narrow question regarding an IPLA design-defect claim: when does a component-part manufacturer owe no duty, as a matter of law, to install safety features that an injured party alleges are necessary?

PACCAR is the manufacturer of a "glider kit," a component part that becomes an operable over-the-road semi-truck after a purchaser installs an engine, transmission, and exhaust system. The glider kit has a forty-foot blind spot behind it; and it is PACCAR's standard practice not to include certain safety features to mitigate that danger, unless a customer specifically requests them.

Here, a driver backed up a semi with an integrated PACCAR glider kit and struck and killed construction foreman Rickey Brewer. His widow asserted a design-defect claim against PACCAR, alleging that the lack of certain safety features rendered the glider kit defective. PACCAR argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because it owed no duty, as a matter of law, to install those safety features—because this duty fell solely on the final manufacturer of the completed semi.

Under these circumstances, PACCAR, as the component-part manufacturer, is not entitled to summary judgment. Its glider kit was not going to be incorporated into an end product that had multiple anticipated configurations. Rather, the component part had one reasonably foreseeable use: to be integrated into an operable over-the-road semi. Thus, PACCAR had to make one of two showings to be relieved of a duty, as a matter of law, to include the allegedly necessary safety features. It made neither.

PACCAR did not show that the final manufacturer was offered, and declined, the allegedly necessary safety features or that the integrated glider kit can be used safely without them. Thus, whether PACCAR owed Brewer a duty to include the features is a question for the trier of fact.

Finally, while PACCAR may assert a sophisticated-user defense against the design-defect claim, the merits of that defense are likewise a question for the trier of fact. We accordingly reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment for PACCAR.

Facts and Procedural History

PACCAR manufactures vehicles and parts that W & W Transport uses to conduct its trucking operations. One PACCAR product that W & W purchases is a glider kit—the body and frame of a semi-truck. W & W purchases glider kits, as opposed to new vehicles, so that it can install its preferred engines, producing more fuel-efficient semis that are easier to maintain.

In 2015, W & W bought a PACCAR sleeper-cab glider kit, and installed an engine, transmission, and exhaust system, rendering the glider kit an operable over-the-road semi-truck.

The glider kit created a forty-foot blind spot directly behind the semi. But PACCAR did not include certain safety features—such as a rear-view window, a backup alarm, a backup camera, or backup flashers—to alleviate the dangers associated with the blind spot when the semi is reversed. And PACCAR and W & W disagree about whether PACCAR offered these features as options.

The following year, W & W employee Raymond Miller was backing up the completed semi at a construction site. He felt a nudge, which is normally "nothing unusual." But he was immediately alerted by a man pounding on his window, urging him to pull forward. Construction foreman Rickey Brewer had been pinned between the back of the truck and a trailer and died from his injuries.

Rickey's widow, Angela Brewer, filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against PACCAR. She asserted, in part, a defective-design claim under the IPLA,¹ alleging that PACCAR's glider kit was unreasonably dangerous and defective because it lacked certain safety features and warnings relating to the blind spot.

PACCAR moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty, as a matter of law, to install those safety features. To that end, PACCAR argued that it did not manufacture the completed semi and that the glider kit was not defective or unreasonably dangerous when it left PACCAR's control. In support, PACCAR included two affidavits from one of its engineers, who stated that safety features were options for buyers to order, and that PACCAR built the glider kit to W & W's design specifications.

In response, Brewer argued that summary judgment was inappropriate. She reasoned that there was evidence the glider kit was defective under the IPLA because it lacked a rear-view window, a backup alarm, a backup camera, backup flashers, and warnings relating to the blind spot. In support, she designated evidence including testimony and a report prepared by an expert in auto-safety design. The expert opined that the glider kit was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because it lacked adequate backup safety devices as standard installations.²

The trial court held a hearing on both PACCAR's motion for summary judgment and Brewer's later cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Brewer argued in her cross-motion that under the IPLA, PACCAR owed a duty to Rickey as a bystander. The court granted PACCAR's motion for summary judgment and denied Brewer's cross-motion. Brewer appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed. It first held that summary judgment in PACCAR's favor was improper because "it should be a question of fact as to whether it was reasonable for PACCAR to put a product into the stream of commerce that lacked one or several" safety features. Brewer v. PACCAR, Inc. , 98 N.E.3d 83, 93 (Ind. Ct. App.), aff'd on reh'g , 104 N.E.3d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). It then addressed Brewer's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, explaining "there should be no dispute that the IPLA applies to [Brewer's] claims against PACCAR." Id. at 97.

PACCAR petitioned to transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).³

Standard of Review

We review summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in Brewer's favor. See Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship , 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016). The standard is the same on appeal as it is for the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only when the designated evidence "shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

Discussion and Decision

The IPLA subjects a manufacturer of "a product or a component part of a product ," Ind. Code § 34-6-2-77 (2018) (emphasis added), to liability for physical harm caused by a manufacturer placing "into the stream of commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer," I.C. § 34-20-2-1. See also I.C. § 34-20-1-1. A product may be defective under the IPLA if it is defectively designed, if it has a manufacturing flaw, or if it lacks adequate warnings about dangers associated with its use. See I.C. §§ 34-20-4-1, -2; see also, e.g. , Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson , 109 N.E.3d 953, 956 (Ind. 2018).

Here, Brewer's IPLA claim asserts that PACCAR's glider kit was defectively designed because it lacked certain safety features to reduce the danger inherent in its forty-foot blind spot. Because a design-defect claim is based in negligence, Brewer must establish that (1) PACCAR owed a duty to Rickey; (2) PACCAR breached that duty; and (3) the breach proximately caused an injury to Rickey. See I.C. § 34-20-2-2 ; Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford , 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007). The only element at issue today is duty—whether PACCAR lacked a duty, as a matter of law, to install certain safety features. See Kennedy v. Guess, Inc. , 806 N.E.2d 776, 783 (Ind. 2004).

PACCAR acknowledges that component-part manufacturers may be liable for negligence under the IPLA—but it asserts that summary judgment is appropriate here because it had no duty, as a matter of law, to include the safety features that Brewer alleges were necessary. Brewer counters that summary judgment in PACCAR's favor is improper because the designated evidence shows the glider kit was defective when it left PACCAR's control—given PACCAR's failure to include certain safety features.

Indiana caselaw on this issue—when a component-part manufacturer has a duty under the IPLA to include safety features—is sparse. But it has established that, under the IPLA, component-part manufacturers may have no duty, as a matter of law, to install safety features when the component part can be put to a variety of uses that prevent the component manufacturer from reasonably knowing whether and how safety features should be included. See Shanks v. A.F.E. Indus. , 275 Ind. 241, 249–50, 416 N.E.2d 833, 838 (1981) ; Del Signore v. Asphalt Drum Mixers , 182 F. Supp. 2d 730, 745–46 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (applying Indiana law). In those cases, the duty to install safety features, if it exists at all, falls on the final manufacturer and not the component-part manufacturer. See Shanks , 275 Ind. at 250–51, 416 N.E.2d at 838 ; Del Signore , 182 F. Supp. 2d...