Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship

Decision Date28 April 2016
Docket NumberNo. 49S05–1604–CT–219.,49S05–1604–CT–219.
Citation51 N.E.3d 1184
Parties Kathy L. SINER, Personal Representative of the Estate of Geraldine A. Siner, Deceased, and John T. Siner, Prior Enduring Power of Attorney and Medical Representative of the Deceased, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. KINDRED HOSPITAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, d/b/a Kindred Hospital of Indianapolis, et al., Mohammed A. Majid, M.D., Dennis Nicely, David Uhrin, R.N., Appellees–Defendants.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Kathy L. Siner, John T. Siner, Indianapolis, IN, Appellants pro se.

Melinda R. Shapiro, Libby Y. Goodknight, Lauren C. Sorrell, Krieg Devault LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees Kindred Hospital, Dennis Nicely, and David Uhrin.

Michael Roth, Brett T. Clayton, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Mohammed Majid.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05–1404–CT–165

RUSH, Chief Justice.

To obtain summary judgment in Indiana, a moving party must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of the opposing party's claim. Conflicting affidavits regarding an element of a claim cannot satisfy this burden because they create a disputed factual issue that must be resolved at trial.

In this medical malpractice case, the defendants' own designated evidence revealed conflicting medical opinions on the element of causation. Because these conflicting opinions create a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is inappropriate and would deny the plaintiffs their rightful day in court. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

Facts and Procedural History

Eighty-three-year-old Geraldine Siner, who had advanced dementia, was admitted to Kindred Hospital in October 2007 for treatment of aspiration pneumonia. She was unable to make her own medical decisions during her stay, but her son John Siner was her designated health care representative and had been appointed power of attorney in 1996.

Both John and his sister Kathy Siner consistently instructed the care providers, including the attending physician Dr. Mohammed Majid, to classify their mother as “full code” so she would receive all life-sustaining therapies in the event of cardiac or pulmonary arrest. But Kindred Hospital's Ethics Committee reviewed the family's decision, noting that Geraldine Siner's condition was unlikely to improve, that [t]he greatest benefit with least burden [was] to make the patient a no code,” and that the family had “unrealistic expectations and strong religious beliefs.” The Ethics Committee ultimately overruled the “full code” decision in mid-November—acknowledging [l]egal concerns with changing code status despite family opposition”—and changed Geraldine Siner's classification to “no code,” so that she would not receive any life-sustaining therapies.

After Kathy Siner was told that she needed to find another hospital and doctor” if she wanted her mother to remain “full code,” John and Kathy Siner arranged for a transfer to Methodist Hospital. When Geraldine Siner arrived at Methodist Hospital on December 8, 2007, she required immediate treatment for a collapsed lung and was suffering from wounds on her cheeks, overwhelming infection, and septic shock. She died twenty days later.

In November 2009, Kathy Siner filed a medical malpractice complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance against Kindred Hospital and several of its employees (collectively, Kindred) and Dr. Majid. A medical review panel issued a unanimous opinion “that the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, and that their conduct may have been a factor of some resultant damages, but not the death of the patient.” John and Kathy Siner then filed this medical malpractice suit pro se, alleging that the defendants “failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances, proximately resulting in injuries and damages of a nature requiring compensation.”

Kindred and Dr. Majid separately moved for summary judgment. Each designated as evidence the medical review panel's opinion, as well as affidavits from Dr. James Krueger—one of the members of the panel—saying that in his opinion Kindred and Dr. Majid “did not cause injury to Ms. Siner” in administering her pulmonary care.1 Kindred and Dr. Majid argued that Dr. Krueger's affidavits shifted the burden to the Siners to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation and that the medical review panel's opinion could not satisfy that burden because it was too speculative to provide affirmative evidence of proximate cause.

The Siners responded to both motions for summary judgment. They designated affidavits regarding Geraldine Siner's care from two additional doctors—Dr. Lawrence Reed II and Dr. Timothy Pohlman—in their response to Kindred's motion, but not to Dr. Majid's motion. The trial court granted Dr. Majid's motion for summary judgment because the Siners had not designated any expert testimony on the causation element. The court likewise granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, determining that because Dr. Reed's and Dr. Pohlman's affidavits did not address the issue of causation, the Siners failed to show a genuine issue of material fact on that element of their medical malpractice claims. The Siners appealed the grants of summary judgment as pro se appellants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part in a divided opinion. Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 33 N.E.3d 377 (Ind.Ct.App.2015).

The Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed summary judgment for Kindred after determining that Dr. Pohlman's affidavit did, in fact, create a genuine issue of fact on proximate cause. Id. at 384 (majority opinion); Siner, 33 N.E.3d at 386 (Kirsch, J., dissenting). The majority, however, affirmed summary judgment for Dr. Majid because the Siners did not designate Dr. Pohlman's affidavit as evidence when responding to Dr. Majid's motion. Siner, 33 N.E.3d at 385 (majority opinion). The majority also noted that the medical review panel's opinion—that the defendants' “conduct may have been a factor of some resultant damages”—was too speculative regarding causation to support a verdict and thus could not create a genuine issue of material fact for summary judgment. Id. Judge Kirsch dissented from the majority's decision regarding Dr. Majid, arguing that even if one member of a medical review panel could later undermine the panel's previous unanimous opinion, the contradiction creates a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 386 (Kirsch, J., dissenting).

The Siners petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, vacating the Court of Appeals decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). For the reasons explained below, we reverse the trial court's grants of summary judgment to Kindred and Dr. Majid.2

Standard of Review

Our summary judgment standard of review is well settled. We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and affirm summary judgment only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) ; see also, e.g., Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind.2014). And we “give careful scrutiny to assure that the losing party is not improperly prevented from having its day in court.” Tankersley v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., 791 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ind.2003) (citing Landmark Health Care Assocs. L.P. v. Bradbury, 671 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ind.1996) ).

To that end, Indiana's distinctive summary judgment standard imposes a heavy factual burden on the movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of the claim. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003. For a medical malpractice claim, those elements are (1) that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the physician breached that duty; and (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386 (Ind.1995). A “unanimous opinion of the medical review panel in favor of the movant is “ordinarily sufficient” to meet this initial burden, requiring the non-movant to rebut the medical panel opinion with expert medical testimony. Stafford v. Szymanowski, 31 N.E.3d 959, 961 (Ind.2015). But cases hinging on disputed material facts are by definition inappropriate for summary judgment, because weighing evidence is “a matter for trial, not summary judgment.” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1005–06 ; In re Ind. State Fair Litig., No. 49S02–1601–CT–51, 49 N.E.3d 545, 547–48, 2016 WL 348155, at *2 (Ind. Jan. 28, 2016).

Discussion and Decision

Kindred and Dr. Majid, as the summary judgment movants, had the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of the Siners' medical malpractice claims. See Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind.2013). Establishing this prima facie case is typically “only the beginning of the story,” but here Kindred and Dr. Majid failed to carry even this initial burden, making summary judgment inappropriate. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004.

I. Defendants Must Affirmatively Negate the Plaintiffs' Claims in Order to Merit Summary Judgment.

Because Kindred and Dr. Majid moved for summary judgment, they bear the burden of “affirmatively negating” at least one element of the Siners' claims. Schmidt v. Ind. Ins. Co., 45 N.E.3d 781, 785 (Ind.2015). They argue that Dr. Krueger's affidavits satisfy that burden by demonstrating that Kindred and Dr. Majid did not cause injury to Geraldine Siner. But Dr. Krueger's affidavits do not address all of the Siners' claims.

In their complaint, the Siners allege malpractice “on multiple acts or occurrences,” resulting in “multiple injuries to [Geraldine Siner's] nervous system, respiratory system, cardiovascular system, [and] musculoskeletal system”;...

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