Brewer v. Simmons

• Decision Date: 02 December 1964
• Docket Number: No. 3569.,3569.
• Citation: 205 A.2d 60
• Parties: Donald D. BREWER, Director, Department of Public Welfare, District of Columbia, Appellant, v. Marie SIMMONS and Henry Simmons, Jr. Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 60

205 A.2d 60

Donald D. BREWER, Director, Department of Public Welfare, District of Columbia, Appellant, v. Marie SIMMONS and Henry Simmons, Jr. Appellees.

No. 3569.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 9, 1964.

Decided December 2, 1964.

John R. Hess, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Chester H. Gray, Corp. Counsel, Milton D. Korman, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Hubert B. Pair, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for appellant.

Marie S. Klooz, Washington, D. C., for appellee Marie Simmons.

Winfred R. Mundle, Washington, D. C., for appellee Henry Simmons, Jr.

David Carliner and William Beasley Harris, Washington, D. C., with leave of court filed a brief for the National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae, urging affirmance.

Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.

MYERS, Associate Judge:

This appeal followed issuance of an order in the Domestic Relations Branch permanently enjoining the Department of Public Welfare of the District of Columbia, and all subordinates and agents acting for said Department, from discontinuing welfare payments to a wife and minor children.

Without waiving other bases of error, the fundamental contention of the Department of Public Welfare, through its Director, is that the Domestic Relations Branch lacks primary or general equity power to issue an injunction interfering with the administration of the public welfare laws of the District of Columbia. The husband and wife, on the other hand, joining in support of the injunctive relief granted sua sponte by the trial judge, argue that the order is within the statutory powers vested in the Domestic. Relations Branch, in the exercise of its delegated authority, whether in law or in equity, as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of its creative act, including exclusive jurisdiction over support and property rights of minor children. They also argue that the proposed action by the Department was against the public policy of this jurisdiction and that the minor children here involved would suffer irreparable injury if the welfare payments contributed for their support were terminated.

We first consider the steps taken to date in the pending litigation. The cause of action initiated by the wife, without prepayment of costs, sought maintenance for herself and support for nine minor children ranging in age from two years to eighteen years. She complained that the husband, although earning about $106 a week, plus overtime, had failed and refused to adequately support his family, which was not separated at that time but lived together in the same marital abode. No answer was filed by the husband and, upon entry of default and after a hearing, an order was entered February 15, 1962, finding that he had failed and refused to adequately support his family and, although he was temporarily unemployed due to a recent leg injury, the court directed him to pay from the check he was receiving from his local union under a member's disability plan $34.00 per week as temporary support for the family.

It appears that as of November 7, 1963, he was delinquent in the amount of $1,778.-00 and on that date an order was issued finding him in contempt of the order of support and committing him to jail for 120 days or until such earlier time as he should purge himself by paying the arrearages. Execution of the commitment was stayed as long as he paid regularly the $34.00 per week originally awarded plus $16.00 per week to discharge the accumulated arrearages. The order further provided that he report to the United States Marshal for confinement to jail for five weekends and for release therefrom Mondays through Fridays.

On May 13, 1964, the wife filed a motion to modify the order of February 15, 1962, by setting specific times for visitation by the husband to the marital abode and requesting that he be ordered "not to molest her and the children by coming to the house at any other time, day or night." The reasons for this request as given by the wife at the hearing on the motion were set forth in the Opinion and Order of the court dated May 28, 1964.

"* * * She also states she receives Aid for Dependent Children from the Department of Public Welfare and without this assistance she could not maintain her family. Plaintiff in effect is asking this Court, however, to restrain the defendant from visiting with her or with his children, except during certain brief specified periods. The reason for this request is her apprehension that she will be deprived of the assistance being furnished by the Department of Public Welfare, by virtue of the policies set forth in the `Handbook of Policies of the Department of Public Welfare.' Plaintiff also states she does not want the defendant around the home or to associate with her or the children while he is under the influence of alcohol."

The court then concluded:

"It is obvious from the evidence of record that the children herein could not be supported without the aid from the Department of Public Welfare. It also seems clear that this aid ought not to be forthcoming only at the price of disassociation of the family. Any such policy of the Department of Public Welfare which would deprive the children of that support because of visits from their father would be against public policy."

In addition to prohibiting the husband from the use of any intoxicants immediately before and during visits to his family and from physically molesting them, but overruling the request for limiting the times for visitation, the court sua sponte ordered the Department of Public Welfare to show cause why it should not be enjoined from "in any way interfering with the dependency status of the [wife] and her children, or depriving the [wife] and her children of Welfare benefits, solely because of the visits of the [husband], or his presence in the home." The court also ordered that the Department be temporarily restrained from taking any action which would interfere with the dependency status of the wife and children.

On behalf of the Department of Public Welfare, its Director filed an answer challenging the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the matter, asserting that the wife's apprehension that she might be deprived of assistance being furnished her was without foundation and that adequate administrative remedies were available which must be exhausted before she may resort to judicial review. The Director moved to vacate the temporary restraining order and to quash the Rule to Show Cause on the same...