In re Buchanan, Case No. 2015 DRB 4111
| Decision Date | 18 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2015 DRB 4111 |
| Parties | Donald Ray Buchanan Petitioner, and Thomas Ainora Petitioner. |
| Court | D.C. Superior Court |
On February 19, 2016, the Court held a hearing on Petitioner Donald Ray Buchanan and Thomas Ainora's Consent Petition for Termination of Parental Rights, filed November 25, 2015. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court granted the petition and issued a short written Order terminating Mr. Ainora's parental rights over Mr. Buchanan, with a written Memorandum Opinion to follow, which the Court now issues.
Mr. Ainora and Mr. Buchanan testified that they have been in romantic relationship for over thirty years. In 2002, the parties, who then were living in Maryland, entered into an adult adoption, with Mr. Ainora adopting Mr. Buchanan, because they were unable to marry in any state in the United States, and they wished to obtain legal protections so that they could visit one another in the hospital, inherit property from one another, and generally help take care of one another as they aged. The adoption was issued in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland on July 3, 2002.
Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Ainora now reside in the District of Columbia and have lived in this jurisdiction since 2013. They testified that because same-sex marriage is now legal the District of Columbia they would like to be married and, therefore, filed a consent petition to terminate their legal father-son relationship so that they could then become legally married. The parties testified that they are unable to secure a termination of parental rights in Maryland, where the adoption was issued, as they are both bona fide residents of the District of Columbia.
In their appearance before the Court on February 19, 2016, both parties testified as to their consent to the petition and desire to become legally married to one another.
This Court has the authority to grant the Petitioners' Consent Petition for Termination of Parental Rights under the Court's inherent equitable powers to do that which justice requires and which is not barred by statute. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia has the power in equity to adjudicate any civil action at law, see Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990 (D.C. 1979); Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 1 (2015), with the equitable powers to "effectively carry out the purposes of its creative statute." Leftwich v. Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139, 143 (D.C. 1982) (citing Brewer v. Simmons, 205 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1964). The Domestic Relations Branch of this Court, in particular, has equitable jurisdiction over adoption and family matters. In Brewer v. Simmons, 205 A.2d 60, 63 (D.C. 1964), the D.C. Court of Appeals stated:
By its separate creative statute, the Domestic Relations Branch has exclusive jurisdiction over adoption, support, custody and property rights of minor children and possesses all legal and equitable powers necessary to effectuate these purposes. In that respect, it has been held that the Branch "has the general equitable power which the District Court formerly had in dealing with such problems to give such relief as it finds is required under the circumstances." (quoting David v. Blumenthal, 292 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1961)) (emphasis added)
This Court has exercised its equitable powers in cases concerning parental rights and family matters in general in the past. In Felder v. Allsopp, 391 A.2d 243 (D.C. 1978), the D.C. Court of Appeals held that an action for visitation rights by one who claimed to be the father of achild could be brought under the equitable powers of the Superior Court despite the fact that "proceedings . . . to establish parentage" brought pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-2342 (1973) were governed by a two-year statute of limitations which the father could not meet, because the Code was silent regarding statutes of limitations for visitation actions, and thus the Superior Court could act in equity. Similarly, in In re D.M., 562 A.2d 618 (D.C. 1989), this Court was held to have equitable jurisdiction to consider paternity independent of a request for child support, custody, or divorce, as nothing in the Code specifically restricted such. Additionally, in Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775 (D.C. 1996), the D.C. Court of Appeals held that the Superior Court's power to adjudicate custody disputes between unmarried parents is based on its general equitable powers, even though the statutes that then addressed temporary or permanent custody referred only to married persons. In so deciding, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated specifically that "[T]he question is not whether the court has authority granted by statute but whether the legislature has sought to limit the court's inherent authority." Id. at 778. When the legislature has not so limited the Court's authority, this Court may exercise its inherent equitable powers to provide relief.
Although the District of Columbia Code does outline some restrictions with regard to terminating parental rights, at D.C. Code §§ 16-2351 (2015), et seq., under the Subchapter titled, "Proceedings Regarding the Termination of Parental Rights of Certain Neglected Children," such restrictions do not apply to the Court in this case, because the purposes of this Subchapter are unrelated to the circumstances of this case. The Subchapter does not contemplate a situation where both parties to the adult-child relationship are adults, particularly where one adult adopted another when the two were in a romantic relationship, in order to protect one another in the absence of available marriage rights, and therefore the Court may exercise its equitable powersin this case.
Under D.C. Code § 16-2351, the purposes of this Subchapter are to:
These stated "purposes" for D.C. Code §§ 16-2351 (2015), et seq., only contemplate terminating parental rights over minor children, who must be placed with another family or become a ward of the state, and whose parents do not consent to such termination. These statutes clearly do not contemplate terminating parental rights over adults who are self-sufficient and legally independent of their parents, and who would only gain rights upon such termination (through marriage, in this case). None of these stated "purposes" are relevant to the parties' situation.
In this case, Mr. Buchanan is not a "child" who must be placed with a family, but rather is a sixty-seven year old adult who has not been in any party's "custody" since the age of eighteen, and whose natural parents had already passed as of the time of his adoption by Mr. Ainora in 2002. See 2002 Judgment of Adoption at Exhibit 1 of Consent Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. In addition, all parties consent to this termination, so that no party's constitutional rights are being infringed upon. As such, the stated purposes of D.C. Code § 16-2351, et seq., do not contemplate termination of parental rights for individuals in the parties' situation, and the legislature has thus not sought to limit the court's inherent authority togrant such a termination, as stated in Ysla, 684 A.2d at 775. Because the Court is not restricted by statute, it may therefore exercise its equitable powers and grant this Consent Petition for Termination of Parental Rights.
is in Mr. Buchanan's Best Interests
Even if this Court had determined that it was bound by the D.C. Code regarding termination of parental rights in this matter, this Court would still grant the parties' Petition. Under D.C. Code § 16-2353(a) (2015), "A judge may enter an order for the termination of the parent and child relationship when the judge finds from the evidence presented, after giving due consideration to the interests of all parties, that the termination is in the best interests of the child." Here it is in Mr. Buchanan's best interests that Mr. Ainora's parental rights be terminated so that the parties are able to marry.
Whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a 'child' is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See In re A.C.G., 894 A.2d 436 (D.C. 2006); In re C.T., 724 A.2d 590 (D.C. 1999); In re I.B., 631 A.2d 1225 (D.C. 1993). The Court has wide latitude in applying the statutory criteria to determine whether termination of parental rights is in the 'child's' best interests, see In re F.N.B., 706 A.2d 28; In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470 (D.C. 1996). In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, what is relevant to trial court's decision is quality of the specific relationship at issue, not some generalized view of the importance of a parent's interest in child. See, e.g., In re M.M.M., 485 A.2d 180 (D.C. 1984) (emphasis added).
In this case, terminating Mr. Ainora's parental rights over Mr. Buchanan is entirely in Mr. Buchanan's best interests, both under the...
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