Brewer v. Valk
Decision Date | 08 February 1933 |
Docket Number | 363. |
Parties | 204 N.C. 186, 87 A.L.R. 237 v. VALK et al. BREWER |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Forsyth County; Stack, Judge.
Suit by Mary Brewer, by her next friend, Mrs. W. E. Oldham, against Dr. A. DeT. Valk and others. From a judgment for plaintiff defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
This is a civil action had before his honor, A. M. Stack, judge presiding at the October term, 1932, of the superior court of Forsyth county, on complaint of the plaintiff for a permanent restraining order enjoining and restraining Dr. A. DeT. Valk from proceeding with an operation to asexualize or sterilize Mary Brewer under authority of chapter 43, article 6 entitled "Sterilization of Persons Mentally Defective." See Michie's N.C. Code of 1931, §§ 2304(h)-2304(l).
The complaint is as follows: The judgment of the court below is as follows: "This cause coming on to be heard and being heard before His Honor, A. M. Stack, Judge presiding at the October 3rd Term of the Superior Court of Forsyth County, and it appearing that a temporary injunction was signed on October 6, 1932, upon a bill for injunction having been filed restraining the defendants from sterilizing the person of Mary Brewer, under authority of Section 2304(i) of the Consolidated Statutes and of the sections following; and it appearing that ten days notice was given to the defendants in which to answer or show cause why this restraining order should not be made permanent; and it further appearing that defendants waived the ten days notice and voluntarily appeared in court on Saturday, October 8, 1932, at 9:30 A. M., for the purpose of a hearing on the above restraining order; and it further appearing to the court that said statute is invalid and unconstitutional for that it fails to give plaintiff notice of the said operation, an opportunity to present witnesses and be heard, and it thereby violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and section 1, article 17 of the Constitution of North Carolina: It is, therefore, ordered, considered, adjudged and decreed, that the restraining order heretofore signed on the 6th day of October, 1932, be, and the same is hereby continued and made permanent and the defendants are forever enjoined from sterilizing the said Mary Brewer, or perform upon her person any operation under the authority of Section 2304(i) of the Consolidated Statutes and the sections following, which might impair her procreative organs."
To the signing of the foregoing judgment, the defendants excepted, assigned error, and appealed to the Supreme Court.
Fred S. Hutchins, of Winston-Salem, E. C. Bryson, of Bryson City, and T. Spruill Thornton, for appellants.
Hanselle L. Hester, of Winston-Salem, Gordon E. Dean, of Durham, and William C. Lassiter, of Smithfield, for appellee.
The question involved: Is chapter 43, article 6, entitled "Sterilization of Persons mentally defective" (Michie's N.C. Code of 1931, §§ 2304(i) and 2304(j), Public Laws of 1929, c. 34, §§ 2 and 3), unconstitutional, in that it failed to give this plaintiff notice and a hearing of the proposed operation, an opportunity to present witnesses and be heard, and thereby violates the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and article 1, § 17, Constitution of North Carolina? We think so.
The sections are as follows:
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 14, § 1, is as follows:
Constitution of North Carolina, art. 1, § 17, is as follows: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land." We shall also quote article 1, § 29: "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty."
The defendants contend that the statute now under consideration comes within the police power of the state--promotion of general welfare--and is constitutional. The courts have been unable or unwilling definitely to circumscribe police powers.
The principle is well stated in 6 R. C. L. (Police Power) § 182, pp. 183, 184: "The police power is an attribute of sovereignty, possessed by every sovereign state, and is a necessary attribute of every civilized government. It is inherent in the states of the American Union and is not a grant derived from or under any written constitution. It has been said that the very existence of government depends on it, as well as the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, and the enjoyment of private and social life and the beneficial use of property.
It has been described as the most essential, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government." Part section 190, p. 191 ...
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