Brewster v. County of Shasta

• Decision Date: 22 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.S-98-2157 LKK/PAN.,CIV.S-98-2157 LKK/PAN.
• Citation: 112 F.Supp.2d 1185
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Thomas BREWSTER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SHASTA, a public entity; Shasta County Sheriff's Department, a public entity; Brad McDannold, an individual; D. Compomizzo, an individual; California Department of Justice, a public entity, Defendants.

112 F.Supp.2d 1185

Thomas BREWSTER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SHASTA, a public entity; Shasta County Sheriff's Department, a public entity; Brad McDannold, an individual; D. Compomizzo, an individual; California Department of Justice, a public entity, Defendants.

No. CIV.S-98-2157 LKK/PAN.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

September 22, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Alan Prentice, Prentice and Schaap, Sacramento, CA, for Thomas Brewster.

John H. Hager, Jr., Law Offices of John Hager, San Francisco, CA, for Shasta County, Shasta County Sheriff's Dept., Brad McDannold, D. Compomizzo.

ORDER

KARLTON, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff sues the County of Shasta and two deputies of the Shasta County Sheriff's Department alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. He argues that the County of Shasta is liable for injuries caused by the execution of the Shasta County Sheriff's policies concerning suspect arrests and crime investigations because the Sheriff is a final policymaker for County. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The County moves for summary judgment and contends that California sheriffs represent the state and not the county when they effectuate arrests and investigate crimes, and thus the County cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for plaintiff's alleged injuries. Below, I resolve that claim.¹ As I now explain, however, the law relative to this issue is less than pellucid.

It is established that states are not amenable to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). It is equally well established, however, that county governments and their law enforcement agencies may be sued for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F.Supp. 1435, 1451 (E.D.Cal. 1995).

While a county may be sued under § 1983, it is not liable "solely because it employs a tortfeasor...." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to present official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Because the county must be the "moving force" behind the injury in order to be liable, Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (citation omitted), a county is not liable for the conduct of a nominal county official who, in fact, acts as a state official. See McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). Moreover, because a suit for damages against state officials in their official capacities is, in effect, a suit against the state, the Eleventh Amendment bars such an action. See id.²

The determination of whether a county official acts for the state or for the county is a question of law, see Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), which, as a first consideration, turns on how the state defines the official's functions. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734.³ Because initially state law defines the relationship of sheriffs to the state, a determination of that relationship may vary from one jurisdiction to another.⁴ Thus, to resolve the present motion I must turn to California law to determine the status of a county sheriff. As will become apparent, California has not addressed this question with a single voice or a single answer.⁵

Subsequent to McMillian, the California Supreme Court, analyzing the California Constitution and various California statutes, concluded that a district attorney represents the State when prosecuting crimes and when training employees concerning the prosecution of crimes. See Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 353, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920 (1998). A California Court of Appeal, analyzing the same state law provisions addressed in Pitts, and noting that the words "sheriff" and "district attorney" appear in tandem in many of the cited authorities, concluded that California county sheriffs act as state officials when they establish policies concerning the release of persons from county jails. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Aangeles (Peters), 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1174, 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 860 (1998).⁶

The Peters Court cited article V, section 13 of the California Constitution⁷ and Cal. Gov't Code § 12560⁸ which generally provide that sheriffs are under the supervision of the State Attorney General. The Peters Court also cited Cal. Gov't Code § 26600 which "imposes on county sheriffs the duty to enforce criminal law" and Cal. Gov't Code § 25303 which provides that county boards of supervisors may not, pursuant to their general powers of supervision over county officers, "affect the independent and constitutionally and statutorily designated investigative and prosecutorial functions of the sheriff...." Id. at 1175, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.

While Pitts and Peters are suggestive of the resolution of the issue at bar, they are not directly determinative as Pitts deals with district attorneys and Peters addresses the function of California sheriffs relative to administering county jails.⁹ Moreover, as I now demonstrate, other California cases demonstrate that there is significant ambiguity as to the status of sheriffs under California law.

In Dibb v. County of San Diego, 8 Cal.4th 1200, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 55, 884 P.2d 1003 (1994), the California Supreme Court upheld the right of San Diego County to establish a citizen police review board to consider public complaints about the county sheriff's department. In doing so, the court cited to Cal. Gov't Code § 25303¹⁰ and rejected the argument that § 25303 limited the county's authority to monitor county officers solely to their fiscal conduct. See id. at 1209, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 55, 884 P.2d 1003. Rather, the court observed that, under that statute, a county board of supervisors has the power "to supervise the county officials in order to assure that they faithfully perform their duties." Id. at 1209, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 55, 884 P.2d 1003 (citing People v. Langdon, 54 Cal.App.3d 384, 390, 126 Cal.Rptr. 575 (1976)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The court further explained that "the operations of the sheriff's department ... and the conduct of employees of th[at] department[] are a legitimate concern of the board of supervisors." Dibb, 8 Cal.4th at 1209, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 55, 884 P.2d 1003. The court did not perceive that these general supervisorial powers were in conflict with the obligation of the board not to obstruct the sheriff's office's investigative function. See id. at 1210-14, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 55, 884 P.2d 1003.¹¹ Moreover, as long ago as 1942, a California court of appeals concluded that supervision by the Attorney General does not alter the status of sheriffs as elected county officials. See People v. Brophy, 49 Cal.App.2d 15, 27, 120 P.2d 946 (1942). The Brophy Court explained:

Manifestly "direct supervision [by the Attorney General under article V, section 21 of the California Constitution¹²] over every ... sheriff ..." does not contemplate absolute control and direction of such officials. Especially is this true as to sheriffs

... as the provision plainly indicates. These officials are public officers, as distinguished from mere employees, with public duties delegated and entrusted to them, as agents, the performance of which is an exercise of a part of the governmental functions of the particular political unit for which they, as agents, are active.¹³

Id.

In sum, while Pitts addresses the status of California district attorneys and Peters addresses sheriffs only in their function as jail administrators, Dibb, represents a direct holding concerning the relationship of county boards of supervisors to sheriffs, but also in a different context, and Brophy addresses the relationship of the Attorney General to sheriffs. Under the circumstances, this court must conclude that whether California county sheriffs, when investigating crimes, are county or state officials under California law is unsettled.

As noted above, California's statutory law is also not dispositive. Although under Cal. Gov't Code § 24000 "the officers of the county [include a] sheriff," as noted above the power of boards of supervisors over sheriffs in their investigative function is, by statute, significantly limited.¹⁴

The uncertain status of California sheriffs under the state's law led this court to seek information concerning another criterion established by the McMillian case. The Supreme Court observed that another way of ascertaining the status of a nominal county official is an inquiry into the actual function of the official. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734.¹⁵ In that light, this court referred the matter back to the parties for further briefing on the actual practice. Unfortunately, neither party has provided the court with evidence concerning the Attorney General's supervision of the sheriff of Shasta County in his investigative function. There is no evidence about how frequently, if ever, the Attorney General actually supervises the sheriff's conduct of his office, reviews policies adopted by the sheriff, or otherwise limits the discretion of the sheriff as to how his officers shall conduct investigations.¹⁶

Given the lack of determinative guidance, the question now is how is this court to resolve the issue? If this were a factual issue the mode of resolution would be quite direct: the party bearing the burden of proof, must lose. Here, however, the question is one of law, and thus cannot turn on the burden of persuasion. It appears to this court that the doctrine of stare decisis aids the...