Scott v. Solano County Health and Social Services

• Decision Date: 05 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 06-1216 LKK/EFB.,CIV. 06-1216 LKK/EFB.
• Citation: 459 F.Supp.2d 959
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Tasha SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Solano County, Patrick Duterte and Trish Edie, et al, Defendants.

459 F.Supp.2d 959

Tasha SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Solano County, Patrick Duterte and Trish Edie, et al, Defendants.

No. CIV. 06-1216 LKK/EFB.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

September 5, 2006.

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Marylon M. Boyd, Law Office of Marylon Boyd, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff.

Cori Rae Sarno, Angelo, Kilday & Kilduff, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

KARLTON, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, Tasha Scott ("Scott"), files suit against defendants Solano County, Solano County Health & Social Services Department ("CHSS"), Patrick Duterte (Director of Solano CHSS)¹, and Trish Edie (plaintiffs supervisor), alleging the following claims against all defendants: 1) "Racial and Color Discrimination" (Government Code § 12940, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 2) Harassment/Hostile Work Environment (Government Code § 12940, Title VII); 3) Retaliation (Government Code § 12940); 4) Violation of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; 7) Employment Practices Discipline in Violation of Public Policy; 8) Violation of Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution; 9) Violation of Article 1, Section 8 of the California Constitution; 10) Violation of Government Code § 12948; 11) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; 12) Wrongful Termination; 13) Negligent Hiring, Supervising and/or Training; 14) Defamation.

Defendants move to dismiss all claims, except for claim five (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). I decide the matter based on the pleadings, the parties' papers and after oral argument.²

I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Tasha Scott, is an African — American woman who was employed by defendant, CHSS, as an Employment Resource Specialist from July 9, 2002 until her termination on October 14, 2004. Compl. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that she applied for supervisory positions on or about January 2004 and May 2004, but that less qualified Caucasian individuals were hired for such positions. Id. at 2. She contends that when she complained of race discrimination because "she was more qualified than the person's [sic] hired," she "became a target of retaliation." Id.

Plaintiff maintains that during the course of her employment she objected to violating the rights of her clients by "rushing clients into signing documents stating they read and understood their rights and responsibilities" when many of them could not read or did not understand what they were signing. Compl. at 2. Scott allegedly expressed concern to "lead worker" Dave Madden, who then communicated plaintiffs concerns on or about August 2004 to Trish Edie ("Edie"), plaintiffs supervisor. Plaintiff claims that because of her complaints about rushing clients into signing documents they did not understand, she was "singled out" and "required to go through mandatory new employee training even though she had already been employed more than two years and had exemplary performance." Id.

On September 22, 2004, plaintiff alleges that without any warning or notice, she was removed from her position and "false charges were levied against her," accusing her of "dishonesty and violation of company rules." Compl. at 2. On October 14, 2004, Scott's union representative advised Director, Patrick Duterte, and Human Resource [sic] Manager Wayne Page that there was no evidence that plaintiff "exhibited any dishonesty or lack of integrity or violated any policies." Id. Nevertheless, Scott was terminated by defendant on October 14, 2004. Id.

On December 16, 2005, plaintiff filed the instant suit in Alameda County Superior Court. Plaintiff seeks general, compensatory, special, and punitive damages, front pay and back pay, and attorney's fees. Compl. at 16. On June 5, 2006, defendants removed the action from Alameda County Superior Court to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.³

II.

DISMISSAL STANDARDS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 1461, 10 L.Ed.2d 678 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 10 L.Ed.2d 605 (1963) (inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). So construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiffs allegations, however, it is not proper for the court to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss all but one of plaintiff's fourteen causes of action. The court turns to each cause of action and explains why defendants' motion must be GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.⁴

A. TITLE VII AND FEHA CLAIMS (CLAIMS 1,2,3)

Plaintiffs first claim for relief alleges "Racial and Color discrimination" pursuant to Title VII,⁵ the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")⁶, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁷ Plaintiffs second claim alleges "Harassment/Hostile work environment" under Title VII and FEHA, while her third claim alleges "Retaliation" under FEHA.⁸

Individual defendants Patrick Duterte, Director of CHSS, and Trish Edie, plaintiffs supervisor, move to dismiss the Title VII and FEHA claims asserted against them, arguing that supervisors and other individual employees are not an "employer" as defined under Title VII and FE HA, and thus cannot be held personally liable. Mot. at 4. Defendants maintain that only the county may properly be considered plaintiff's employer.

Defendants are only partially correct. Under Title VII, there is no personal liability for employees. FEHA, however, allows liability to attach to individual employees for harassment and retaliation.

a. Title VII

Under Title VII, there is no personal liability for employees, including supervisors. Miller v. Maxwell's Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1993)665, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109, 114 S.Ct. 1049, 127 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994)("This circuit ... protect[s] supervising employees from liability in their individual capacities").⁹ The Ninth Circuit has also made clear that as to liability under Title VII, "[t]here is no reason to stretch the liability of individual employees beyond the respondent superior principle intended by Congress."¹⁰ Id. at 588. See also Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.1982)("[I]ndividual defendants cannot be held for back pay."). This court is bound by Miller and Padway and must dismiss the Title VII claims contained in causes of action one and two against defendants Duterte and Edie. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588.

b. FEHA

The court must dismiss the FEHA allegations against Edie and Duterte contained in claim one (discrimination), but sustain the FEHA claims against these individuals as to claims two and three (harassment and retaliation, respectively).

i. Discrimination Claim

In Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640, 663, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333 (1998), the California Supreme Court held that supervisors could not be held liable under FEHA's general anti-discrimination provision. The court articulated that it was concerned that "imposing liability on individual supervisory employees would do little to enhance the ability of victims of discrimination to recover monetary damages, while it can reasonably be expected to severely impair the existence of supervisory judgment." Id. at 651-52, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.

According to the court this concern was embodied in FEHA's statutory language and its varying approaches to harassment and discrimination claims. FEHA prohibits "an employer ... or any other person" from harassing an employee, Cal. Gov. § 12940(j)(1), but prohibits only "an employer" from engaging in improper discrimination. Id. at § 12940(a). The court explained that "harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives ... discrimination claims, by contrast, arise out of the performance of necessary personnel management duties." Reno, 18 Cal.4th at 645-46, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333 (quotation omitted). To avoid creating supervisory conflicts of interest and a chilling of effective management, the court concluded that the Legislature did not intend to hold supervisors liable for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 354, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.

In her first claim, plaintiff avers that "[d]efendants and each of them engaged in conduct or carried out affirmative policy or condoned unlawful conduct" pursuant to FEHA. Specifically, she contends that her "race was the motivating factor" in defendants' decision to...