Bridewell v. Pritchett
| Decision Date | 09 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 18000,18000 |
| Citation | 562 S.W.2d 956 |
| Parties | Billy BRIDEWELL, Appellant, v. Emory H. PRITCHETT et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
The appeal is from the denial of injunction to prevent sale of real estate by a trustee under a deed of trust. The application for injunction was ancillary to Billy Bridewell's suit against Emory H. Pritchett and his wife for specific performance of their contract. Joined is the Honorable George Hopkins who but for the injunction would have proceeded to sell the property.
Since this court was of the opinion that consummation of the sale of the real estate by the trustee would constitute interference with this court's jurisdiction of the appeal and result in the destruction of the subject matter we enjoined sale pending hearing of the appeal, and advanced submission. See Padgett v. Mutual Building & Loan Association, 504 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1971, no writ).
Judgment of the trial court in denial of injunction is affirmed. By order of this date our prior injunction is dissolved.
The specific performance sought by Bridewell was for the Pritchetts to consummate a new contract with him to effect cancellation of the attempts to foreclose. The attempted foreclosure was upon real estate which had been purchased by Bridewell from the purchaser from the Pritchetts. In consideration of the Pritchetts' agreement for Bridewell's payment of $300.00 to Hopkins, plus payment of additional agreed amounts to the Pritchetts, all by cashier's checks, it was Bridewell's contention that his own performance or agreement was sufficient to make the contract one he was entitled to enforce.
There had in fact been a purported contract agreed upon by the parties which required performance by Bridewell as understood by him; for which there was to be return performance by the Pritchetts. However, it was the contention of the Pritchetts that Bridewell was lacking in the tender of all performances required of him by his failure and refusal to agree to pay in installments not only the principal amount of a purchase-money note executed by Bridewell's grantor and assumed by Bridewell, but also the future interest to accrue thereon at an increased rate above that provided by the note. Because of dispute over whether Bridewell would be required to agree to pay an increased interest rate appears to have been the sole occasion for the failure of consummation of a new contract. Bridewell contended that such an increase in interest was no part of the obligatory performance by him as his consideration; the Pritchetts contended that it was, and that there was no contract unless Bridewell so agreed.
Prior to time for delivery of the cashier's checks by Bridewell to the office of Mr. Hopkins there was discovery that there had been no specific agreement upon interest to be thereafter paid by Bridewell on the existent note obligation (or on a new note obligation). Hopkins telephoned Bridewell and notified him the amount of interest the Pritchetts required. Here the attempts to consummate a contract ended. Bridewell's suit for specific performance supplanted any further attempt by him. Neither Bridewell nor the Pritchetts have parted with anything.
Neither party has ever changed legal position to his or their detriment because of a belief that a completed contract had been accomplished. By reason of this, perhaps, we could affirm the judgment. See Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 52, "Acceptance of Offer Defined," and § 90, "Promise Reasonably Inducing Definite and Substantial Action." However, we have adopted other reasons for affirmance.
We have concluded that as applied to the equitable proceeding to exact specific performance of contract the matter of interest to be paid by Bridewell was "of the essence" thereof, under the circumstances; that because there had been no "meeting of the minds" by both parties upon the matter of...
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Swinehart v Stubbeman & McRae
...merely because a real estate transaction may be incidentally involved." Id. at 267 (citing Bridewell v. Pritchett, 562 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). We do not agree with Swinehart that the transfer of the working interests in the oil and gas leases und......
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IN RE ACM-TEX., INC.
...material terms. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., Inc. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.1992) (citing Bridewell v. Pritchett, 562 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1978)). Material terms "are those that the parties would reasonably regard as vitally important elements of their barga......
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W.G. Pettigrew Distributing Co. v. Borden, Inc.
...Borden, PDI must tender evidence to demonstrate that a contract did, indeed, exit. See, e.g., Bridewell v. Pritchett, 562 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The facts revealed in the summary judgment record fall far short of establishing the elements necess......
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T.O. Stanley Boot Co., Inc. v. Bank of El Paso
...1984, no writ). Each contract should be considered separately to determine its material terms. Bridewell v. Pritchett, 562 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In a contract to loan money, the material terms will generally be: the amount to be loaned, maturity......