Bridges v. Beard

• Citation: 941 F.Supp.2d 584
• Decision Date: 01 May 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06–0268.
• Parties: Shawnfatee BRIDGES, Petitioner v. Jeffrey BEARD, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

941 F.Supp.2d 584

Shawnfatee BRIDGES, Petitioner

v.Jeffrey BEARD, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 06–0268.

United States District Court,

E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 23, 2013.

As Amended May 1, 2013.

Anne L. Saunders, Beth A. Muhlhauser, Federal Public Defender, Harrisburg, PA, Sarah E. Davies, Cozen O'Connor, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner.

Alisa R. Hobart, Berks County Office of District Attorney, Frederick R. Mogel, Mogel, Speidel, Bobb & Kershner, Douglas J. Waltman, Reading, PA, Kelly S. Kline, Mandracchia & McWhirk LLC, Skippack, PA, for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by Shawnfatee “Shawn” Bridges pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On February 3, 1998, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder of Gregory and Damon Banks and other crimes in Pennsylvania state court. After a separate penalty hearing, the petitioner was sentenced to die. His death sentence has been stayed pending the resolution of these federal habeas proceedings. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Commonwealth's Brady violations entitle Bridges to a new trial. In addition, Bridges' ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase entitle him to a new sentencing hearing. The petitioner raises numerous federal claims for relief, and the Court's discussion of those claims is necessarily lengthy and complex. To aid in the understanding of this Memorandum and Order, an Appendix is included listing the disposition of all claims. I will begin with a discussion of the two claims on which I am granting relief, to be followed by an examination of the remaining claims.

In brief, Bridges was tried in January and early February 1998 for the murder of cousins Gregory and Damon Banks in Exeter Township, Pennsylvania, on December 8, 1996. See Commonwealth v. Bridges (Bridges I), 563 Pa. 1, 757 A.2d 859, 865–66 (2000) (affirming conviction). The evidence at trial showed that Bridges believed that the Banks cousins were responsible for a masked armed robbery of his home. Bridges was not present at the time of the break-in, but his girlfriend was. The prosecution's theory was that the Banks cousins had attempted to rob drugs from Bridges' home and that Bridges was motivated to kill them in part to cement or safeguard his drug-trafficking endeavors. The prosecution charged Bridges solely as an accomplice. It never formally alleged that Bridges had shot the victims himself.

I. BRADY CLAIM AND PENALTY PHASE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM

A. Relevant Legal Standards

1. Exhaustion

The state courts must have the first opportunity to redress any claimed violation of a habeas petitioner's federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–76, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The habeas statute codifies this principle by requiring that a petitioner “exhaust[ ] the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The statutory exhaustion requirement applies to each federal claim and is met only when the claim was “fairly presented to the state courts.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S.Ct. 509. The Commonwealth alleges that Bridges did not fairly present any of the federal claims in his Third Amended Petition to the Pennsylvania courts when he had the opportunity to do so. Commw. Mem. in Support of Ans. 1–3 (Doc. No. 128).

To fairly present a federal claim, a petitioner must alert the state courts to the federal nature of the claim. McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir.1999). Citations to the federal Constitution or to federal case law can provide adequate notice of the federal character of the claim. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir.1992). The petitioner may also alert the state courts to the federal nature of a claim in subtler ways, including “reliance on state cases employing [federal] constitutional analysis in like fact situations,” or “assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution.” Id. Thus, a federal claim may be fairly presented to the state courts even when the petitioner makes no express reference to federal law. McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261.

The federal claims made to the state courts need not be identical, word for word, with the claims now pursued in habeas. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 277, 92 S.Ct. 509 (petitioner is entitled to “variations in the legal theory or factual allegations used to support a claim”). But the exhaustion requirement would “serve no purpose if it could be satisfied by raising one claim in the state courts and another in the federal courts.” Id. at 276, 92 S.Ct. 509. A petitioner has exhausted a federal claim only if he or she presented the “substantial equivalent” of the current claim to the state court. Id. at 278, 92 S.Ct. 509;see also McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261 (petitioner must present both “factual and legal substance” of claim to state courts). The claim also must be presented to the correct state courts:

Because the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts, ... state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established review process.

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).

In Pennsylvania, appeals in capital cases—both direct appeals and appeals in post-conviction collateral proceedings—are taken directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania without any review in an intermediate appellate court. See42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(h)(1) (direct appeal); id. § 9546(d) (appeal from denial of PCRA relief). Bridges has thus exhausted his available state-court remedies if he fairly presented his federal claims to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court either on direct appeal from his judgment of conviction and sentence or during collateral proceedings, pursuant to the Post–Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9542 et seq. Either one will suffice: Once a claim is presented to the state court in a direct appeal, it need not be repeated in later collateral proceedings. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989); Swanger v. Zimmerman, 750 F.2d 291, 295 (3d Cir.1984).

The opinions of the state courts are a natural starting point to determine which federal claims Bridges fairly presented. See Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir.1982) (exhaustion may be shown “by demonstrating that a state court has expressly decided the issues ... in [the] habeas petition”). But the exhaustion doctrine requires only that a petitioner's federal claims be “ presented to the state courts; they need not have been considered or discussed by those courts.” Swanger, 750 F.2d at 295 (emphasis in original). If the state court opinions contain no reference to a petitioner's federal claim, the habeas court must look instead to the petitioner's state-court submissions to determine if the claim was fairly presented. Brown, 669 F.2d at 158;cf. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (claim is fairly presented when it appears within the petition or brief). Here, the relevant filings will be Bridges' appellate briefs to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and his PCRA petitions.

2. AEDPA Deference

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a habeas court may not grant relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state courts unless the adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Third Circuit has interpreted these statutory provisions as a three-step inquiry, looking first to the “contrary to” clause, second to the “unreasonable application” clause, and finally to the “unreasonable determination of the facts” clause. Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 417 (3d Cir.2011). For these purposes, “clearly established federal law” means “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003).

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1) when the state court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth” in a Supreme Court precedent, or when the state court “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a different result from [the Supreme Court's] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor (Terry Williams), 529 U.S. 362, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In these cases, the federal court has de novo review over the state court decision. Johnson v. Williams, –––U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1097, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013). When the state court correctly identifies the governing federal precedent but applies it in a debatable manner, the “contrary to” clause is not violated. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when the state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle ... but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The habeas petitioner must show that the state court decision was objectively unreasonable and not merely incorrect. Id. at 410–411, 120 S.Ct. 1495;Bl...