Bridges v. City of Charlotte
| Decision Date | 24 June 1942 |
| Docket Number | 532. |
| Citation | 20 S.E.2d 825,221 N.C. 472 |
| Parties | BRIDGES et al. v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
This action was brought by plaintiffs, taxpayers of the City of Charlotte, against the defendants, in the several capacities indicated, to enjoin further levy and collection of local taxes for contribution to the State Retirement Fund under Chapter 25, Public Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 143 Public Laws of 1941, known as the Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement Act, and to restrain defendants from paying out taxes already levied and collected for that purpose.
The Board of Trustees Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System was made a party to the action by consent and was permitted to adopt the answer of its codefendants.
The Act referred to provides for a retirement fund for teachers in the public schools, a part of which is raised out of public funds and a part by deductions from teachers' salaries. By its terms, local administrative units which supplement the items of school expense and conduct schools of a higher standard or longer term than those afforded by State support for the eight months term are required to contribute proportionally to the State fund, and the taxing authorities therein are required to provide the necessary funds therefor. Pertinent sections are as follows:
Chapter 25, Public Laws of 1941, Section 8, subsection (1) (c).
Section 1, Chapter 143, Public Laws of 1941, adds:
The Charlotte city schools were operated under special charter until the enactment of the School Machinery Act of 1933, Chapter 562, Public Laws of 1933. Thereafter the Charlotte district was set up as a city administrative unit for the purpose of operating schools under that Act, and has since continued as such city administrative unit.
The School Machinery Act of 1933, pertinent features of which were reenacted in 1935 and in 1939, Pub.Laws 1935, c. 455, Pub.Laws 1939, c. 358, contains the following provisions: "That the county board of education in any county administrative unit and the board of trustees in any city administrative unit, with the approval of the tax levying authorities in said county or city administrative unit and the State School Commission, in order to operate the schools of a higher standard than those provided for by State support, but in no event to provide for a term of more than 180 days, may supplement any object or item of school expenditure: Provided, that before making any levy for supplementing State budget allotments an election shall be held in each administrative unit to determine whether there shall be levied a tax to provide said supplemental funds, and to determine the maximum rate which may be levied therefor." Section 17.
Following the procedure laid down in the Act, the Charlotte City Administrative Unit, on March 23, 1935, voted supplements to State support of the schools, fixing the maximum tax limit for that purpose at twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollar property valuation, and proceeded to conduct a nine months school term and to pay teachers' salaries.
The local school board filed its supplementary budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1941, providing for the expenditure of the entire special tax under the 25¢ levy for purposes other than the payment of the required sums to the Teachers' Retirement Fund, and requested that the sum budgeted in connection with the Retirement Fund, approximately $17,124.75, be raised from sources other than the 25¢ special school levy. The levy was made and the taxes partially collected, and the authorities concerned propose to proceed with the collection of the rest of the taxes and to make the required contribution to the State Retirement Fund, if not contrary to law.
The plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order, and on the hearing of the order to show cause before Olive, J., the injunction was dissolved and plaintiffs appealed.
Taliaferro & Clarkson, of Charlotte, for plaintiffs, appellants.
Tillett & Campbell, of Charlotte, Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and George B. Patton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants, appellees.
No exception was made in the court below to the manner in which this suit is constituted, or to want of capacity of some of the defendants, as sued, in relation to the subject matter of the action. No doubt the parties desired a decision more broadly dealing with the merits of the case, as voiced by the challenge to the constitutionality of the Retirement Act and its interpretation in connection with related statutes, particularly the tax limitation adopted by popular vote for supplements under the School Machinery Act. We review the case in that light.
But the joinder of parties defendant and the capacity in which they are sued suggest that plaintiffs considered themselves as dealing with an attempted exercise of authority by the City of Charlotte as a municipality and with the "Board of School Commissioners of the City of Charlotte," formerly an agency of the municipality, as a corporate body retaining the relation to the schools in that district given it in the special act of incorporation. That is not the case. The present situation will be much less confusing if we remember that the Charlotte School District operating as a special charter district, came squarely within the revolutionary fiat of Section 4, Chapter 562, Public Laws of 1933: "All school districts, special tax, special charter or otherwise, as now constituted for school administration or for tax levying purposes, are hereby declared non-existent." Under the further provisions of this Act, the Charlotte district became a city administrative unit, and the trustees of the former district were retained only as the local administrative body of that unit, shorn of all administrative authority other than that which they get from the School Machinery Act. This concession was made to the governing body of the old district, no doubt, to cushion the shock of total liquidation and out of deference to the importance of the trusts that had been committed to them-- the magnitude of the schools-- and to conserve the experience and interest built up in administration. But here the old regime ended and the new dispensation began. The unit was now a part of the Public School System and henceforth an agency of the State. In this is found the principle upon which our decision must rest. Its application will be as brief as a full understanding of the subject will permit.
After careful study of the subject through many years prior to 1941, a Commission was appointed (Resolution 48, Public Laws of 1939, p. 913), which made a thorough investigation and reported its findings and recommendations to the General Assembly of 1941, which thereupon enacted Chapter 25, Public Laws of 1941, as amended by Chapter 143, Public Laws of 1941 which is known as the "Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement Act." The purpose of that Act is to provide benefits on retirement for the teachers in the public school system of the State and for State employees. It is based not only upon the principle of justice to poorly paid State employees, but also upon the philosophy that a measure of freedom from apprehension of old age and disability will add to the immediate efficiency of those engaged in carrying on a work of first importance to society and the State. The fund for final distribution on retirement is contributed in part by the State from public funds, and in part by deductions from teachers' and employees' salaries. County administrative units and city administrative units which supplement State support of...
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