Bridges v. F. H. McGraw & Co.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1957
• Citation: 302 S.W.2d 109
• Parties: Herbert BRIDGES et al., Appellants, v. F. H. McGRAW & COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 109

302 S.W.2d 109

Herbert BRIDGES et al., Appellants, v. F. H. McGRAW & COMPANY, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 29, 1957.

Rehearing Denied June 7, 1957.

Joseph S. Freeland, Francis T. Goheen, Paducah, for appellants.

James G. Wheeler, Paducah, for appellee.

STANLEY, Commissioner.

The circuit court dismissed for want of jurisdiction the complaint of the appellants, Herbert Bridges and Robert C. Newman, against F. H. McGraw and Company, appellee, which sought a declaration of rights and recovery of certain travel pay claimed to be due them and other employees under a bargaining agreement made with their labor union. The judgment rests on the conclusion that jurisdiction lies in the federal court by virtue of § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185. A similar complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Western Districk of Kentucky by the local union and these two individuals jointly had been dismissed by that court for want of jurisdiction. The appellants very reasonably ask, 'If both these decisions are sound, where may we go for relief?'

The appellee was the principal contractor of the United States Atomic Energy Commission in the construction of a large plant located near Paducah during the years 1951 and 1952. A collective bargaining agreement between the contractor and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America provided that the contractor would pay the wages prescribed and abide by the rules and regulations of the affiliated union in the locality. Local Union No. 559, to which the plaintiffs belonged, was affiliated with the general union in that locality. The complaint charges that during the year 1951 its rules and regulations 'required the payment to carpenters and millwrights when working more than ten miles from the City of Paducah of travel pay at the rate of $1.00 per trip,' and that during the year 1952 they required the payment of an additional 12 1/2 cents per hour to such workmen when working more than five miles from the city.

The complaint avers that during both years all the carpenters and millwrights were employed more than ten miles from Paducah and were entitled to receive the travel pay and additional wage, but the defendant had, in violation of its agreement, failed and refused to pay the same. The complaint further charges that the defendant owes each of the said union members a 'substantial sum of money, the exact amount of which is not known to the plaintiffs' but is shown on the records of the defendant. It is stated that the number and names of all the workmen entitled to the pay are unknown to the plaintiffs, but they believe the number to exceed 2,000, and that the aggregate sum owing to the workmen is not less than $250,000.

The plaintiffs brought the action for themselves individually and as representative and on behalf of all members of their union. Appropriate allegations are made as to the existence of an actual controversy with respect to liability. The plaintiffs prayed (1) a declaration of rights, (2) judgment of liability on the part of the defendant, (3) a disclosure and accounting, and (4) recovery of sums due the union members.

The defendant raised questions of jurisdiction and the right of the plaintiffs to sue in a representative capacity or at all. It admitted the several contractual relations and certain other facts but traversed specifically and generally all the allegations petaining to liability.

The defendant specially pleaded that the plaintiffs were seeking to maintain the action under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and that by the enactment Congress had pre-empted jurisdiction, so that rights under it can be adjudged only in the federal courts. In response, the plaintiffs filed the record in the previous case in the federal court. In that case the local union and the two individuals as joint plaintiffs had invoked jurisdiction under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and also upon diversity of citizenship. The defendant had challenged the jurisdiction of the subject matter and also charged that the union was not the real party in interest within the meaning of Federal Rule 17, 28 U.S.C.A. The order of the court merely sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint 'for want of jurisdiction.' There is controversy in the pleadings and the argument of the present case as to the grounds of the conclusion.

Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, is as follows:

'Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.'

Since this confers jurisdiction in actions within its scope 'without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties' we think it is implicit in the dismissal order of the United States District Court the it was based upon some other ground than diversity of citizenship. In the argument before us it was said to have been under the ruling of Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electrical Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 489, 99 L.Ed. 510, to be considered later.

The appellants maintain that the judgment of the United States District Court is res judicata the question of jurisdiction of the state court. We do not consider this intricate plea but go directly to the question and determine it initially.

As a start, we must recognize a citizen's fundamental privilege of access to the courts for redress of injury done him in his rights and to employ the usual remedies for the enforcement thereof in actions of every kind. Kentucky Bill of Rights, § 14, Constitution. This, of course, relates to Kentucky courts, subject to the exercise of delegated powers of the federal government. And we must recognize the elementary fact that state courts have jurisdiction in all cases within their local commitments unless within its constitutional power Congress has pre-empted a particular filed and has expressly or impliedly assigned exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. It ought, therefore, to be clear and certain from the particular enactment that Congress has deprived a citizen of his right to resort to the courts of his state.

There is a feeling that the purpose of Congress in its progressive expansion of the regulation of commerce between the states is to have the federal government take over complete control of managment-labor relations, including judicial power in respect thereto. See comment as to 'multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures' in Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, op. cit. 490-491, 74 S.Ct. 161, op. cit. 166, 98 L.Ed. 228. Cf. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed. 640, holding the congressional purpose was to pre-empt the field of anti-sedition legislation, and this precluded enforcement of state statutes against sedition. It was by force of this federal control of labor-management relations that the present contract between the union and the employer was executed. True, the rights asserted in the complaint are founded upon the contract, but the suit is particularly a common law action by individual employees to recover wages alleged to be due them under a contract of hire, the terms of which are defined in the collective agreement made for their benefit under the auspices of the federal law.

In later years it has been generally regarded that a collective bargaining agreement establishes in a general way reciprocal rights and responsibilities of the employer, the employees collectively and the union. The agreement 'establishes no concrete contract between the employer and any employee, but is only an agreement as to terms on which contracts of employment may be satisfactorily made and carried out.' 31 Am.Jur., Labor, § 97. It is contemplated that those terms are to be incorporated in separate contracts of hire with each employee. MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., 9 Cir., 182 F.2d 170, 18 A.L.R.2d 348. When one accepts employment under the collective agreement, he thereby ratifies and accepts its terms, and his rights and his employer's rights are to be measured and adjudged by that contract. McGregor v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 244 Ky. 696, 51 S.W.2d 953. In some relations the union contracts as a principal, but, as we have written a labor union exists for the benefit of its members and is their servant and agent in securing fair and just wages and good working conditions, although it may not bind a member in the exercise of his personal...