Bridges v. Nat'l Union
| Decision Date | 04 August 1898 |
| Citation | 73 Minn. 486,76 N.W. 270 |
| Parties | BRIDGES v NATIONAL UNION. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Certain parts of the rules or “laws” of defendant association, a life insurance company organized in the state of Ohio on the co-operative or assessment plan, construed.
2. Held, under these “laws,” that it is the duty of the secretary of the “senate,” on the 10th day of each month, to direct every council that at least one assessment shall be collected from each member of the council; and, whenever the condition of the general treasury demands more revenue in anticipation of death claims, where deaths have actually occurred among the members, which condition the secretary is to ascertain, he may direct that two or more assessments shall be collected.
3. The duty of the secretary as to assessments in defendant association is fully performed when he forwards to each council a notice or direction that one or more assessments shall be collected.
4. Such notice or direction is presumptive evidence that the assessments therein required to be collected are necessary to meet death claims.
5. The trial court was fully warranted in finding from the evidence that plaintiff's deceased husband had, in his lifetime, been duly notified by mail of certain assessments made against him.
6. Under the “laws,” members were required to pay assessments within one month from the “date of the notice.” The notice in question bore date April 10, 1896, and the member was, according to its terms, required to pay within one month from the “date of the notice.” It was mailed in the city in which the member resided April 20th. Held, on the facts here, that it is immaterial whether the month commenced to run on the day of the date of the notice, or the day it was mailed, or the day when it was, or, in due course of mail, should have been, received.
7. Whether Gen. St. 1894, § 3311, which requires that each notice of assessment made upon the members of an association of this character “shall truly state the cause and purpose of the assessment,” applies to an association incorporated under the laws of another state, is not determined; but it is held that this requirement was not intended to affect notices where the assessment could be for one cause only, and for but one single purpose, such as the establishment of, or to add to, a fund to be used for the payment of death claims, and for no other purpose, there being no other fund out of which such claims could be paid.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; J. F. McGee, Judge.
Action by Helen E. Bridges against the National Union on a benefit certificate. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Wm. H. Hallam, for appellant.
Keith, Evans, Thompson & Fairchild (Charles J. Kavanagh, of counsel), for respondent.
The defendant is a mutual benefit association, engaged in the business of insuring the lives of its members upon the co-operative or assessment plan. Its home office is at Toledo, Ohio. Its governing and legislative body is known as the “Senate,” and it has numerous subordinate councils, located in Minnesota and other states. The association and its members are governed by a code of regulations known as the “Laws” of the order, each of these laws being numbered. Dues and assessments are collected from the members. The dues are a fixed quarterly charge for the payment of expenses. Assessments are collectible only for the payment of death losses. Under the laws and practice of the defendant, they are to be called on the 10th day of the month, as the demands of the treasury to pay death losses require. The fund raised by assessments is known as the “Benefit Fund.” It is available for no other purpose than the payment of death losses, and no other fund is available for that purpose. The amount of one assessment is fixed, according to the age and rate of the member; but the number of assessments to be called in any given month depends upon the demands of the treasury, as determined by the properly constituted authority. The sum to be assessed upon the members at any call, therefore, is indeterminate, and must be fixed as a prerequisite to each assessment. Notice of every assessment must be given by the financial secretary of each subordinate council to its members; and, if the assessment be not paid by each member within one month from the date of the notice, he stands suspended from all benefits, subject to reinstatement on certain specified conditions. The plaintiff's deceased husband became a member of this order in April, 1890, receiving a benefit certificate in the sum of $3,000, payable to plaintiff. It is admitted that Mr. Bridges paid all demands made upon him by the defendant until April, 1896, when, it is claimed, he failed to respond to a notice mailed on April 20th, informing him that he must pay two assessments within one month, or stand suspended from all benefits from and after that date. No subsequent notice of any assessment was ever sent to Bridges. Defendant claims to have sent a notice on May 20th that he had been suspended on May 10th, and stating the terms upon which he could be reinstated. There was no law of the order providing for this notice of suspension. Defendant's sole defense is the nonpayment of this alleged double assessment. Mr. Bridges died November 28, 1896. It is admitted that proofs of death by the plaintiff were waived, and that, if entitled to any relief against the defendant, she is entitled to recover $3,000 and interest. A trial being had, the court made its findings and order for judgment in favor of the defendant. From the judgment entered, according to this order, the plaintiff appeals.
On the hearing of the appeal, plaintiff's counsel argued with zeal and ability a large number of his 38 assignments of error, but of these very few need special consideration. The undertaking to pay the benefit was based upon the proviso that the member, Mr. Bridges, should be in good standing at the time of his death. So, the real inquiry arises out of an alleged double assessment made April 10, 1896, numbered 182 and 183, notice of which was mailed April 20th, it is claimed, by the financial secretary of the local council to which Mr. Bridges belonged, to Mr. Bridges, in the same city. Briefly stated, the validity of these assessments and the sufficiency of the notice are the questions to be determined; for, without going into details, we are of the opinion that proof of the mailing of this notice was so well established by the testimony that a finding to the contrary would have been wholly unwarranted. This testimony was much stronger and more conclusive than that relied upon and held sufficient in Bachdahl v. Grand Lodge, 46 Minn. 61, 48 N. W. 454. Under the terms of law 42, mailing of the notice only was required to be shown.
1. As to the validity of the two assessments made April 10th. The plan of organization (section 4,...
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