Bridges v. Speer
| Decision Date | 20 April 1955 |
| Citation | 79 So.2d 679 |
| Parties | Mildred BRIDGES, Appellant, v. Daisy B. SPEER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Vivian A. Speer, Deceased, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
George A. Speer, Jr., Sanford, for appellant.
J. Thomas Gurney, Orlando, for appellee.
This appeal is from a final judgment entered in favor of the appellee after the lower court dismissed appellant's second amended complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action for gross negligence under the guest statute, Section 320.59, F.S.1951, F.S.A.
We think the complaint sufficiently alleged gross and wanton negligence. First, we think that type of conduct clearly appears from the allegations in the complaint that 'said Daisy B. Speer did drive and operate said Speer automobile at a high rate of speed with her eyesight defective and impaired to the extent that she could not drive said Speer automobile safely at said high rate of speed she was driving, as aforesaid, in that her eyesight was poor, her perception of distance bad to the extent that she could not safely judge distances and in that she saw objects double at times, all of which she well knew or had reason to know and should have known and as the sole proximate cause of her driving with defective and impaired vision to the extent aforesaid, said Daisy B. Speer did then and there drive said Speer automobile without reducing the speed thereof' off the road to the right and into a car making a right turn resulting in injury to plaintiff passenger.
Our cases fully sustain this conclusion. In Baker v. Hausman, Fla., 1953, 68 So.2d 572, 573, in upholding a judgment dismissing a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, we said, in speaking of physical impairment in such cases, 'in jurisdictions where the courts have been confronted with the question they have generally held that negligence, much less gross negligence or wanton misconduct will not be imputed to one who suddenly 'blacks out', faints or suffers a sudden 'attack or stroke,' loses consciousness and control of his car causing injury to himself or his guest without premonition or warning of his condition.' (Italics added.) And we held in Bryan v. Bryan, Fla., 1952, 59 So.2d 513, 514, that a driver was not guilty of wanton misconduct when he fell asleep at the wheel of an automobile unless he 'knew, or should have known, that he was in no condition to drive an automobile.' (Italics added.) But in Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So.2d 671, 672, where the driver knew what his condition of stupor was because he had just prior to the accident fallen asleep in a place where he stopped, we observed that the driver also knew that he was in no condition to drive and knew that his subsequent conduct in operating the vehicle 'endangered the lives of all people traveling on such highway', and we held that the driver's conduct justified a conviction of manslaughter, and that such a defendant 'cannot escape the responsibility by averring that he fell asleep and did not realize that he had hit and killed an unfortunate human being who was entirely without fault.'
The opinion in the last cited case and the general trend of the cases point up the fact that the pivot upon which the question turns is knowledge of one's unfitness to drive. It is not even simple negligence if one has a sudden attack, loses control of his car and causes an accident if he had no premonition or warning. In such event the very foundation of negligence-knowledge and hence foreseeability-is absent. Our cases seem to hold, however, that where one has notice or knowledge of the existence of a physical impairment. which may come on suddenly and destroy his power to control an automobile, it is negligence to an extreme degree for such person to operate such vehicle. It is a moral certainty that when such event occurs some one, either the operator, or his guest, or innocent bystanders or operators of other vehicles, may be killed or...
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Thorne v. Contee
...trial judge erred by withdrawing punitive damages from the jury's consideration in an automobile tort case. Quoting from Bridges v. Speer, 79 So.2d 679, 681 (Fla.1955), the court stated "that where one has notice or knowledge of the existence of a physical impairment which may come on sudde......
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Herrod v. Schimmelfing, 71--262
...person would know might Possibly result in injuries to persons or property. Carraway v. Revell, Fla., 116 So.2d 16, supra; Bridges v. Speer, Fla., 79 So.2d 679, supra; DeWald v. Quarnstrom, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 919. Put in another way, gross negligence is that course of conduct where the like......
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Hoisington v. Kulchin, 33609
...cases: Cormier v. Williams (1941), 148 Fla. 201, 4 So.2d 525; Erlichstein v. Roney (1944), 155 Fla. 333, 20 So.2d 254; Bridges v. Speer (Fla.1955), 79 So.2d 679; Faircloth v. Hill (Fla.1956), 85 So.2d 870; Klems' Inc. v. Cline (Fal.1958), 105 So.2d 881; Farrey v. Bettendorf (Fla.1957), 96 S......
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Dornton v. Darby
...from an unforeseen cause, loses control of his automobile and a collision results, is not chargeable with negligence. Bridges v. Speer, Fla., 79 So.2d 679; Baker v. Hausman, Fla., 68 So.2d 572; Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, Fla.App., 171 So.2d 432, cert. den. 177 So.2d 475; Malcol......
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Negligence cases
...a sudden loss of consciousness or attack from an unforeseen cause. NEGLIGENCE CASES §2:80 Florida Causes of Action 2-48 Bridges v. Speer , 79 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1955). It is not even simple negligence if one has a sudden attack, loses control of the car and causes an accident if the driver had......