Bridges v. State
| Decision Date | 21 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20220077,20220079,20220086 |
| Citation | 2022 ND 147 |
| Parties | John Clark Bridges, Petitioner and Appellant v. State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeals from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable Bruce A. Romanick Judge.
Kiara Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant submitted on brief.
David L. Rappenecker, Bismarck, ND, for respondent and appellee submitted on brief.
[¶1] John Clark Bridges appeals from district court orders and judgments granting the State's motions for summary disposition and denying Bridges' applications for postconviction relief as untimely, barred by misuse of process and res judicata, and for lack of genuine issues of material fact. Bridges argues summary disposition of his applications was inappropriate and he was entitled to evidentiary hearings in each case. We affirm.
[¶2] Bridges was convicted following guilty pleas to murder and kidnapping in 2012 and attempted murder in 2013. He did not appeal either conviction. Bridges previously applied for postconviction relief, and this Court affirmed the orders denying Bridges' applications. See Bridges v. State, 2022 ND 82, 973 N.W.2d 6; Bridges v. State, 2021 ND 232, 968 N.W.2d 188.
[¶3] In June 2021, in case 08-2021-CV-01163, Bridges applied for postconviction relief related to his murder conviction. In November 2021, in case 08-2021-CV-02060, Bridges applied for postconviction relief from his attempted murder conviction. In December 2021, in cases 08-2021-CV-02236 and 08-2021-CV-02302, Bridges filed additional applications for postconviction relief in each underlying criminal case. The State filed answers to the applications, alleging each was either untimely, a misuse of process, or barred by res judicata. The State separately moved for summary disposition of each application.
[¶4] The district court granted each motion for summary disposition and denied Bridges' applications for postconviction relief. The court determined Bridges' applications were untimely, Bridges had failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact, any alleged new evidence would not have had an effect on the proceedings, and Bridges' claims were barred by res judicata and misuse of process. Bridges appeals from each order.
[¶5] Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Abdi v. State, 2021 ND 110, ¶ 8, 961 N.W.2d 303 (citing Morris v. State, 2019 ND 166, ¶ 6, 930 N.W.2d 195). The applicant bears the burden of establishing grounds for postconviction relief. Id.
[¶6] Summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief after the State responds is akin to summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. Davies v. State, 2018 ND 211 ¶ 9, 917 N.W.2d 8. "The party opposing the motion for summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable inferences at the preliminary stages of a post-conviction proceeding, and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if a reasonable inference raises a genuine issue of material fact." Id. A district court may summarily dispose of an application for postconviction relief if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Everett v. State, 2016 ND 78, ¶ 15, 877 N.W.2d 796. Questions of law are fully reviewable by this Court. Id.
[¶7] Applications for postconviction relief must be filed within two years of the date of the conviction becoming final. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2). Each of Bridges' applications was filed more than two years after his convictions. However, N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3) allows a district court to consider an application filed outside two years in three instances: (1) the application alleges newly discovered evidence; (2) the petitioner establishes that the petitioner suffered from a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely assertion of postconviction relief; or (3) the petitioner asserts a new interpretation of law that is retroactively applicable to the petitioner's case. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3). None of Bridges' applications allege he suffered from a physical disability or mental disease. Bridges' applications assert claims of newly discovered evidence and new interpretations of law. We review his individual applications in turn.
[¶8] In case 08-2020-CV-01163, Bridges argues testimony by his psychiatrist at an evidentiary hearing in March 2021 on a previous application for postconviction relief from his murder conviction constitutes newly discovered evidence.
[¶9] Under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1), a district court may consider an application filed more than two years after conviction if the application alleges "the existence of newly discovered evidence" that would establish "in light of the evidence as a whole . . . the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted." Generally, when an applicant for postconviction relief seeks to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court reviews it under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d) to determine whether relief is necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." Lindsey v. State, 2014 ND 174, ¶ 16, 852 N.W.2d 383. In the context of an application for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence following a guilty plea, we have explained the "manifest injustice" analysis is similar to N.D.R.Crim.P. 33. Lindsey, at ¶ 29. We have applied the following test:
The defendant must show (1) the evidence was discovered after the guilty plea, (2) the failure to learn about the evidence before the plea was not the result of the defendant's lack of diligence, (3) the newly discovered evidence is material to what would have been the issues at trial, and (4) the weight and quality of the newly discovered evidence would likely result in an acquittal at trial.
Id. This standard predates the existence of the statute of limitation under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2).
[¶10] The State argues the key concern under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1) is whether the newly discovered evidence if proved in light of the evidence as a whole, would establish Bridges did not engage in the criminal conduct for which he was convicted.
[¶11] We agree. We conclude the test to be applied to a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33 is higher for an application for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1). Our previous analysis only required an applicant for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence to establish "the weight and quality of the newly discovered evidence would likely result in an acquittal ...." Lindsey, 2014 ND 174, ¶ 29 (citing N.D.R.Crim.P. 33). However, N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1) requires an applicant to "establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted." Because the burden is higher for postconviction relief than that applied to motions under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33, a more suitable test is necessary.
[¶12] We are persuaded by the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Marble v. State, 2015 MT 242, 380 Mont. 366, 355 P.3d 742. In Marble, the Montana Supreme Court held it had "erred in equating a motion for new trial with a postconviction relief claim based upon newly discovered evidence because, while a motion for new trial does-by definition-contemplate a new trial, postconviction proceedings are in no way tethered to such relief." Id. at ¶ 29. Before Marble, the Montana Supreme Court applied a standard similar to our own under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33, requiring a petitioner to satisfy a five-part test:
Marble, at ¶ 22; cf. Everett, 2016 ND 78, ¶ 17 (). In Marble, the State argued this five-part test was incompatible with postconviction relief. According to the State, proof "the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct" on an application for postconviction relief is a higher requirement than the showing of a "reasonable probability of resulting in a different outcome" on a motion for new trial. Marble, at ¶ 24. The court agreed, concluding the five-part test was inconsistent with the standard set forth in the postconviction relief statute requiring "newly discovered evidence . . . the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct." Id. at ¶ 31 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(2)). The court ultimately concluded a district court "shall utilize the very test set forth [by statute and] determine whether the 'newly discovered evidence . . ., if proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct' for which he or she was convicted." Id. at ¶ 36.
[¶13] Our statute for establishing grounds for postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence is nearly identical to that reviewed by the Montana Supreme Court in Marble. Compare N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1) with Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102(2). Section 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(1), N.D.C.C. conflicts with the test under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33 only as it applies to the last prong. We therefore agree with the reasoning of Marbl...
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Bell v. State
...[¶5] "Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure." Bridges v. State , 2022 ND 147, ¶ 5, 977 N.W.2d 718. "Summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief after the State responds is akin to summary judgment ......