Bridges v. United States
| Decision Date | 07 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18-727C |
| Parties | ROBERT BRIDGES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
David Ricksecker, McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, Washington, D.C for Plaintiffs. With him on briefs was Gregory K McGillivary, McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP, Washington, D.C.
Robert R. Kiepura, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch Civil Division, United States Department of Justice Washington, D.C. for Defendant, United States. With him on briefs were Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director, Lauren S. Moore, Trial Attorney, and Jana Moses, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C, as well as Kathleen Haley Harne, Assistant General Counsel, Employment Law Branch, Office of General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.
Plaintiffs - current and former Federal Bureau of Prisons employees at Federal Correctional Institution Milan ("FCI Milan" or "the Prison") - seek overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") for time spent traveling between their regularly scheduled shifts at the Prison and voluntary overtime shifts guarding inmates at area hospitals. Plaintiffs also seek compensation for mileage accumulated on their personal vehicles in transit between regular and overtime shifts. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are ripe for disposition.[1]
There are no genuine disputes of material fact. Rather, the case turns on how the relevant regulations define Plaintiffs' workday. Those regulations rule out compensation for the travel time at issue. Accordingly, Defendant's motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED. The case is DISMISSED.
FCI Milan inmates with medical needs that cannot be handled at the Prison are admitted to nearby hospitals, where correctional workers guard the inmates at all times. Pls.' Mem. App. at PA9-10.[2] Hospital posts are staffed by Prison employees on overtime assignments. PA9.
Work schedules at the Prison and the relevant hospitals are organized into shifts. At the hospitals where FCI Milan inmates are most commonly treated, shifts are usually staggered an hour later than Prison shifts. PA17, PA21, PA161-64, PA272, PA274, PA277. The hospitals are approximately 15 miles away from FCI Milan, or about a 20-minute drive. PA13, PA18, PA40. As a result, Prison workers doing hospital assignments typically complete their Prison shift, then travel to a hospital for an overtime shift. PA21. Other arrangements for scheduling Prison and hospital shifts are possible, see, e.g., PA22-23, but the parties agree that the legal analysis is the same.
Hospital and Prison shifts are both tracked in the Prison's roster. PA31, PA41, PA101. But they are scheduled differently. FCI Milan employees normally bid on quarterly posts at the Prison, with posts scheduled two weeks in advance. PA9, PA28. Hospital shifts are not assigned in that way. PA8-9, PA28, PA101, PA114. Instead, employees voluntarily sign up for overtime availability and leave a phone number "for management to call." PA250, PA 253. When overtime shifts need to be assigned, the lieutenant on duty contacts employees by phone according to their order on a rotation. PA18, PA28, PA 250, PA253. Employees can accept or decline the overtime when contacted. If necessary, the Prison assigns workers to mandatory hospital overtime, but employees usually volunteer. PA22.
Employees who work a shift at FCI Milan and then a volunteer overtime shift at a hospital are compensated for the time they spend at their posts, but not for their travel time between work locations. In contrast, Prison employees are paid for travel when they are assigned to mandatory overtime shifts, or when they must travel to a hospital during their regular Prison shift. PA22, PA50. Employees are also compensated when they transport prisoners or drive a government vehicle to the hospital. PA19, PA33, PA42, PA100.
Overtime for Prison-to-hospital travel has been a matter of controversy at FCI Milan before. Three memoranda of understanding between FCI Milan and the Prison employees' union (the "MOUs") contain language covering overtime assignments: "[I]f the assignment is located away from the official duty station within the local commuting area (i.e. outside hospital), time spent traveling will not be considered hours of work, unless the employee is required to drive a government vehicle or perform work while traveling." Def.'s Resp. & Cross-Mot. Exh. B at 1 (ECF 39-2); PA251, PA254.
The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to adjudicate "any claim against the United States founded either upon … any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department … in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Because the Tucker Act is "a jurisdictional statute [that] does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages," United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-07 (1967)), parties asserting Tucker Act jurisdiction must "identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States, separate from the Tucker Act itself." Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004). That entails identifying a "money mandating" source of law, i.e., a statute or regulation that "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained and is reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages." Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quotes and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983), and United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003)).
Plaintiffs' claims for uncompensated travel time are based on FLSA, which is a money-mandating source of law. See Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Their claims for mileage reimbursement rely on other sources of law that require non-discretionary payment by the United States to particular recipients. See 5 U.S.C. § 5704(a)(1) (); Program Statement 2200.04 at 23-24, BOP Temporary (TDY) Travel Regulation (Dec. 1, 2016) (ECF 49-1) (). Those terms are money-mandating as well. See, e.g., Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc., 525 F.3d at 1307.[3] The Court therefore has jurisdiction over both claims.
"[T]he special statute of limitations governing the Court of Federal Claims requires" that timeliness be considered a jurisdictional question. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008). FLSA claims must be brought within two years of alleged violations, or within three years of willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Plaintiffs allege that the challenged payment practices have continued "on an ongoing basis to date," Am. Compl. ¶ 7 (ECF 2), and the summary judgment record bears that out. Plaintiffs' claims are therefore timely.
A party seeking summary judgment must show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." RCFC 56(a). "[A]ll evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable factual inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (). Summary judgment should be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Cross-motions for summary judgment should be evaluated as independent motions. "[T]he court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ., 667 F.2d 305, 313- 14 (2d Cir. 1981)). "[T]he court is not relieved of its responsibility to determine the appropriateness of summary disposition in a particular case," even if the parties agree that no material facts are disputed and summary disposition is appropriate. Williams v. United States, 144 Fed.Cl. 218, 230 (2019) (citing Prineville Sawmill Co. v. United States, 859 F.2d 905, 911 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
FLSA requires compensation for hours worked, including work "suffer[ed] or permit[ted]" by the employer. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(g), 207(a)(1); see also 5 C.F.R. § 551.401(a). The Portal-to-Portal Act limits that mandate with a general rule excluding time spent in travel to and from work:
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