Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 70830,WINN-DIXIE,70830
• Citation: 335 S.E.2d 445,176 Ga.App. 227
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: BRIDGES v.ATLANTA, INC. et al.

Page 445

335 S.E.2d 445

176 Ga.App. 227

BRIDGES v. WINN-DIXIE ATLANTA, INC. et al.

No. 70830.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Sept. 10, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 1985.

Lonzy F. Edwards, Macon, for appellant.

John W. Collier, Macon, Alan F. Herman, Atlanta, for appellees.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

Appellant Sue Bridges was employed as a part-time cashier in a grocery store owned and operated by appellee Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc. (Winn-Dixie). This particular store sustained considerable losses and inventory shortages over a twenty-month period, and a security investigation was undertaken in an attempt to remedy the situation. Company officials announced at a meeting attended by all store employees that the investigation was under way; employees were urged to reveal to company officials any information they might have regarding the shortages and were also informed that they would be expected to submit to polygraph examinations.

Two days after the meeting, when Ms. Bridges arrived at the hour scheduled for her test, according to her deposition testimony she informed Winn-Dixie's safety and security manager, a Mr. McLemore, and the polygraph examiner that some six months previously her physician had told her that she had multiple sclerosis. According to her testimony, she inquired of McLemore and the examiner as to whether the condition or the medication she was taking for it might distort or otherwise invalidate the results of the examination. They replied in the negative, and Ms. Bridges executed the release forms (one paragraph of which stated that she knew of no illness or other physical condition which would interfere with the test) and underwent the examination. At the conclusion of the test the examiner informed McLemore that Ms. Bridges' response to a question asking whether she had given unauthorized discounts had indicated deception. McLemore then told Ms. Bridges that there was a "problem" and questioned her on this subject. She insisted that she had given no unauthorized discounts and done nothing else that would evoke a "deceptive" answer; and, in response to specific questions by McLemore, denied that she had done anything that would provoke a false accusation by any of the store's employees. McLemore then informed her that a fellow cashier had reported that she had seen Bridges giving unauthorized discounts. During this conversation, according to her own deposition testimony as well as that of appellees, Ms. Bridges grew angry, upset, and "hysterical" and used strong language to McLemore. She testified by affidavit that during the encounter McLemore was "standing over" her and had called her a "damn liar"; this testimony was disputed by McLemore and the polygraph examiner who had heard the encounter through an open door. The conversation was terminated when Ms. Bridges left the examination site and "clocked out" of the store.

Ms. Bridges was asked to take a second polygraph examination, this one to be administered by a different firm. She agreed to being retested but refused to sign the release forms; she was therefore not permitted to take the examination. She was subsequently discharged for being "uncooperative" in the security investigation. Several other employees were discharged by Winn-Dixie for acts of dishonesty uncovered during the investigation.

Appellant testified that her physician had told her not to get "upset," as doing so would aggravate her condition. She acknowledged, however, that she had not called her doctor for advice as to whether to take the examination and had not consulted him or sought treatment after the events of either the day when she had actually taken the examination or the day when she was scheduled to take a second examination. She alleged, however, that she had experienced certain physical symptoms (trembling, temporary partial paralysis) subsequent to these events, and that the conduct of appellee's agents towards her constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and was the proximate cause of her symptoms.

After filing a response to appellant's complaint and engaging in discovery, appellee moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding as a matter of law that appellee's conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness or egregiousness necessary to sustain an allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, Ms. Bridges assigns error to this judgment. Held:

1. Georgia law recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thomas v. Ronald A. Edwards Constr. Co., 163 Ga.App. 202, 293 S.E.2d 383 (1982); Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga.App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907). The burden which the plaintiff must meet in order to prevail in this cause of action is a stringent one, however. "In order to sustain a cause of action in this state for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show that 'defendant's actions were so terrifying or insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.' " Sossenko v. Michelin Tire Corp., 172 Ga.App. 771, 772, 324 S.E.2d 593 (1984); Georgia Power Co. v. Johnson, 155 Ga.App. 862, 863, 274 S.E.2d 17 (1980). In Sossenko plaintiff complained of statements and advice by members of his employer's personnel department regarding his job performance and the possible consequences of his failure to comply with requirements or decisions of his superiors. In that case the court, 172 Ga.App. at 772, et seq., 324 S.E.2d 593, cited cases in which the statements or threats on the basis of which the courts had awarded judgment to the plaintiff "were outrageous and egregious, such as where a defendant terrorized a frightened plaintiff at gunpoint in an attempt to collect a bill, ... and where a defendant physically intimidated frightened mourners as they attempted to bury a family member." See American Fin. & Loan Corp. v. Coots, 105 Ga.App. 849, 125 S.E.2d 689 (1962); Stephens v. Waits, 53 Ga.App. 44, 184 S.E. 781 (1935).

The court held in Sossenko, 172 Ga.App. at 773, 324 S.E.2d 593, that "considered individually or collectively, the statements made to appellant could not have foreseeably resulted in the mental distress of which appellant complains because they do not rise to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness." In Ga. Power Co. v. Johnson, supra, where a contractor added to his itemized bill $5,000 for the owner's wife's interference on the job, and swore out a dispossessory warrant when the owners refused to close until certain disputed items had been settled, the court held, 155 Ga.App. at 863, 274 S.E.2d 17, that neither of these acts could "reasonably be characterized as humiliating, insulting, or terrifying" and did not amount to "the kind of egregious conduct necessary to state a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional disress." Cf. Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga.App. 297, 91 S.E.2d 383 (1956) (eleven-year-old girl threatened with jail if she did not let men into house to repossess her mother's television); Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., sup...