Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 96-0521

• Decision Date: 19 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-0521,96-0521
• Citation: 929 S.W.2d 440
• Parties: 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1110 BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., Relator, v. The THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 440

929 S.W.2d 440

39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1110

BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., Relator, v. The THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

No. 96-0521.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Sept. 19, 1996.

James Edward Maloney, Claudia Wilson Frost, Maria Wyckoff Boyce, Houston, Joe R. Greenhill, Bob E. Shannon, Austin, Eduardo R. Rodriguez, Joseph A. Rodriguez, Brownsville, for Relator.

Scott L. Daily, Dallas, G. Thomas Allison, III, Longview, Steven Mark Vidaurri, Edinburg, Lawrence Coffey, Corpus Christi,

Bruce L. Jamison, Truett Bryan Akin, Houston, for Respondent

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

In this original proceeding, the court of appeals conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order transferring venue from Hidalgo County to Dallas County. The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in transferring venue after refusing to grant a second motion for continuance to complete reasonable discovery on venue. 925 S.W.2d 119. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we conditionally grant mandamus.

David Crockett Woods and Sandra Kay Woods sued Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. and five other defendants for unspecified personal injuries. They alleged in their petition that venue was proper in Hidalgo County on the unsupported allegation that Firestone maintains agents and representatives in that county. Firestone moved to transfer venue to Dallas County, where it concedes it has an agent or representative. The Woodses had not undertaken any discovery until the date their response to the venue motion was due. At that time, they also sought a continuance of the venue hearing claiming they needed more time to complete discovery. The trial court granted a continuance of the January 7, 1996 venue hearing until January 31, 1996.

On the day of the hearing, the Woodses sought a second continuance, again asserting they needed more time to complete discovery. While Firestone had produced one corporate representative for deposition, the Woodses argued that this witness could not testify about the authority of Firestone's agents in Hidalgo County. Firestone's failure to produce an appropriate corporate representative and failure to produce a policy manual, the Woodses claimed, necessitated another continuance. The trial court denied the continuance and transferred the cause of action to Dallas County.

The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's actions deprived the Woodses of their opportunity for reasonable discovery on venue. 925 S.W.2d 119. Because the Woodses were not given the opportunity to properly develop the venue evidence, the court of appeals held that the Woodses lacked an adequate remedy by appeal, thus entitling them to mandamus. Id. We disagree.

As we recently reiterated, venue determinations generally are incidental trial rulings that are correctable on appeal. Montalvo v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 917 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.1995). We have granted mandamus, however, when the trial court abused its discretion in failing to afford a party seeking a transfer under TEX.R.CIV.P. 257 a reasonable opportunity to supplement the venue record before the venue hearing with affidavits and discovery products. Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex.1990). This case is unlike Union Carbide.

In Union Carbide, the trial court on the day of the venue hearing ordered that no live testimony would be permitted. Union Carbide, relying on the trial court's previous order permitting oral testimony and based on the unavailability of discovery products, had prepared for an eight-week full evidentiary venue hearing with live testimony. Union Carbide sought a continuance to supplement the record with affidavits and other...