Bridgewater v. State

Decision Date13 January 2015
Docket NumberWD 75421
Citation458 S.W.3d 430
PartiesAdam D. Bridgewater, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Adam D. Bridgewater, Appellant Pro Se.Robert J. Bartholomew Jr., Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division Three: Lisa White Hardwick, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Opinion

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Adam Bridgewater (Bridgewater) filed a motion to recall mandate on October 24, 2014 (“Motion”). An exhibit attached to the Motion was missing from trial counsel's file at the time of Bridgewater's Rule 24.035 hearing and is material to his claim of ineffective assistance which alleged that trial counsel affirmatively misrepresented that Bridgewater would receive a single life sentence1 if he pleaded guilty. The motion court's judgment denying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relied exclusively on a credibility determination favoring trial counsel's testimony that appears to be inconsistent with the exhibit attached to the Motion. And Bridgewater's guilty plea hearing does not plainly refute his claim of prejudicial reliance on trial counsel's affirmative representation. We therefore recall our mandate issued November 20, 2013; withdraw our order/memorandum dated September 10, 2013; vacate the motion court's judgment in the Rule 24.035 proceeding; and remand this matter to the motion court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Factual and Procedural Summary

Bridgewater was charged as a prior offender with four counts of the class A felony of assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree in violation of section 565.0812 and four associated counts of armed criminal action in violation of section 571.015. The information alleged that, on or about March 16, 2007, Bridgewater knowingly fired a gun at Officer Dan Cook, a Neosho police car driven by Officer Mike Sharp, and a Highway Patrol car driven by Trooper Grant Hendrix. Bridgewater was twenty years old at the time of the offense.

On September 24, 2008, Bridgewater pleaded guilty to three counts of assault of a law enforcement officer and the three associated counts of armed criminal action. The written plea petition reflected Bridgewater's agreement that:

3. I received a copy of the information (charge against me). I read the information and have discussed it with my attorney. My attorney explained every charge to me and I understand that I am charged with 4 counts of 1st degree assault on law enforcement officer & 4 counts armed criminal action. I understand the nature of the charge against me and my lawyer informed me that the range of punishment which the law provides is 10 to 30 or life on the assaults and minimum 3, no maximum on armed criminal action.

(Emphasized material is handwritten on document). The written plea agreement reflected Bridgewater's understanding that the State would, in exchange for his plea, dismiss “Counts VII & VIII,” (the fourth charge of assault of a law enforcement officer and its associated armed criminal action charge), and other pending but unrelated traffic and criminal charges except an arson charge. The written plea agreement expressed Bridgewater's understanding that [a]ny sentence received on the arson charge would be designated to run concurrent.”

A guilty plea hearing for the assault and armed criminal action charges was conducted on September 24, 2008. During this hearing, Bridgewater testified that he had seen a copy of the amended information and that he understood the charges against him. Bridgewater testified that he understood that as to “each count of first degree assault on a law enforcement officer, the range of punishment is minimum of 10, maximum of 30, or life.” Bridgewater also testified that he understood that as to “each count of armed criminal action, the minimum sentence is three years and the maximum sentence is not set forth in the statute, and therefore there is no maximum.” Bridgewater was not asked by trial counsel or the plea court whether he understood that the sentences on each of these six counts could be made to run consecutively.3

The trial court found that Bridgewater's pleas were voluntarily and intelligently given with a full understanding of his rights and the effect of his guilty pleas on those rights. After finding that there was a factual basis for the guilty pleas, the trial court accepted Bridgewater's guilty pleas and ordered a Sentencing Assessment Report.

The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 2, 2009.4 The officers assaulted by Bridgewater and other witnesses testified. Following the evidence, the State argued that the sentencing court should give Bridgewater “whatever number [of life sentences] the court thinks is justified ... [and] run everything consecutive.” Bridgewater's trial counsel asked the court to follow the Sentencing Assessment Report which recommended either ten years or fourteen years in prison.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed six life sentences on Bridgewater. The trial court ordered that each life sentence for armed criminal action would run concurrently with the related life sentence for assault of a law enforcement office, and that the three life sentences for assault of a law enforcement officer would run consecutively. As a result, Bridgewater is serving three consecutive life sentences.

Immediately after announcing sentence, Bridgewater was asked by the trial court:

Q: Other than discussing this—the plea of guilty with you, did your attorney communicate any threats or promises to you to induce you to enter your plea of guilty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you satisfied with the services rendered to you by [trial counsel] and—and the public defender's office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is there anything you wish to add concerning the—the assistance received from the—your—from your attorney?
A: No, sir.
Q: Is there anything you wish me to consider concerning your representation by your attorney before I determine whether or not probable cause exists to believe that you have received ineffective assistance of counsel?
A: No, sir.

(Emphasis added.)

After he was committed to the Department of Corrections, Bridgewater filed a timely pro se Rule 24.035 motion. The trial court appointed counsel, who filed an amended Rule 24.035 motion. The amended motion alleged that Bridgewater's trial counsel was ineffective in that she “misinformed [Bridgewater] that if he pled guilty he would receive a cumulative sentence structure of life imprisonment .”5 (Emphasis added.) The amended motion asserted that but for trial counsel's affirmative misrepresentation, Bridgewater would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing during which Bridgewater and others testified. Bridgewater testified that he knew he was entering an open plea on the three assault and related armed criminal action charges, and that he knew a life sentence was possible on each charge, but that his trial counsel assured him that the trial court would impose sentence in a manner that would result in a single life sentence. Bridgewater testified that he relied on this assurance. Although Bridgewater knew he would likely serve life in prison by pleading guilty he was willing to plead because by receiving a single life sentence, he would at least have a chance to be released from prison during his lifetime.6 Bridgewater testified that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial if he had known that he might receive consecutive life sentences—an outcome that ensures he will die in prison, and that is no better than the outcome he could have received had he insisted on going to trial.

Bridgewater's trial counsel testified at the Rule 24.035 motion hearing, in pertinent part, as follows:

Q: All right. What discussions did you have with [Bridgewater] prior to his plea, as far as what possible sentence he would get?
A: I don't have a specific recall of the details. And looking through the files that you have shown me, it appears that the notes of discussions are missing from those files . I've—And without those I couldn't give you specific details .
Q: Okay. Do you have a recollection of telling him that he would receive one life sentence with everything made concurrent?
A: I don't specifically recall making that representation.
Q: Okay. What did you tell him?
A: Again, I couldn't give you specific recall. I could only tell you what it would be my practice to tell a client .
Q: What would be your practice?
A: My practice would be to tell a client the worst case scenario, which would be—in this case multiple consecutive life sentences. And to tell what our goal was, what we hoped for, which would be to mitigate through a sentencing hearing, and to ask the judge for leniency.

On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that Bridgewater's “initial intent” was to proceed to jury trial, and that she had “tried to get a plea bargain from the State ... several times,” though nothing was forthcoming. Trial counsel indicated that “[a]t some point a few small scraps were offered, in terms of some dismissed charges ... but nothing that compared to the charges that the State was proceeding on. The State expressly asked trial counsel:

Q: Would it ever be your practice to predict or guarantee somebody that you're representing what they could expect with an open plea?
A: No.

The motion court denied Bridgewater's Rule 24.035 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion court found:

Trial counsel testified at the hearing on this motion that she informed [Bridgewater] that consecutive life sentences were within the range of punishment available to this court at sentencing. Trial counsel further testified that she never indicated to [Bridgewater] that if he were to
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  • Rueger v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • 20 d2 Setembro d2 2016
    ...2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This right to effective assistance of counsel applies to guilty plea proceedings. Bridgewater v. State, 458 S.W.3d 430, 438 (Mo.App.W.D.2015). However, if conviction is the result of a guilty plea, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is “immaterial exce......
  • Finley v. State, SD 33564
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • 10 d2 Dezembro d2 2019
    ...assistance of counsel, then a recall of our mandate is the appropriate remedy. Thompson , 134 S.W.3d at 33.In Bridgewater v. State , 458 S.W.3d 430 (Mo. App. 2015), a motion to recall mandate alleged that a memorandum missing from Bridgewater’s file corroborated his testimony that plea coun......
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    ...Rules (2017).2 We suggest the State review the court’s direct findings on credibility and direct the State to Bridgewater v. State , 458 S.W.3d 430 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (citing State v. Bursby , 395 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Mo. 1965) (emphasis added) ); see also Holland v. State , 954 S.W.2d 660, 6......
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    ...is pleading guilty to multiple counts. See, e.g., Stark v. State , 553 S.W.3d 378, 384 n.2 (Mo. App. 2018) ; Bridgewater v. State , 458 S.W.3d 430, 433 n.3 (Mo. App. 2015) ; Holland v. State , 954 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Mo. App. 1997) ; Payne v. State , 864 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo. App. 1993). Continui......
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