Bridgman By and Through Bridgman v. New Trier High School Dist. No. 203, 97-1412

• Decision Date: 04 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-1412,97-1412
• Citation: 128 F.3d 1146
• Parties: 122 Ed. Law Rep. 94 Andrew BRIDGMAN, a minor, by and through Lynne C. BRIDGMAN, his mother and guardian, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW TRIER HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 203 and Mary Dailey, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1146

128 F.3d 1146

122 Ed. Law Rep. 94

Andrew BRIDGMAN, a minor, by and through Lynne C. BRIDGMAN, his mother and guardian, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW TRIER HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 203 and Mary Dailey,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1412.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 26, 1997.

Decided Nov. 4, 1997.

Michael D. Robbins, Gregory J. Schlesinger (argued), Schlesinger & Krasny, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John M. O'Halloran, Matthew J. Devereux (argued), Coleman & O'Halloran, Andrea R. Waintroob, Franczek, Sullivan, Mann, Crement, Hein & Relias, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

In 1995, Andrew Bridgman was a freshman student at New Trier Township High School. On February 27 of that year, he was required to attend an after-school smoking cessation program as a result of his having been caught smoking cigarettes on or around school property on at least two occasions. Mary Dailey, New Trier's Student Assistance Program Coordinator, supervised the smoking cessation program that Bridgman attended.

Upon Bridgman's arrival at the program, Dailey noticed that Bridgman and several other students were giggling and acting in an unruly fashion. Bridgman acknowledges that he was laughing with the other students, but denies being unruly. Dailey states that while the other students quickly calmed down, Bridgman remained distracted and behaved inappropriately during the program. Dailey says she noticed that Bridgman's eyes were bloodshot and his pupils dilated. She also claims that his handwriting was erratic on a worksheet that he completed as part of the program, and that some of his answers were "flippant."

As a result of her observations, Dailey became suspicious that Bridgman had been using marijuana. She took Bridgman into an adjoining room and accused him of being under the influence of drugs. Bridgman denied the charge, stating that he did not use drugs. Bridgman then asked to call his mother. Dailey allowed him to do so, although she insisted that he speak to his mother on a speaker phone so that Dailey could hear both ends of the conversation.

After Bridgman had spoken to his mother, Dailey took him into another adjoining room, where she had the school's Health Services Coordinator, Nurse Joanne Swanson, administer a "medical assessment" of Bridgman. The assessment consisted of taking Bridgman's blood pressure and pulse. Swanson noted that both of these readings were considerably higher than those listed on the record of Bridgman's freshman physical examination. Swanson was concerned about the high blood pressure and pulse measurements, but at no time reached the conclusion that Bridgman was under the influence of drugs. She also noted that Bridgman's pupils were dilated, but did not notice that his eyes were bloodshot, or that he was acting strangely in any way.

Following the physical examination, Dailey told Bridgman to remove his outer jersey and hat and empty his pockets so that she could conduct a search. Bridgman sarcastically inquired whether she wished him to remove his shoes and socks as well, to which she replied in the affirmative. He removed all of the requested garments, and Dailey searched them, along with the contents of his pockets. At all times, Bridgman continued to wear his undershirt and pants.

At this time, Bridgman's mother arrived. She took her son into another room to talk privately. When they returned to the room where Dailey and Swanson were, one of the two asked Ms. Bridgman for permission to test the reactivity of Andrew Bridgman's eyes to light. Ms. Bridgman asked if this test would definitively determine whether her son had used drugs, and either Swanson or Dailey told her that it would not. Ms. Bridgman indicated that she would take her son to a pediatrician in order to have a definitive drug test conducted on him. The following day, Andrew Bridgman underwent a drug test, admitted by the parties to be definitive, which indicated that he had not in fact been using marijuana.

Bridgman, through his mother, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the school and Mary Dailey, alleging that both Dailey's actions and New Trier's de facto policy regarding medical assessments violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. He also alleged a state law tort of false light invasion of privacy. Upon the school's motion, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. Bridgman appeals, and we affirm.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Cornfield by Lewis v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1993). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. The reviewing court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. Once the moving party has produced evidence to show that it is entitled to summary judgment, the nonmoving party must affirmatively demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir.1996).

In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings. "The object of [Rule 56(e) ] is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit." Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed.2d 695. Moreover, a genuine issue of material fact is not shown by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538. Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

II. DAILEY'S ACTIONS IN SEARCHING BRIDGMAN

The Fourth Amendment protects public school students against unreasonable searches and seizures by school officials. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333, 105 S.Ct. 733, 738, 83 L.Ed.2d 720. Because of the special circumstances of the school context, however, school officials need not demonstrate the existence of probable cause in order to justify a search of a student's person or property. Id. at 340-342, 105 S.Ct. at 742-743. Rather, such a search is permissible if it is both "justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 341-342, 105 S.Ct. at 742-743. This Court has held that the "justified at its inception" portion of the T.L.O. standard means that a "search is warranted only if the student's conduct creates a reasonable suspicion that a particular regulation or law has been violated, with the search serving to produce evidence of the violation." Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1320. The second T.L.O. requirement means that "the measures adopted [must be] reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-342, 105 S.Ct. at 742-743.

In arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate, Bridgman presented expert testimony designed to prove that the physical symptoms upon which Dailey relied--bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils--are not reliable indicators of marijuana use. The same expert testified that measuring blood pressure and pulse, as Dailey and Swanson did in the medical assessment, would not reliably indicate whether a student was using marijuana. Dailey and New Trier countered by presenting documents produced by such organizations as the American Medical Association listing, in various combinations, bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, and heightened blood pressure and pulse rates as indications of marijuana use.

As the district court observed, the appropriate inquiry is not whether the medical profession uniformly agrees that the symptoms observed and tests conducted indicate marijuana use. Rather, the question is whether Dailey's actions in ordering the medical assessment and then searching Bridgman's outer clothing...