O'Brien v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 92-1086
| Citation | 972 F.2d 1 |
| Decision Date | 01 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-1086,92-1086 |
| Parties | 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3014, 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 803, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,647, 61 USLW 2106, 123 Lab.Cas. P 10,344 William J. O'BRIEN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) |
Philip G. Boyle, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff, appellant.
Gary D. Buseck with whom Robert L. Farrell and Parker, Coulter, Daley & White, Boston, Mass., were on brief for defendant, appellee.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, LAY, * Senior Circuit Judge, and O'SCANNLAIN, ** Circuit Judge.
We must decide whether a state law providing for physical handicap discrimination claims against employers is preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88.
In August 1985, William J. O'Brien was laid off by Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") from his position as yardmaster in the Boston area. O'Brien declined Conrail's offer of a position in Springfield, Massachusetts and instead applied for a stevedore position with Conrail, also in the Boston area. Although such position was already filled, O'Brien had eight and one-half years of seniority with Conrail and under the collective bargaining agreement he was entitled to "bump" the less senior employee filling the position.
O'Brien was born without a right hand. The supervisor of the stevedoring operation told O'Brien he was disqualified from being a stevedore because he was physically incapable of performing the duties of a stevedore. O'Brien requested a field test to refute the supervisor's contention. Six Conrail employees conducted the field test, and concluded that O'Brien could not safely perform all of the duties of a stevedore. In particular, the six-member committee determined that O'Brien would not be able to climb ladders safely in adverse weather, and would not be able to handle safely the forty pound "bridge plates" used in the stevedoring operation.
O'Brien filed a grievance under the procedures provided by the collective bargaining agreement, claiming that Conrail violated the antidiscrimination provision of such agreement. The grievance was first denied by the Manager-Labor Relations at Conrail, and later by Conrail's Senior Director-Labor Relations. O'Brien then submitted the matter to the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB"), which was created by the RLA to resolve labor disputes in the railroad industry. The NRAB denied O'Brien's grievance.
O'Brien also filed a complaint with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP"), which investigates complaints of unlawful employment discrimination lodged against federal contractors such as Conrail. The OFCCP determined that Conrail had not violated the antidiscrimination provisions of its contract with the government. O'Brien sought reconsideration by the Director of the OFCCP, who affirmed the determination of the OFCCP.
Eventually, O'Brien was called back from lay off by Conrail to his former yardmaster job. In January 1988, however, O'Brien was again laid off. O'Brien wrote to the stevedoring supervisor requesting to "bump" an employee in a stevedore position, and the supervisor replied that "Conrail's prior determination still stands."
On March 14, 1988, after he had requested the stevedore position but before his request was denied, O'Brien filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"), a prerequisite to bringing an action in court for a violation of the state antidiscrimination law. O'Brien alleged that Conrail had violated Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B ("Chapter 151B"), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of physical or mental handicap, if the handicapped person is "capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation required ... would impose an undue hardship to the employer's business." Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B, § 4. The MCAD permitted O'Brien to file suit in Massachusetts state court, and he did so. 1
Conrail petitioned to remove the case to United States district court, alleging that the district court had diversity jurisdiction and jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a), which grants federal jurisdiction over a "civil action ... arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce." The district court granted the removal petition.
Conrail then moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) O'Brien's claims were preempted by the RLA, (2) O'Brien's claims were preempted by Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, (3) the adverse determinations of the NRAB and the OFCCP had preclusive effect on O'Brien's claims, and (4) O'Brien's claim under Chapter 151B was barred by a six month statute of limitations. A hearing on the motion was held before U.S. Magistrate Judge Marianne Bowler.
The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted for Conrail on all the grounds urged by Conrail except the statute of limitations theory. The district court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate judge in whole and entered summary judgment for Conrail. O'Brien timely appealed.
O'Brien argues that the district court erred in determining that his claim was barred because his state statutory rights under Chapter 151B are independent of and exceed his rights under the RLA and the collective bargaining agreement with Conrail. O'Brien contends that the resolution of his claim under Chapter 151B "hinge[s] upon the meaning to be given the terms of the statute involved, and not those within the collective bargaining agreement," and thus that the RLA and the collective bargaining agreement are simply not implicated, let alone preemptive.
Preemption doctrine is founded on Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, which states that "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Under the Supremacy Clause, "state laws that 'interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution' are invalid." Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 2481, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991) ). Thus, the mere fact that O'Brien's cause of action under Chapter 151B is "independent" of the RLA says nothing about whether such action is preempted by the RLA. Indeed, in any case where preemption doctrine is applied, there will be a state law cause of action "independent" of federal law. Rather, the critical issue is whether the state law, Chapter 151B, "interfere[s] with" the federal RLA.
" '[P]reemption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.' " Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, ----, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990)). Where, as here, express preemption is absent,
the challenged state law must yield when it "regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively" ... [or] where the state law "actually conflicts with federal law." ... Such a conflict arises where it is physically impossible to comply with both the federal and the state law or where "state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 993, 117 L.Ed.2d 154 (1992). Hence, we consider whether the RLA evinces a congressional intent to occupy the field of railroad labor relations and whether separate state causes of action such as Chapter 151B undermine the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" in enacting the RLA.
This court has not previously had occasion to determine the scope of preemption under the RLA. We have, however, examined preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87. See Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107, 109 S.Ct. 3158, 104 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1989). The LMRA and the RLA are similar in many respects: "[a]lthough the preemptive effect of ... the Labor Management Relations Act ... cannot be 'imported wholesale into the railway labor arena,' courts may look to the construction of other federal labor statutes for assistance in construing [the RLA]." McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 844 F.2d 294, 299 (6th Cir.) (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 1118, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879, 109 S.Ct. 196, 102 L.Ed.2d 166 (1988).
In Jackson, an employee challenged drug testing by his employer under Massachusetts' privacy laws. Jackson, 863 F.2d at 113. The employer contended that the employee's Massachusetts causes of action were barred, state law having been preempted by the federal LMRA. Id. The court observed that "under state law, Massachusetts would look to the [collective bargaining] Agreement to discern the scope of the privacy right which [the employee] was attempting to assert." Id. at 120. The court then held that "[b]ecause resolution of [the employee's] state-law claims 'requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining contract,' ... it follows inexorably, as night unto day, that [the LMRA] preempts maintenance of the suit in its present form." Id. at 122 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883 n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988)).
We believe that the holding of Jackson is equally applicable to asserted RLA...
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