O'Brien v. Fitzgerald

• Decision Date: 23 October 1894
• Citation: 38 N.E. 371,143 N.Y. 377
• Parties: O'BRIEN et al. v. FITZGERALD et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

143 N.Y. 377

38 N.E. 371

O'BRIEN et al.

v.FITZGERALD et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 23, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department.

Action by Miles M. O'Brien and another, as receivers, against Lawrence J. Fitzgerald and others, impleaded, to recover damages sustained by reason of the negligence of defendants in the management of the Madison Square Bank. From a judgment of the general term (29 N. Y. Supp. 975) affirming an order overruling the demurrer of defendant Fitzgerald, he appeals. Reversed.

Franklin Pierce, for appellant.

Louis Marshall, for respondents.

FINCH, J.

On its face and in its form this is an action at law to recover damages for negligence. The corporation, represented by its duly-appointed receivers, sues individuals, who were its directors, for such neglect or wrong in the performance of their duties as resulted in large losses, and demands a money judgment for the damages sustained. There is no suggestion that any equitable relief is essential to a full and complete redress, and no facts are stated which indicate a need of such intervention. It is not averred that a discovery is requisite to the completeness of the remedy. On the contrary, the acts of negligence are asserted as fully known, and capable of proof. It is not alleged that an accounting is necessary to ascertain the damages, but these are claimed as a definite and fixed sum, resulting directly from the negligent acts of the defendants. It is not asserted that such defendants are severally liable for separate and personal misconduct, and in separate and different amounts, although that is a reasonable inference from the facts stated in the complaint, but it demands judgment against all and against each for the full amount claimed. The circumstance led to the interposition of a demurrer to the complaint, based upon the ground that different causes of action affecting different defendants had been improperly joined. It is not denied that the demurrer is well taken if the action is to be regarded as one at law, but the contention is that it is an action in equity, for the vindication of a trust and the protection of its beneficiaries; and that view of it has been taken by the courts below with some hesitation, and with a very obvious doubt of the consistency of our earlier rulings.

I think those courts are right in saying that the formal demand of relief with which the complaint concludes is not decisive of the legal or equitable character of the action. We so held in Bell v. Merrifield, 109 N. Y. 202, 16 N. E. 55, saying that where an answer had been interposed, and facts were stated in a complaint which ‘show that it is of an equitable nature, and that the cause of action is simply equitable, we do not think a case is made for trial by jury, under Code, § 968, merely because the complaint improperly asks for a money judgment only.’ That language clearly and plainly implied that a demand of judgment for money only would stamp the action as one at law, unless the facts pleaded showed an equitable cause of action simply, and that the relief asked was therefore improperly confined to a money demand merely. In other words, our doctrine was that the demand of money only, on its face and primarily, characterized the action as one at law, but not so conclusively as to prevent a...