O'Brien v. Siegel
| Decision Date | 11 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–P–420.,12–P–420. |
| Parties | Allie O'BRIEN v. Kenneth SIEGEL. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREBy the Court (FECTEAU, HANLON & SULLIVAN, JJ.).
This appeal arises from events that followed the publication of a newspaper article in which it was reported that the plaintiff, Allie O'Brien, had been arrested for underage drinking. O'Brien, a former student at Newburyport High School, brought a complaint against the city of Newburyport, various school officials, and her former chemistry teacher, Kenneth Siegel. The plaintiff's appeal concerns the dismissal, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), of the claims for infliction of emotional distress, violation of civil rights and defamation against Siegel, and the allowance of the motion for summary judgment on the assault count against him. We affirm.
1. The motion to dismiss. We review the order allowing the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint de novo, accepting all allegations as true and drawing any reasonable inferences in her favor. “[W]e look beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Curtis v. Herb Chambers I–95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011). The allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are as follows. On the evening of May 31, 2007, the plaintiff, then a junior at Newburyport High School, and a friend went to an after-the-prom party at a private home. While others were drinking alcohol, she was not. As a result of a noise complaint from a neighbor, the police arrived, detained those students still on the premises, including the plaintiff, and subsequently charged them with underage drinking.1 On June 5, the names of the students who were charged appeared in a local newspaper.
On June 7, when Siegel passed the plaintiff in the hall at school, he told her, “Your parents must be proud of you.” Later that day, the plaintiff came to Siegel's chemistry classroom prior to the start of class. After the class had been “underway for a while” Siegel, a former Marine, stopped discussing chemistry and began to “rant and rave in a loud and threatening voice” about underage drinking and the punishments meted out to student athletes. He pointed to the plaintiff and said, “There's no excuse for this.” He also referred to his former student who was struck and killed by an intoxicated student. At one point, he pounded his fist on the white board. The plaintiff started crying and was unable to regain her composure. Siegel told her that if she could not compose herself, she should leave the classroom. She did so.
a. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. We conclude that the dismissal was proper.2 “To sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant intended to cause, or should have known that his conduct would cause, emotional distress; (2) that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered severe distress.” Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 263–264 (1994), citing Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144–145 (1976). The conduct alleged, which constituted an impassioned, if ill-advised, disquisition on the dangers of teen drinking, cannot be characterized as “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99 (1987), quoting from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965). At most, the defendant's actions could be characterized by a jury as angry and overzealous, but not so outrageous as to be intolerable in civilized society. See ibid .
b. Civil rights. The plaintiff claims that Siegel's conduct constituted a violation of her right to a public education under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I. “To prove a claim under the MCRA, [the plaintiff] must show an interference, or attempted interference, with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of Massachusetts, by means of ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.” ’ Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 593–594 (2001).
The plaintiff does not identify a constitutional or statutory right that she has been denied. The Legislature requires each town to maintain schools for the instruction of children and also requires school attendance. G.L. c. 71, § 1; G.L. c. 76, § 1. A child is afforded the right to an “adequate public education,” which includes “a safe and secure environment in which all children can learn.” Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 129–131 (1995). Taking as true the allegation that she was compelled to leave class, leaving class early on one occasion does not amount to the denial of the right to an “adequate” public education, and the plaintiff cites no law for the proposition that her alleged emotional distress prevented her from obtaining an “adequate” education.
c. Defamation. “Defamation is the publication of material by one without a privilege to do so which ridicules or treats the plaintiff with contempt.” Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 416 Mass. 808, 812 (1994), quoting from Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319 (1991). An allegedly defamatory statement need not be an explicit assertion, but rather, “[a]n insinuation may be as actionable as a direct statement.” Howell v. Enterprise Publishing Co., 72 Mass.App.Ct. 739, 742 (2008), quoting from Mabardi v. Boston Herald–Traveler Corp., 347 Mass. 411, 413 (1964). However, to be actionable, the statements must be false. Ibid. Most of the statements alleged in the complaint were comments on teen drinking; they were not statements about the plaintiff. To the extent that any of them could be treated as statements of fact, not opinion, the plaintiff acknowledges that none of the statements made by Siegel were false or defamatory in and of themselves.
Rather, the plaintiff argues that by stating his views on drunk driving, pointing to her and saying that there was “no excuse” for her behavior, and referring to the death of his former student, Siegel targeted the plaintiff, accused her of drinking at the party, and suggested that she is no better than the drunk driver who killed his former student. To the extent the plaintiff challenges Siegel's statements that “there's no excuse for this” and that students who drink alcohol at parties should be punished, those are protected opinions. See Cole v. Westinghouse Bdcst. Co., 386 Mass. 303, 312 (1982) (). At most, Siegel's remarks fall within the rubric of defamation by innuendo, a doctrine which contemplates that certain expressions of opinion may be defamatory. See generally Reilly v. Associated Press, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 764, 774 (2003). “A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory...
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