O'Brien v. Trustees of Troy Annual Conference of United Methodist Church

• Decision Date: 28 January 1999
• Citation: 684 N.Y.S.2d 328,257 A.D.2d 954
• Parties: 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 625 Roberta O'BRIEN, Appellant, v. TRUSTEES OF the TROY ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF the UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Respondent, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 328

684 N.Y.S.2d 328

1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 625

Roberta O'BRIEN, Appellant, v. TRUSTEES OF the TROY ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF the UNITED

METHODIST CHURCH, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Jan. 28, 1999.

James W. Woolsey Jr., Albany, for appellant.

Roche, Corrigan, McCoy & Bush (Scott W. Bush of counsel), Albany, for respondent.

Before: CARDONA, P.J., MERCURE, SPAIN, CARPINELLO and GRAFFEO, JJ.

SPAIN, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ceresia Jr., J.), entered December 11, 1997 in Rensselaer County, which granted a motion by defendant Trustees of the Troy Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.

In August 1991, plaintiff was severely injured when she fell through an allegedly rotted and deteriorated porch on property owned by defendant First United Methodist Church of Rensselaer (hereinafter First United), located in the City of Rensselaer, Rensselaer County. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced separate actions against First United and defendant Trustees of the Troy Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (hereinafter defendant). After the two actions were consolidated, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it on the grounds that it neither owned the premises where the accident occurred nor was responsible for maintaining the premises. In opposition, plaintiff admitted that First United was the record title holder of the premises but argued that defendant exercised sufficient control over the property to impose liability upon it. Finding that plaintiff failed to establish a question of fact as to whether defendant exercised sufficient control over the property to impose liability, Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

We affirm. "[I]t is well established law that liability for a dangerous condition on property is predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control or special use of the property" (Palmer v. Prescott, 208 A.D.2d 1065, 1066, 617 N.Y.S.2d 411, lv. denied 85 N.Y.2d 804, 626 N.Y.S.2d 755, 650 N.E.2d 414; Turrisi v. Ponderosa Inc., 179 A.D.2d 956, 957, 578 N.Y.S.2d 724; McGill v. Caldors, 135 A.D.2d 1041, 1043, 522 N.Y.S.2d 976). Where none of these elements is present, a party cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the dangerous or defective condition (see, Warren v. Wilmorite Inc., 211 A.D.2d 904, 905, 621 N.Y.S.2d 184; Turrisi v. Ponderosa Inc., supra, at 957, 578 N.Y.S.2d 724; Balsam v. Delma Eng'g Corp., 139 A.D.2d 292, 296-297, 532 N.Y.S.2d 105, lv. denied, lv. dismissed 73 N.Y.2d 783, 536 N.Y.S.2d 741, 533 N.E.2d 671).

Here, it is undisputed that First United was the sole record title owner of the premises where the accident occurred. The fact that defendant may obtain title to the premises upon the abandonment or discontinuance of First United is not sufficient to establish a present ownership interest, or authority in ...