Briggins v. State, 53147

• Decision Date: 14 July 1982
• Docket Number: No. 53147,53147
• Parties: Eddie Gene BRIGGINS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 691

416 So.2d 691

Eddie Gene BRIGGINS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 53147.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 14, 1982.

Willie L. Rose, Lexington, Mel Davis, Leonard McClellan, Oxford, for appellant.

Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before SMITH, P. J., and WALKER and DAN M. LEE, JJ.

WALKER, Justice, for the Court:

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Lafayette County wherein the appellant, Eddie Gene Briggins, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to serve a term of eighteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

On August 31, 1980, appellant and his wife drove to the Eastview Apartments in Oxford, Mississippi. When a friend informed appellant that the taillights on his car were not working, he asked his wife to go upstairs and borrow some tinfoil to wrap the fuse. Appellant's two sisters-in-law lived in the apartments.

Appellant testified that after his wife went upstairs, he heard the deceased, Edward Junior Houston, the boyfriend of appellant's sister-in-law, cursing at his wife. Appellant told the decedent not to speak to his wife that way, and the decedent then came downstairs and began arguing with appellant. Shortly thereafter appellant and Houston both left in their automobiles. The appellant drove to his house, put his loaded shotgun on the backseat and returned to the apartments to wait for Houston to return.

Appellant testified that when the decedent arrived, he told Houston that he wanted to talk to him and at that time decedent got something from his car. Appellant testified he could not determine what the decedent removed from the car but that he then fired one shot in the air. Houston then yelled at appellant "go ahead and shoot me" and appellant shot and killed him. Photographs taken at the scene showed a hammer lying near the decedent's body. Later that night appellant turned himself in to the Lafayette County sheriff.

Appellant's first assignment of error is that the trial court permitted the introduction of a color photograph of the deceased. This assignment has no merit. The photograph had probative value in that it showed the location of the gunshot wound and therefore should have been admitted. Moreover, in this State the trial judge is granted much discretion to determine the admissibility of photographs, and we find there was no manifest abuse of that discretion.

Appellant's next assignment of error concerns the court's refusal to grant certain instructions dealing with various theories of self-defense. ¹ The jury was amply instructed as to the theory of self-defense in Instruction D-10. This instruction clearly stated that if appellant had reasonable grounds to apprehend that he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm at the hands of the decedent, the self-defense doctrine would apply. Instructions D-4, S-2 and S-4 all stated that the prosecution must disprove the claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt when that issue has been sufficiently raised. Pierce v. State, 289 So.2d 901 (Miss.1974). When read together we find the jury was properly instructed on the doctrine of self-defense.

Appellant's final assignment of error is that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to consider prior threats made by the decedent against the appellant. Appellant requested the following instructions: ²

The Court instructs you that in reaching your decision as to whether Mr. Briggins had reasonable cause to believe the decedent was about to attempt to inflict great bodily harm upon him at the time of the shooting, you are to consider the previous arguments that occurred earlier that date between the parties, as well as, all threats that the decedent may have made, if any, toward Mr. Briggins. (Emphasis added).

In reaching your decision as to whether Mr. Briggins had reasonable cause to believe the decedent was about to attempt to inflict great bodily injuries against him, the Court instructs you to consider all previous arguments, hostility and difficulties between Mr. Briggins and the deceased. (Emphasis added).

These instructions singled out and gave undue prominence to parts of the testimony and as worded would have amounted to a comment on the weight of the evidence contrary to our well established rule. Ceary v. State, 204 Miss. 299, 37 So.2d 316 (1948). Therefore, the trial judge properly refused both instructions.

For the above reasons, the appellant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

PATTERSON, C. J., SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur.

HAWKINS, J., dissents.

HAWKINS, Justice, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, reversible error was committed by the circuit judge's refusal to grant certain instructions requested by the defense.

The issue of self defense was submitted to the jury. Although the defendant's claim of self defense was very weak, it was properly submitted to the jury. McMullen v. State, 291 So.2d 537 (Miss.1974); Ellis v. State, 208 So.2d 49 (Miss.1968); Tate v. State, 192 So.2d 923 (Miss.1966); Brown v. State, 186 Miss. 734, 191 So. 818 (1939); Lofton v. State, 79 Miss. 723, 31 So. 420 (1902).

The facts from the defense standpoint are as follows:

Approximately one or two hours prior to the slaying, Briggins and his wife, Annie, went to the apartment complex where Annie's two sisters lived in an upstairs apartment. Houston lived with one of them, Emma Grace.

Briggins remained outside, and heard Houston profanely abusing Emma Grace and Annie. Houston, it later developed, had a butcher knife he was brandishing. Briggins yelled to Houston, warning him not to insult his wife. Houston came downstairs and a vigorous "cuss fight" ensued between the two. Houston returned upstairs, following which Emma Grace came downstairs and warned Briggins not to turn his back on Houston, that he had a knife.

Briggins, unarmed, drove to his home some distance away and got a shotgun. He then returned for his wife.

In the second, and fatal encounter at the apartment complex, Briggins upon returning waited for the return of Houston, who, in the meantime, had also driven away from the apartment complex.

After Houston returned, Briggins testified he saw Houston go to his car, reach under a seat, and Briggins shot his shotgun into the air. Houston dared Briggins to shoot him, and Houston then raised his arms. Briggins thereupon shot and killed him. Briggins stated he thought he was in danger from either a pistol or a sawed-off shotgun. ¹

No pistol or shotgun was found in the possession of Houston following the killing. A hammer was found near his body.

Because a jury question was presented as to whether Briggins acted in lawful self-defense, Briggins was clearly entitled to have the jury specifically instructed that they could consider (1) threats made against Briggins by Houston, if any, and (2) that the danger did not have to be actual, but reasonably apparent.

There were general instructions granted the State and defendant on the law pertaining to self-defense. None of them, however, addressed either of the specific issues of previous threats made on Briggins, or reasonably apparent danger as opposed to actual danger.

Briggins' requested instructions on both these issues were refused by the circuit judge.

When self-defense is a proper issue before the jury, the state of mind of both the decedent and the accused become proper subjects for the jury in determining whether the accused at the time of the slaying had "... reasonable ground to apprehend (from the deceased) a design ... to do some great personal injury," and whether there was, "... imminent danger of such design being accomplished." Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 97-3-15(f) (1972).

As an aid to the jury in making its determination whether the slaying was in lawful self-defense, this Court has consistently held previous difficulties between the parties, as well as threats, should be admitted into evidence before the jury (so long as they are not too remote in time). For the same reason, even though the accused may not have been in actual danger from the deceased when he killed him, movements or conduct on the part of the decedent at the time which caused the accused to be reasonably fearful of either losing his life or suffering serious bodily harm at the hands of the deceased are proper evidence to be considered by the jury.

Cases holding previous difficulties as well as threats are admissible for both the State and the accused are: Wilson v. State, 390 So.2d 575 (Miss.1980) (threats were competent for a different reason); Murphy v. State, 232 Miss. 424, 99 So.2d 595 (1958); Hardy v. State, 143 Miss. 352, 108 So. 727 (1926); Clark v. State, 123 Miss. 147, 85 So. 188 (1920); Leverett v. State, 112 Miss. 394, 73 So. 273 (1916); Burks v. State, 101 Miss. 87, 57 So. 367 (1911); Echols v. State, 99 Miss. 683, 55 So. 485 (1911); Godwin v. State, 73 Miss. 873 (1896).

Cases of this Court holding that the accused is not required to be in actual danger, but may act upon reasonable appearances of danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm from the decedent at the time of the slaying are: Bell v. State, 207 Miss. 518, 42 So.2d 728 (1949); Scott v. State, 203 Miss. 349, 34 So.2d 718 (1948); McNeal v. State, 115 Miss. 678, 76 So. 625 (1917); Johnson v. State, 79 Miss. 42, 30 So. 39 (1901); Godwin v. State, 73 Miss. 873 (1896).

In this case the circuit judge gave wide latitude to the accused, offering him full opportunity to offer into evidence before the jury the previous difficulties and threats, and also all facts which might have shown he acted when he was in "reasonably apparent" danger as opposed to any actual danger. Having done so, however, he enigmatically refused to specifically instruct the jury on either of these issues, although requested to do so. ²

Regarding the previous difficulties and...