Briggs v. Barber (In re Estate of Briggs)
| Decision Date | 12 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 32995,SD 32995 |
| Citation | 449 S.W.3d 421 |
| Parties | In the Estate of George L. Briggs, Deceased. Jona A. Briggs, Personal Representative of the Estate of George L. Briggs, Deceased, and Jona A. Briggs, Individually and as Successor Trustee of the George L. Briggs Revocable Trust Agreement Dated June 3, 2004, Petitioner/Respondent–Appellant, v. Renate Barber, Respondent/Petitioner–Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Donald W. Ingrum of Branson, MO, Attorney for Appellant
Michael L. Miller of Springfield, MO, Attorney for Respondent
Jona A. Briggs, individually, as personal representative, and as trustee (“Briggs”), appeals from the trial court's judgment finding that Briggs and Renate Barber (“Barber”) reached a settlement agreement resolving three related lawsuits involving the division of real property between them, and granting Barber specific performance of that settlement agreement. Briggs raises two points of error—(1) there was no substantial evidence to determine the legal description of the real property involved, and (2) “there was no substantial evidence to support the judgment or it misapplied the law” in finding that Briggs and Barber reached a settlement agreement. We affirm the trial court's judgment because, viewing the evidence as we must view it in accordance with our standard of review, there was substantial evidence to permit a competent surveyor to find and identify the real property involved, and to support the trial court's finding that Briggs and Barber reached a settlement agreement.
Viewed in accordance with our standard of review, the evidence showed the following. George L. Briggs, Jr. died on December 12, 2006. On February 9, 2007, Mr. Briggs' daughter, Jona A. Briggs, individually and as trustee of Mr. Briggs' trust, filed a petition to set aside two deeds executed by Mr. Briggs in favor of Renate Barber, Mr. Briggs' companion. Briggs subsequently filed an application for probate of a Will dated June 3, 2004 and letters testamentary, and, on March 9, 2007, was appointed personal representative of the estate of Mr. Briggs. On May 14, 2007, Barber filed a petition to contest Mr. Briggs' Will dated June 3, 2004 and establish a Will dated December 8, 2006 as Mr. Briggs' true Will. The defendants in the will contest included Briggs individually, as personal representative of the estate of Mr. Briggs, and as trustee of Mr. Briggs' trust. On June 12, 2007, Briggs, in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Mr. Briggs, filed a petition to discover assets against Barber in an adversary proceeding within the estate of Mr. Briggs.
On June 18, 2012, Briggs and Barber along with counsel participated in mediation relating to these three lawsuits (i.e., petitions to set aside two deeds, contest a Will, and discover assets) without arriving at a resolution of the lawsuits. Later that day, counsel for Briggs extended to counsel for Barber by telephone an offer to resolve the lawsuits, and counsel for Barber accepted the offer. A short time later on the same day, counsel for Barber asked counsel for Briggs by email to “forward ... a draft of the settlement agreement for my review.” That evening, counsel for Briggs emailed to counsel for Barber “the outline of the deal as I understand it” in ten numbered paragraphs.
After counsel for Barber inquired about “the status of the settlement agreement” on July 9, 2012, counsel for Briggs emailed a draft settlement agreement to counsel for Barber on July 13, 2012. Counsel for Barber replied by email on July 17, 2012,
On August 6, 2012, counsel for Briggs replied by email “[t]he changes are fine.”
Under the revised, written settlement agreement, seven parcels of real property in Taney County and one parcel of real property in Stone County were to be divided as follows: Barber was to transfer to Briggs as trustee Taney County parcels three through seven and the Stone County parcel and all but the east 100 acres of Taney County parcel two (the settlement agreement provided “unless ... mutually agree[d] otherwise,” the boundary line separating the two parts of Taney County parcel two “shall be a line running due north and south”). Barber was to retain Taney County parcel one and the east 100 acres of Taney County parcel two.
Barber subsequently executed the settlement agreement on or about August 20, 2012 (the settlement agreement Barber executed was the same agreement as the settlement agreement counsel for Briggs stated was “fine” on August 6, 2012 except that the date of the agreement had been changed from July to August, and a typographical error in one of the notary acknowledgment blocks had been corrected). Barber then paid a surveyor $3,500 to prepare a survey that divided Taney County parcel two in accordance with the settlement agreement.
On December 27, 2012, Barber filed a motion to enforce the settlement of the three lawsuits between Barber and Briggs individually, as personal representative and as trustee.
On January 30, 2013, by email, counsel for Briggs informed counsel for Barber for the first time that Briggs (1) refused to execute the settlement agreement and (2) offered to settle the three lawsuits on substantially different terms.
On July 9, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on Barber's motion to enforce settlement. When Barber offered into evidence the survey that divided Taney County parcel two, Briggs objected and then withdrew her objection as follows:
The trial court then admitted the survey.1
In an amended judgment filed September 26, 2013, the trial court granted Barber specific performance of a settlement agreement with Briggs, and found that:
on June 18, 2012, Briggs and Barber, through their respective counsel, entered into a settlement agreement, supported by consideration to settle the above-captioned litigation, under the terms set forth in an email from [counsel] for Briggs[ ] to [counsel] for Barber, and that on August 6, 2012, Briggs and Barber further memorialized the terms of the settlement as set forth in the June 18, 2012, email, in a written Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) as counsel for Barber emailed the Settlement Agreement to counsel for Briggs after agreed upon changes to the form of the Settlement Agreement were made to the Settlement Agreement.
In a court-tried case:
Consolidated Grain & Barge, Co. v. Hobbs, 397 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Mo.App.S.D.2013). A claim that the trial court erroneously declared or applied the law is reviewed de novo. Smith v. Great American Assurance Co., 436 S.W.3d 700, 704 n. 3 (Mo.App. S.D. 2014). Briggs has the burden to prove the trial court's judgment should be reversed. Grider v. Tingle, 325 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Mo.App.S.D.2010).
We address Briggs' points in reverse order.
In Briggs' second point, Briggs contends that the trial court erred “because there was no substantial evidence to support the judgment or it misapplied the law in that the evidence ... [showed] a series of offers and counteroffers ... but no unequivocal agreement was reached between the parties.” Contrary to Briggs' contention, substantial evidence showed (1) an oral offer by Briggs' counsel to Barber's counsel on June 18, 2012 followed later that day by an email from Briggs' counsel to Barber's counsel summarizing in writing Briggs' oral offer, (2) a further offer on July 13, 2012 by Briggs' counsel to Barber's counsel in the form of a written settlement agreement, (3) a counteroffer on July 17, 2012 by Barber's counsel to Briggs' counsel in the form of a revised, written settlement agreement, and (4) an acceptance of the counteroffer on August 6, 2012 by Briggs' counsel when Briggs' counsel emailed Barber's counsel and stated “[t]he changes are fine.”
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