Briggs v. Brown

• Decision Date: 07 April 1908
• Citation: 55 Fla. 417,46 So. 325
• Parties: BRIGGS v. BROWN.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

46 So. 325

55 Fla. 417

BRIGGS v. BROWN.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

April 7, 1908

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; Minor S. Jones, Judge.

Action by Merton V. Brown against Fred E. Briggs. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

A civil action for libel will lie when there has been a false and unprivileged publication by letter or otherwise which exposes a person to distrust, hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy or which causes such person to be avoided, or which has a tendency to injure such person in his office, occupation business, or employment.

Where a publication is false and not privileged, and is such that is natural and proximate consequence necessarily causes injury to a person in his personal, social, official, or business relations of life, wrong and injury are presumed or implied and such publication is actionable per se.

Where a publication is not privileged, and is not actionable per se because the publication as ordinarily understood will not naturally and necessarily cause injury, damages may be recovered upon proper allegations and proofs for such special injury as is the natural and proximate, though not necessary consequence of the wrongful publication.

A party injured by a publication cannot recover damages therefor if the publication is true and is made in good faith in such a manner and under such circumstances as to properly serve the rights of others by and to whom the publication was made. Such a publication is privileged when properly made to serve the rights of others. The damage to the injured party, if not needlessly done, is not wrongful, and gives no right of action.

To be privileged a publication must be by and to only those who have a right, duty, or interest in the subject. The publication must be of a character and made without malice in a manner and on an occasion to properly serve such right, duty, or interest, and not to needlessly injure another.

Where a publication is not libelous per se, but special damage or injury is alleged as a natural and proximate result of such publication, and the publication is alleged to be false and to have been maliciously made, it is actionable.

A party is liable in tort for all the consequences that reasonably and naturally flow from or follow his wrongful act, whether the consequences were actually contemplated or not. The tortious act being established, the liability extends to all of the consequences that naturally, proximately, and reasonably follow or result from such act.

A declaration in which it is alleged that an officer of an improvement company wrote a letter to an indemnity company stating that an employé of the improvement company for whom the indemnity company had given a bond was delinquent in his duties to the improvement company with reference to which duties the bond was given, and that the letter was false and maliciously sent, and was received and read by the indemnity company, is not demurrable, where special injuries to the plaintiff are alleged as the result of such a publication.

In an action for libel, where the plea admits the writing of the letter complained of, testimony that the defendant showed the witness a letter which read like the one declared on, and that defendant told the witness it was 'a copy of the letter which he mailed,' is corroboration of the admission of the plea, and tended to prove publication, and should not be stricken.

Where the defendant admits sending a libelous letter, the introduction in evidence of a copy of the letter in connection with other evidence of publication is not harmful; but the admission in evidence over proper objections of a copy of a letter purporting but not shown to be from the person to whom the libelous letter was sent containing matters relating to the privilege of the letter complained of, and containing also exparte suggestious relating to the defendant, is harmful error.

The privilege of a publication is not confined to the legal duties of the parties in the premises.

COUNSEL

Price & Rand, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. M. Robbins, for defendant in error.

An action for libel and slander was brought in the circuit court for Dade county by Merton V. Brown against Fred E. Briggs. The first count of the declaration was for libel, and the other three counts were for slander. The second and fourth counts were discontinuted by the plaintiff during the trial. A demurrer to the evidence under the third count was sustained, the count was amended, and evidence submitted thereunder. A demurrer to the evidence under the third court as amended was overruled. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff on the first count for libel, and fixed the damages at $5,000, and found for the defendant on the other count. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict, and the defendant took writ of error.

The first count of the declaration is as follows:

'For that whereas, the plaintiff, before and at the time of the committing by the defendant of the several grievances hereinafter mentioned, was elected to, held, and exercised an office of emolument and trust in a corporation for profit, organized under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Florida, with its principal business office located at Miami, in the county of Dade and state aforesaid, to wit, the office of secretary and treasurer of the Miami Investment Company, the corporation aforesaid and has always conducted himself in the said office with punctuality, skill, and honesty in the management of the business of his said office and in keeping the accounts of the said corporation and in managing the business affairs of the said corporation, and is and was deservedly held in great credit and esteem by the officers, directors, and stockholders of the said corporation, and in great credit and esteem by his neighbors, and was considered a faithful, honest, and capable officer by the various guaranty and trust companies of the United States doing business in the state of Florida, and was enabled by and through the confidence reposed in his said capacity, faithfulness, and honesty to secure the bonds of indemnity in the said various bond and indemnity companies doing business in the state of Florida whereby he was enabled to hold the position and office of emolument and trust in the said Miami Investment Company and other companies doing business in the state of Florida, whereby he daily acquired divers gains and emoluments in his said office and business to the support and maintenance of his family and the increase of his fortune; and for that whereas, the plaintiff, before the committing by the defendant of the several grievances hereinafter mentioned, held and exercised the office of secretary and treasurer of the Tropical Home Improvement Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Florida, whereof the defendant was the principal stockholder, and the plaintiff then and there holding the office of secretary and treasurer of the said Tropical Home & Improvement Company had been required to enter into a bond with good and sufficient sureties in the sum of $2,000, conditioned upon the safekeeping of the moneys of the last said corporation instrusted to him (the plaintiff) as such secretary and treasurer, and the plaintiff had made and filed with the said corporation a certain bond conditioned as aforesaid with the AEtna Indemnity Company of Hartford, Conn., as surety; and for that whereas, also the plaintiff, before the committing by the defendant of the several grievances hereinafter mentioned at a meeting of the stockholders of the said Tropical Home & Improvement Company, called and held pursuant to law for the purpose of the election of officers for the ensuing fiscal year, did nominate and elect to the office of secretary and treasurer one C. L. Huddleston to supersede the plaintiff in the office of secretary and treasurer of the said Tropical Home & Improvement Company, and thereupon the plaintiff was at once elected and installed into the office of secretary and treasurer of the Miami Investment Company, a corporation as aforesaid, and the plaintiff says that it was a condition to the holding and exercising of the said office of secretary and treasurer of the Miami Investment Company, a corporation as aforesaid, that the plaintiff should enter into a bond in the sum of $5,000, conditioned for the safe-keeping of the moneys of the said corporation intrusted to him, that after the committing of the grievances hereinafter set forth the plaintiff applied to the AEtna Indemnity Company, of Hartford, Conn., to become the surety on such bond and also to other companies doing business as guaranty companies in the state of Florida to become surety on the bond of the plaintiff, all of which applications were denied. Yet the defendant, well knowing the premises as to plaintiff's calling and the necessity for such bonds, and well knowing that the plaintiff had been honest, capable, and faithful in the discharge of his duties as secretary and treasurer of the Tropical Home & Improvement Company, and that the plaintiff had carefully and faithfully discharged the duties of his said office and had kept just and true accounts of the business transactions of the said corporation, and had faithfully and skillfully invested the funds of the said corporation as provided by the bylaws, and had delivered and surrendered to his successor, the said C. L. Huddleston, all of the assets of the said corporation in the hands, custody, and control of the said plaintiff and as such secretary and treasurer, and that a full and complete settlement had been effected between the plaintiff and the said corporation, which

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