Briggs v. Coffin

• Decision Date: 23 May 1894
• Citation: 91 Iowa 329,59 N.W. 259
• Parties: BRIGGS v. COFFIN ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

91 Iowa 329

59 N.W. 259

BRIGGS

v.COFFIN ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 23, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Mitchell county; John C. Sherwin, Judge.

Action in equity to set aside certain conveyances of real and personal property, to recover the property, and for general equitable relief. There was a hearing on the merits, and a judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Reiniger & Lloyd, for appellant.

G. E. Marsh, for appellee Emma B. Coffin.

G. E. Marsh and Eaton & Clyde, for appellee Eaton.

Eaton & Clyde, for appellees A. and M. Schulte.

ROBINSON, J.

One George Briggs died in Mitchell county, about the year 1882, leaving an estate, consisting of both real and personal property. Nearly all of the estate was left to four beneficiaries, in shares as follows: To C. M. Blackman, one-half; to Mrs. Hester Ann Wadsworth, one-fourth; and to Adelaide C. and Emma A. Briggs, one-fourth. The share taken by the persons last named was given by the will to their father, Daniel M. Briggs, but he died before the death of the testator, who was his brother. Mrs. Wadsworth and the Misses Briggs were nonresidents of this state. Mrs. Wadsworth was executrix and C. M. Blackman was executor of the will, but it appears that they acted to some extent separately, employing different attorneys and making separate reports. About the year 1883, the plaintiff, who was a nephew of George Briggs, and then a resident of Missouri or New York, came to this state to act as agent and attorney in fact of Mrs. Wadsworth, and thereafter, and until about the year 1888, she acted in managing the estate through him. It is not made clear what he did, but it is stated that the part of the estate he managed was of the value of from $45,000 to $50,000, and it appears that he took charge of the shares of Mrs. Wadsworth and the Misses Briggs. In December, 1887, Adelaide C. Briggs and her sister, then Emma A. Merville, conveyed to the plaintiff the interests acquired by them through the will, and a few weeks later Mrs. Wadsworth executed to the plaintiff a conveyance of her interest in the estate. A short time thereafter she became dissatisfied, and the plaintiff relinquished to her the interest she had conveyed to him, and commenced an action against her to recover $20,000, alleged to be due him for money advanced and services rendered by him for her in the settlement of the estate. Adelaide C. Briggs also became dissatisfied with what she had done, and demanded that the interest she had conveyed be surrendered to her, but her demand was refused. In January, 1889, the plaintiff, then a resident of Brooklyn, N. Y., came to this state. Actions had been commenced against him on account of his management of the estate, and others were commenced after his arrival. While in this state, he arranged for a conveyance to his attorney, F. F. Coffin, of his entire interest in the estate, including lands, notes, and judgments, and the conveyance was afterwards completed. In March, 1889, Mrs. Wadsworth and Adelaide C. Briggs, then Mrs. Day, conveyed to the defendant Willard L. Eaton their interest in the land of the estate. In September, 1889, Coffin and Eaton made a division of the interests in land which they had acquired as stated. Deeds necessary to effect the division were made by each, Eaton executing to the defendant Emma B. Coffin, who was the wife of F. F. Coffin, a conveyance for some of the land. In November, 1886, C. M. Blackman, as an individual, assigned his interest in certain notes and mortgages which had been given by the defendants A. and M. Schulte, and which belonged to the estate, to the plaintiff and Coffin. On the same day another assignment of the same instruments, purporting to be executed by Blackman as executor, and by Mrs. Wadsworth as executrix, by the plaintiff as her attorney in fact, was made to the plaintiff and defendant Coffin. The notes and mortgages thus transferred were left for collection with Coffin, who was an attorney, and who agreed to obtain judgment on them, and that plaintiff should have and own one-half of the judgment without expense for attorney's fees. The plaintiff alleges that his conveyance of property to Coffin was the result of the joint efforts of Coffin and Eaton to defraud him; that Coffin was his legal adviser, in whom he had great confidence; that Coffin advised him to make the conveyances, in order to stop litigation and expedite the settlement of all matters in dispute between the litigants,--and that the conveyances were made upon the advice so given, and with reliance upon the promise of Coffin to convey the property back to him when the litigation and matters in dispute should be adjusted; that the conveyance of the property which Coffin has made was without authority; that Eaton took the conveyance to him from Coffin with full knowledge of the rights of plaintiff; that the conveyance of land to Mrs. Coffin was made without consideration, and to defraud the plaintiff; that one of the two Schulte mortgages in question was wrongfully satisfied by Coffin, and a certain judgment against one Keating was wrongfully assigned to the defendant M. Schulte. The plaintiff asks that all the land which he claims be conveyed to him by the defendants, in whom the title now appears to be vested; that the transfer made by him to Coffin of personal property, including his claim against Mrs. Wadsworth, be decreed to be void; that the satisfaction of the satisfied Schulte mortgage be set aside; that an account be taken of the amount due him on the two Schulte mortgages; and that he have a decree for the amount and for the foreclosure of the mortgages; and that he have general equitable relief. F. F. Coffin was made defendant in the action, but died before the final hearing, and Mrs. Coffin, who is the administratrix of his estate, has been substituted for him. The defendant Eaton denies all charges of fraud or knowledge of fraud on his part, and all right of plaintiff to recover against him. Mrs. Coffin, in her own right, and as administratrix, denies all liability charged by the plaintiff, and alleges that the conveyances made to her husband were made by plaintiff voluntarily, with the intention and purpose of defrauding his creditors, and that he is now estopped to assert title to the property conveyed. The Schultes allege that their notes have been fully paid and surrendered to them, and that their mortgages are satisfied. The district court dismissed the petition of plaintiff, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants for costs.

1. The appellant has filed in this court a motion to strike the additional abstract of appellees from the files, because a copy thereof was not served on counsel for appellant within 10 days after a copy of the appellant's abstract was served. Section 19 of the rules of practice in this court requires the additional abstract to be served within 10 days after the service of the abstract, but it is not our practice to strike from the files an additional abstract when served after the expiration of the 10 days, especially when, as in this case, the final submission of the cause is not delayed by permitting the additional abstract to remain on file. The rules of this court are designed to secure the submission of cause on their merits in an orderly manner, and as speedily as is practicable. When it seems necessary, we shall not hesitate to impose suitable penalties for their violation, but we are always unwilling to take any action which will tend to prevent the full submission of a cause upon a record which is satisfactory to all parties in interest. The appellant does not appear to have been prejudiced by the delay in serving the additional abstract, and it will be permitted to remain on file.

2. The appellant also asks by motion to have certain portions of the additional abstract stricken out, on the ground that they are not justified by the record. It is not the practice to present such questions by motion to strike, but by a formal printed denial or statement, in the nature of a reply, which may, if necessary, contain a further abstract of the record in explanation of the denial. It is proper to state that, although the motion of appellant will be overruled, we do not find it necessary to give any weight to the portions of the additional abstract to which the motion is directed.

3. This action was commenced on the 27th day of September, 1889. On the 19th day of November, that being the 2d day of the term, the defendants filed a motion to require the plaintiff to give security for costs. Six days later, a cost bond was filed and approved. On the 26th day of November, the petition was assailed by motion, and was amended by the plaintiff. On the next day, the defendants Coffin and his wife, Eaton, and the Schultes were ordered to file answers within 20 days, with the privilege of withdrawing them at the next term and filing demurrers. On the 27th day of December, answers not having been filed, the plaintiff filed a motion asking that the defendants be adjudged in default for failure to answer. On the next day the answer of Eaton was filed, and on the 19th day of January, 1890, the Schultes answered. On the 2d day of the next February term of court the cause was continued without further proceeding. On the 23d day of April, that being the 15th day of the April term, Mrs. Coffin, as administratrix, was substituted as defendant for F. F. Coffin, deceased, and the cause was continued without other action. On the 26th day of July, the answers of Mrs. Coffin, in her own right and...