Briggs v. Fenstermaker
| Decision Date | 06 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:23-cv-00146-JLT-SAB |
| Parties | JOHNNY LEE BRIGGS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID FENSTERMAKER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff Johnny Lee Briggs (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner (BU6282) proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 31, 2023, against David Fenstermaker (“Fenstermaker”), the Community Regional Medical Center (“CRMC”), and the Medical Board of Examiners (“Board”). (ECF No. 1.) The Court screened the complaint, found Plaintiff's claims were Heck-barred, and issued findings and recommendations to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed objections to the findings and recommendations indicating he was willing to dismiss certain claims and defendants but wished to proceed on his claims (ECF No. 12), then filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 13). The FAC, which now purports to sue Defendants Fenstermaker and Heather Shirley (collectively, “Defendants”) (id. at 2) is currently before this Court for screening. For the reasons stated herein, the Court recommends that the FAC be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). If the factual elements of a cause of action are present but are scattered throughout the complaint and not organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim,” dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8 is proper. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, to comply with Rule 8, a complaint should clearly and fully set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” Id. Such notice pleading is required in federal court in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient ....” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, to survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Thus, where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims ... across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” the complaint is properly dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (internal quotations omitted).
As a general rule, the Court must limit its review to the operative complaint and may not consider facts presented in extrinsic evidence. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Materials submitted as part of the complaint, however, are not “outside” the complaint and may be considered. Id.; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the Court is not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by exhibits to the complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff can also “plead himself out of a claim by including unnecessary details contrary to his claims.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS[1]
The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 21, 2022, he was arrested for numerous weapons charges and attempted murder with “great bodily injury assault.” (ECF No. 1 at 3, 5.) The alleged victim, Russel Lowe, died in the hospital 17 days later.[2] (Id. at 5.) On July 8, 2022, after Mr. Lowe's death, a second amended criminal complaint was filed against Plaintiff, in which the charge for attempted murder was amended to first degree murder. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff appears to allege the amendments to the criminal complaint were made because of representations made by Defendant Fenstermaker, a Fresno Police Department Officer. (See ECF No. 13 at 3 (alleging, verbatim, “Defendant David Fenstermaker is not a prosecutor nor is the Fresno Police Department agency/officer, etc. authorized to duplicate file dismissed charges these actions omitted violates my rights.”).) Plaintiff alleges “Defendant committed fraud by refiling amended felony complaint on behalf of Fresno Police Department injuring my right to due process speedy trial.” (Id.) These facts are asserted in support of Plaintiff's first cause of action, titled “separation of powers constitutional violation S.B. 262”[3] (ECF No. 13 at 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that, due to a “classification error and double jeopardy by commitment offense and enhancements, once dismissed reimposed unauthorizably [sic],” he is being unconstitutionally confined at the Wasco State Prison (“WSP”) by the Warden, Defendant Shirley. (Id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff claims he is being confined at WSP “illegally in excess of [an unspecified] confinement statute,” which “breaches the contract to [Plaintiff's] total term imposed ....” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff asserts these facts in support of his second cause of action, for Eighth Amendment “excessive confinement” violations. (Id.)
In addition, Plaintiff indicates he is a state prisoner incarcerated at Wasco State Prison (“WSP”) (see id. at 1); and Plaintiff engaged the prison grievance process through the final level of appeals for his claims (see id. at 3, 4).
Plaintiff alleges he suffered “personal injury” from the “excessive confinement” resulting from the classification errors and illegal sentence enhancements, and “Defendants' inaction to recall procedure.” (Id. at 4.) He seeks unspecified injunctive relief, monetary damages, sanctions for malicious prosecution, and declaratory relief. (See id. at 5.)
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of a plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Long, 442 F.3d at 1185; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). This requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934; see also Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)) (a deprivation occurs if the defendant “does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do”). In other words, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of his federal rights. Moreover, the complaint must allege that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind to violate the underlying constitutional provision. OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012).
The Court finds Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable claim because his claims run afoul of Heck v. Humphrey and are thus Heck-barred.
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