Briggs v. Highlanders

• Decision Date: 25 June 1909
• Docket Number: No. 15,578.,15,578.
• Citation: 122 N.W. 69,84 Neb. 834
• Parties: BRIGGS v. ROYAL HIGHLANDERS.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

84 Neb. 834

122 N.W. 69

BRIGGS

v.ROYAL HIGHLANDERS.

No. 15,578.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

June 25, 1909.

Syllabus by the Court.

A by-law providing for a forfeiture, adopted by a fraternal beneficiary association subsequent to the issuance by it of a benefit certificate, will be strictly construed against the association, and, if passed in contravention of the provisions of the statute governing such association, it will be held void and of no effect. Lange v. Royal Highlanders, 75 Neb. 188, 106 N. W. 224, 110 N. W. 1110, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666, 121 Am. St. Rep. 786.

“Where a fraternal benefit association has not complied with the provisions of section 1, p. 266, c. 47, of the Acts of 1897, and adopted a representative form of government, its governing body is without power to adopt an edict or by-law changing the terms and obligations of a mutual benefit certificate theretofore issued to one of its members.” Lange v. Royal Highlanders, 75 Neb. 196, 106 N. W. 224, 110 N. W. 1110, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666, 121 Am. St. Rep. 786.

Where, under the provisions of the constitution and by-laws of a fraternal beneficiary association, the delegates to the governing body thereof, regularly elected by the members of said association, cannot of themselves, and without the participation of members of committees appointed from members outside of such delegates, legally and of right adopt, alter, or amend the edicts and laws of such association and absolutely control the government of the same, such governing body is not a representative body, and an association so constituted and governed cannot be said to have a representative form of government.

Suicide will not defeat a recovery upon a benefit certificate in a fraternal beneficiary association unless such certificate, together with the lawfully enacted laws and edicts of such associations, so provide in express terms.

Appeal from District Court, Cuming County; Graves, Judge.

Action by Myra E. Briggs against the Royal Highlanders. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Hainer & Smith, for appellant.

A. R. Olson, for appellee.

FAWCETT, J.

On June 5, 1897, Robert N. Briggs, whom we will hereinafter designate as the “assured,” became a member of a local castle of defendant society, and under that date received from defendant a benefit certificate upon his life in the sum of $3,000, payable at his death to his wife (plaintiff) and son. In April, 1905, the assured, for the sole purpose of changing his beneficiary, surrendered his certificate of June 5, 1897, and received from defendant, as a substitute therefor, the benefit certificate in suit. Defendant wrote on the face of such later certificate the words: “The date of certificate No. 1,741 [[[the former certificate] shall be the date on which the settlement of this certificate shall be based.” In its answer defendant admits that the later certificate “was issued in lieu of said first-named certificate.” The defense pleaded is suicide. It is conceded that, at the time the assured became a member of defendant society and obtained his original certificate, there was nothing in the edicts and laws of the society making suicide a defense; but defendant alleges: That in June, 1901, its edicts and by-laws were amended by inserting the following provision: “The benefit certificate issued to a member shall become void, and all benefits thereunder shall be forfeited in case the member shall die from suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane.” And that in September, 1905, they were again amended so as to provide: “In case of the suicide of a member, either sane or insane, the amount of all contributions of a member to the fidelity fund of the fraternity only shall be paid to the beneficiary named in the certificate.” And that the amount contributed by assured during his lifetime to the fidelity fund is the sum of $106.27, which amount it tendered plaintiff, and which plaintiff refused, and that it has kept the tender good by depositing the same in court for the use and benefit of the plaintiff. The reply admits that the assured committed suicide, and alleges: That the acts of defendant in attempting to amend its edicts and by-laws in June, 1901, and in September, 1905, are void, for the reason that defendant did not, at either of said times, have a representative form of government; that the body designated “executive castle,” which is the governing body of defendant, is not a representative body; that it is not elected by the members of said defendant nor by delegates chosen thereby; and that the same is an arbitrary self-perpetuating body, not representative in form, and not authorized or empowered by defendant to enact by-laws, rules, or edicts for the government of the members of defendant, or to revise or amend the same. There was a trial to the court without the intervention of a jury, and judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of her certificate, with interest, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The motion for a new trial in the court below is as follows: “(1) That the findings of the court are not sustained by the evidence in the case, but are contrary to the manifest weight thereof. (2) The findings and judgment of the court are contrary to the law of the case. (3) That the finding and judgment of the court should have been for the said defendant instead of for the said plaintiff.” This motion raises but the one question: Is the judgment of the district court sustained by the evidence? If we give any consideration whatever to the second paragraph of the motion, then the question would simply be: Can a judgment based upon the evidence actually received be sustained?

Some point is made by defendant that the amendment of its edicts and laws in 1901 was prior to the issuance of the certificate in suit, and that the issuance and acceptance of such certificate was subject to the edicts as so amended. This contention is without merit. The mere substitution of the certificate in suit for the one first issued, for the sole purpose of changing the beneficiary, did not constitute such certificate a new and independent contract. We think it is clear that the certificate in suit must be considered, so far as its date and the rights and liabilities of the respective parties are concerned, as if it had been issued upon the date of the issue of said first certificate, viz., the date of assured's admission into the society. That the alleged change in the edicts and laws of defendant by its convention of June, 1901, was ineffectual and void, has already been determined by this court, in Lange v. Royal Highlanders (this same defendant) 75 Neb. 188, 106 N. W. 224, 110 N. W. 1110, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666, 121 Am. St. Rep. 786. The opinion in that case so fully and fairly sets out...