Briggs v. Sanford

• Decision Date: 31 December 1914
• Parties: BRIGGS v. SANFORD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

219 Mass. 572

107 N.E. 436

BRIGGS v. SANFORD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

December 31, 1914

COUNSEL

R. C Estes, of Attleboro, and Waterman & Greenlaw, of Providence R.I. (Charles E. Tilley, of Providence, R. I., of counsel) for complainant.

Hall & Hagerty and Stanley P. Hall, all of Taunton, for respondent.

OPINION

RUGG, C.J.

This suit was heard by a judge of the superior court, who made findings of fact and entered a decree chiefly in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. The evidence is not reported. Hence the findings of fact must be accepted as final. Upon this state of the record the only matters open are that the decree does not correspond with the allegations and prayers of the bill and could not have been entered lawfully on the facts found and that the conclusions reached are incompatible with other facts found. First Baptist Society in Brookfield v. Dexter, 193 Mass. 187, 189, 79 N.E. 342. The plaintiff rests upon the two latter grounds.

The plaintiff, the trustee in bankruptcy of Isaac B. Sanford, the husband of the defendant, seeks to set aside a conveyance of real estate and transfer of personal property made by the bankrupt through an intermediary to his wife more than four months before his bankruptcy. The facts as found by the judge are that the defendant earned money with which certain real estate was purchased many years ago, title being taken in the name of the husband under such circumstances that he held it in trust for the wife. This parcel subsequently was sold and its proceeds devoted to the purchase of other and more valuable real estate, title of this being taken also in the husband's name but under circumstances which made him trustee for her, she being in equity the true owner. This was an eight-acre place occupied by the wife and her husband as a home, but managed entirely by her. She cultivated the land and operated it as a small farm, employed and paid all the help, raised and sold produce and from the proceeds paid off a mortgage upon the property and its taxes. The entire cost was paid either out of the proceeds of the sale of the first parcel, which represented her earnings, or out of the income of the second place, the result wholly of her frugality, industry and sound judgment in carrying on the farming business which she there conducted. The husband did no work on the farm of any consequence, but carried on the business of contractor and builder for many years. He kept his financial affairs to himself and his wife knew nothing about them until about February 1, 1913, when she learned that he was in debt and signed in release of her dower a mortgage for $1,000 made by him upon the real estate in question, upon the understanding that the proceeds should be paid to his creditors and upon condition that the equity of redemption should be conveyed to her as soon as he was able, he then being ill. She supposed that this $1,000 would pay substantially all he owed. On February 26, 1913, being then heavily in debt, he conveyed the land through a third person to the defendant, by deeds which were recorded forthwith. In conclusion the judge found that, taking into account 'the necessary inferences and the usual presumptions arising from a case of this nature,' the plaintiff failed to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that this conveyance to the defendant was in fraud of the husband's creditors.

It alleged in the plaintiff's bill that the husband obtained credit on the strength of being the record owner of this real estate, but as there is no finding supporting this averment, that fact must be assumed against the plaintiff. Hence, it is not necessary to determine what would be the governing principles of law if this had been shown.

The conveyance in question, having been made more than four months prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, is attacked not as being void under the bankruptcy act, but as having been fraudulent as to existing creditors at common law under St. 13 Eliz, c. 5. The ordinary rule is that where one deeply in debt or insolvent, by a voluntary conveyance puts his property out of the reach of his creditors, he is presumed to intend the natural consequence of that act, which is to defeat, defraud, hinder and delay his creditors. Gray v Chase, 184 Mass. 444, 68 N.E. 676. Where, however, there is in fact no fraudulent purpose and a conveyance is made upon some legal consideration, it is not necessarily void, inadequacy of consideration usually not being conclusive evidence of fraud. F. & M. Schaefer...