Briggs v. Titus

Decision Date28 October 1880
Citation13 R.I. 136
PartiesCHRISTOPHER S. BRIGGS v. JONAH TITUS et als.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

A tenancy by the curtesy initiate is in Rhode Island both salable and assignable.

The word " taken" in Revised Statutes R.I. cap. 136, § 1, means taken " in invitum ."

A mechanic's lien essentially resembles a mortgage rather than an attachment: it is not a process " in invitum ."

Greenwich National Bank v. Hall 11 R.I. 124, explained.

DEFENDANTS' petition for a new trial.

A tenancy by the curtesy initiate is both salable and assignable.

Tillinghast & Ely, for plaintiff.

Ira O Seamans, for defendant.

DURFEE C. J.

This is a petition for the new trial of an action of trespass and ejectment for the possession of certain real estate in the town of Warwick. On the trial to the jury the plaintiff adduced in evidence, to show his title, the proceedings in a lien petition in which he was petitioner, and the defendant Jonah Titus and his wife were respondents, and in which, under a decree of the Supreme Court, all the right, title, and interest of the said Titus in the estate in suit were, on June 11, 1864, sold and conveyed to the plaintiff to pay for improvements thereon. It was also put in proof that at the time of the sale and when the lien accrued, the wife of said Titus was the owner of the estate in fee simple in her own right, and that Titus had no interest therein except as her husband, he having married her and had children by her before 1844. The wife died April 20, 1879, before the commencement of the action. The defendants requested the court to charge the jury that, inasmuch as Titus at the time of the sale, and when the lien was supposed to have accrued, was only tenant by the curtesy initiate, he had no salable interest, and that consequently the plaintiff acquired no title by his purchase, and was not entitled to recover. The court refused so to charge, and on the contrary charged in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants contend that the charge was erroneous, and ask for a new trial on account of it.

The counsel for the defendants refers to the case of Greenwich National Bank v. Hall, 11 R.I. 124, in support of the contention that the plaintiff acquired no title by his purchase. In that case we decided that a husband has no interest in his wife's real estate of inheritance, even after he has had children by her, which is liable to attachment for his debts. The counsel supposes that we so decided because we thought an estate by the curtesy initiate is not a salable or assignable estate. This is a misapprehension: we so decided simply because we considered the estate privileged from attachment, for the benefit of the wife and family, under the statute, Rev. Stat. R.I. cap. 136, § 1. The opinion which we delivered deals only with the language of the statute, and has not a word to say concerning the nature of the estate. In point of fact we did not doubt the husband's power to sell his estate by the curtesy initiate. We supposed his right to do so was implied in another section of the same statute, to wit, § 8. And in the opinion subsequently given by the justices In re the Voting Laws, 12 R.I. 586, this quality of the estate is fully recognized. It is intimated that this opinion is inconsistent with the opinion given in Greenwich National Bank v. Hall . If there be any inconsistency we are not able to perceive it. The opinion on the voting laws is, on this point, in accord with Martin & Goff v. Pepall, 6 R.I. 92, decided by this court in 1859.

We think, therefore, that an estate by the curtesy initiate, and especially such an estate acquired before 1844,[1] is both salable and assignable. In Martin & Goff v. Pepall, 6 R.I. 92, it was held that such an estate was liable to sale under the mechanics' lien law; and in Briggs v. Titus &amp Wife, 7 R.I. 441, the decision was virtually reaffirmed in respect of the very estate now in controversy. If these cases were correctly decided,...

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4 cases
  • Gem Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. v. Rossi
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 22 February 2005
    ...the estate to which it attaches consents to it when he consents to the improvement."29 Id. at 235-36, 185 A. at 140 (quoting Briggs v. Titus, 13 R.I. 136, 138 (1880)). The First, Second and Tenth Circuits have acknowledged the preexisting interest theory in post-Doehr cases. See Shaumyan v.......
  • Art Metal Const. Co. v. Knight, 1238.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 11 May 1936
    ...of chapter 301, General Laws 1923, and comes into existence when the work begins or the materials are furnished. In Briggs v. Titus, 13 R.I. 136, at page 138, speaking of the nature of a lien, the court says: "It is not acquired by an adverse proceeding after the debt has been incurred, but......
  • Ball v. Ball
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 5 May 1898
    ...hence, that his interest could be taken on execution. This court has held that, while the interest was salable and assignable (Briggs v. Titus, 13 R. I. 136), it could not be attached during the life of the wife, because the purpose of the statute in regard to the property of married women ......
  • Hunt v. Darling
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 25 November 1904
    ...like a mortgage, the liability to a mechanic's lien is an obligation voluntarily assumed by the owner when he engages a builder. Briggs v. Titus, 13 R. I. 136. The lien proceedings are in rem against the land, and the common-law action is in personam against the employer. In some cases both......

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