Brigham v. Fayerweather
| Decision Date | 05 January 1886 |
| Citation | 5 N.E. 265,140 Mass. 411 |
| Parties | BRIGHAM v. FAYERWEATHER and others. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Kent & Dewey, for defendants.
F.P Goulding, for plaintiff.
A judgment in rem is an act of the sovereign power; and, as such, its effect cannot be disputed, at least within the jurisdiction. If a competent court declares a vessel forfeited, or orders it sold free from all claims, or divorces a couple, or establishes a will under statutes like our Pub.St. c. 127, § 7, a paramount title is passed, the couple is divorced, the will is established as against all the world, whether parties or not, because the sovereign has said that it shall be so. Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show. 232; S.C.T. Raym. 473, Skin. 59, and Beak v Tyrell, Carth. 32; Noell v. Wells, 1 Lev. 235; Scott v. Shearman, 2 W.Bl. 977; The Helena, 4 Rob.Adm. 3; Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. 280; McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J.Eq. 225. But the same is true when the judgment is that A. recover a debt from B. The public force is pledged to collect the debt from B., and no one within the jurisdiction can oppose it. And it does not follow in the former case any more than in the latter, nor is it true, that the judgment, because conclusive on all the world in what we may call its legislative effect, is equally conclusive upon all as an adjudication of the facts upon which it is grounded. On the contrary, those judgments, such as sentences of prize courts, to which the greatest effect has been given in collateral proceedings, are said to be conclusive evidence of the facts upon which they proceed only against parties who were entitled to be heard before they were rendered. The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 146; Salem v. Eastern R. Co., 98 Mass. 431, 449; Baxter v. New England Ins. Co., 6 Mass. 277, 286; Whitney v. Walsh, 1 Cush. 29. We may lay on one side, then, any argument based on the misleading expression that all the world are parties to a proceeding in rem. This does not mean that all the world are entitled to be heard; and, as strangers in interest are not entitled to be heard, there is no reason why they should be bound by the findings of fact, although bound to admit the title or status which the judgment establishes. Still the cases last cited show that some judgments in rem are conclusive evidence of the facts adjudicated in favor of a stranger, as against a party; and if the analogy is to be applied to all judgments which create or change a status or a title, it would apply here; for the plaintiff was a party to the decree establishing the will, and that decree necessarily proceeded on the ground that the testator possessed sufficient capacity to make the will.
But these cases cannot be taken to lay down a general principle. The reasons given for the decisions are not that the conclusion follows as a necessary effect of judgment in rem merely as such, but are special reasons of convenience or construction. In The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 145, the doctrine as to sentences of prize courts is said to rest on "the propriety of leaving the cognizance of prize questions exclusively to courts of prize jurisdiction; the very great inconvenience amounting nearly to an impossibility of fully investigating such cases in a court of common law; and the impropriety of revising the decisions of the maritime courts of other nations, whose jurisdiction is co-ordinate throughout the world." In Baxter v. New England Ins. Co., 6 Mass. 277, 300, and Robinson v. Jones, 8 Mass. 536, 540, the effect of a sentence, in a subsequent action, on a policy of insurance is referred to the settled construction of mercantile contracts. In Lothian v. Henderson, 3 Bos. & P. 499, 545, the doctrine seems to be thought to stand on practice and authority, rather than on principle. See Castrique v. Imrie, L.R. 4 H.L. 414, 434. The general principle is stated with substantial correctness by Sir James F. Stephen in his work on Evidence, (article 42:) "Statements contained in judgments, as to the facts upon which the judgment is based, are deemed to be irrelevant as between strangers, or as between a party or privy and a stranger, except in the case of judgments of courts of admiralty condemning a ship as prize," and some other judgments of a kindred nature.
Apart from precedent, there seems to be no satisfactory ground for treating the probate of a will as evidence of the testator's mental capacity on a collateral issue. For, except in the comparatively small number of cases where the probate of the will is opposed, the investigation of the fact is necessarily only formal. Still less do we see why, if the probate is not evidence against a party who had no right to be heard, he should hold the executor bound by it when he himself is free. Ordinarily, estoppels by judgment are mutual. The fact can be tried in the superior court as well as in the probate court, and was actually tried in this very case. Thus the chief reason offered for the effect of prize sentences is removed.
One or two cases cited by the defendant may need a word of explanation. It has been held, in a suit by an administrator, that letters of administration are conclusive proof of the intestate's death, unless the defendant pleads in abatement. Newman v. Jenkins, 10 Pick 515. And elsewhere it has been decided, in a suit where the plaintiff's title was derived from an administrator's sale, that the letters are prima facie evidence of the death. Jeffers v. Radcliff, 10 N.H. 242; Tisdale v. Connecticut Ins. Co., 26 Iowa, 170; S.C. 28 Iowa, 12. But in these cases the...
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Brigham v. Fayerweather
...140 Mass. 4115 N.E. 265BRIGHAMv.FAYERWEATHER and others.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.Filed January 5, Bill in equity to set aside a mortgage deed executed by one Azubah Brigham, plaintiff's testator, on the ground that, at the date of the execution of the deed, she was not of suf......