Bright Horizon House, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Henrietta, Monroe County

Decision Date16 November 1983
Citation469 N.Y.S.2d 851,121 Misc.2d 703
PartiesBRIGHT HORIZON HOUSE, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the TOWN OF HENRIETTA, MONROE COUNTY, New York, Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

DAVID O. BOEHM, Justice.

In this Article 78 proceeding petitioner, Bright Horizon House, Incorporated, challenges the determination of the respondent, Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Henrietta [Board], that the use proposed by petitioner is not a permitted use under the applicable zoning ordinance and in further denying petitioner's application for a use variance.

Petitioner is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a Christian Science accredited care facility in the Rochester area. In furtherance of this objective, the petitioner in 1977 purchased an eleven acre parcel in the Town of Henrietta for $85,000.00 from the Mother Church and First Church of Christ Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts. Presently, the property is tax exempt under section 420-a of the Real Property Tax Law. 1

In March 1983, petitioner applied to the Board for permission to construct the facility, consisting of 32 living units, at the corner of Castle Road and Winton Road in the Town of Henrietta. The parcel is located in an R-1-15 district.

Article V, § 127-6A(6) of the Town Code sets forth the permitted uses in an R-1-15 district:

"Churches, schools and institutions of higher education, public hospitals, public libraries and municipal and special district buildings, provided that no such buildings shall be located within fifty (50) feet of any adjoining lot line ...."

The proposed care facility would have 32 fee-paying residents occupying separate rooms. It would be staffed by accredited Christian Science nurses and practitioners. These would not provide medical nursing or physician's care in the usual sense and are given special exemption from licensing under sections 6527, par. 4(b) and 6908 sub par. (1)g of the Education Law (see People v. Cole, 219 N.Y. 98, 113 N.E. 790). Accreditation for the facility comes directly from the Mother Church, The First Church of Christ Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts.

According to the Accreditation Standards, which the petitioner provided, the operation of the facility must be supportive of Christian Science healing and nursing practices established pursuant to the Church Manual.

As noted by petitioner in its memorandum of law, the Christian Science Church was founded in the late 1800's by Mary Baker Eddy. Although based upon Protestant Christianity, it is characterized by the belief that "A sick body is evolved from sick thoughts" (citing, Eddy, "Science and Health" 260:20). Christian Science eschews traditional medical care, relying instead on the power of faith in Christian Science beliefs and practices to cure physical illness.

In order to be admitted to the facility, a patient would be obliged to acknowledge that he or she will rely exclusively on Christian Science for healing and recognize that traditional medical services or treatment of any kind are not available. Ordinarily, individuals who have sought medical diagnosis or treatment are not accepted until after two months from such treatment.

At the hearing of March 23, 1983, Elizabeth Heintz, a member of petitioner's board, when questioned by members of the Zoning Board, stated the purpose of the facility as follows:

"Heintz: Christian Science is based on the teachings of Christ Jesus and healing. And so we require people who are educated in healing to help our people and so Christian Science nurses are basically nurses who care for people who have certain illnesses. We do not dispense drugs, and we do not go with many of the prescribed methods of medical healing, but we do require trained nurses to help our people.

"Spero: Well, what would they be doing? This is what I'm saying. Are they simply there for the purpose of training new people?

"Heintz: Well, if I could give you an example, for instance if we had a Christian Scientist who had a claim of a broken hip and was brought to our facility. Obviously, a person with a broken hip needs help in getting about, needs help in food preparation, in bathing, general care that is needed when they cannot care for themselves.

"Spero: Well then, in that respect, it is a health care facility.

"Heintz: Health, no. No, that's not in our vocabulary. It is really and truly a house of prayer and healing."

Further on in the hearing Elizabeth Heintz was asked if this wouldn't be a facility that catered to elderly people. She responded:

"I would say to be perfectly honest with you it's generally the elderly that begin to need, but also I should tell you that we have what is known as rest and study and we have any number of younger people who come to study Mrs. Eddy's works and the bible and they may be there for a weekend or even for a week. We have, say for instance, young housewives who sort of maybe need to get away from five kids and three feet fences and what have you, and will come in for rest and study. So you could have a huge variance. But again, to be perfectly honest with you, I would say those that are in need of care would tend to be along in years."

The Board, on May 25, 1983, concluded that the care facility constituted "neither a church, a public hospital, or conventional health care facility" and that neither economic hardship nor hardship caused by any uniqueness of the land had been established so as to warrant the granting of a variance.

The petitioner challenges the validity of the Board's decision on three grounds, the first being that the Board's finding that the proposed use was not permitted under the zoning ordinance was improper. Specifically, petitioner alleges that the Board incorrectly construed the definition of church and house of prayer and, in so doing, denied petitioner's request for an interpretation of the ordinance which would have permitted the facility in the R-1 residential district.

It is a well settled rule that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board or body it reviews unless the decision under review is arbitrary and unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of discretion (Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 520, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827).

The zoning ordinance does not define the term "church", and this court, therefore, is obliged to define the term in light of its ordinary and accepted meaning (1 McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Statutes, § 94).

In Matter of Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15, 136 N.E.2d 488, the Court of Appeals articulated a broad definition of church.

"A church is more than merely an edifice affording people the opportunity to worship God. Strictly religious uses and activities are more than prayer and sacrifice and all churches recognize that the area of their responsibility is broader than leading the congregation in prayer. Churches have always developed social groups for adults and youth where the fellowship of the congregation is strengthened.... To limit a church to being merely a house of prayer and sacrifice would, in a large degree, be depriving the church of the opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and strengthening itself and the congregation...."

(1 N.Y.2d, supra, p. 453, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15, 136 N.E.2d 488).

That definition, however, is not entirely applicable here because it was formulated in the context of uses accessory or ancillary to the principal use of a structure as a place of worship (see Diocese of Buffalo v. Buczkowski, 112 Misc.2d 336, 342-343, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1015, affd. on other grds., 90 A.D.2d 994, 456 N.Y.S.2d 909; cf. Order Minor Conventuals v. Lee, 64 A.D.2d 227, 231, 409 N.Y.S.2d 667). The Town Code defines an accessory use or structure as one "customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use or building and located on the same lot with such principal use or building" ( § 127-2B [emphasis added] ). In this case, not only is the subject property physically separated from the local Christian Science Church, which is located across the street, but also the petitioner is a separate organization in no way affiliated with the church or its activities.

The difficult question of whether a particular land use constitutes a "church" has constantly troubled the courts because important constitutional rights are embedded within the definition. The conclusions have not always been consistent as different courts have given the term varying constructions (see, Anno., 62 A.L.R.3d 197).

Here, the facts support the Board's conclusion that the proposed facility does not constitute a church. Its purpose is not "public worship", an activity typically associated with a church (see Webster's New International Dictionary, 3d ed.). Rather, as the petitioner's by-laws state, it is a nursing facility intended "to provide skilled nursing care, comfort, support and maintenance for those seeking healing through Christian Science." Unlike a conventional church, this facility is, as the Board found, residential in nature, providing room and board to fee-paying individuals for a period of up to six months, much longer than typically would be associated with church attendance. Additionally, there does not appear to be a common area or sanctuary set aside for worship, as is the case with a house of worship. It is particularly significant that the petitioner's representatives themselves do not consider this facility to be a church according to the tenets of their own religion. Not only do they acknowledge that a Christian Science church is located across the street, but they also liken in a broad sense their facility to a retreat house used by other religions rather than to a church. ...

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