Bright v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist.

Decision Date06 December 1976
Citation556 P.2d 1090,134 Cal.Rptr. 639,18 Cal.3d 450
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 556 P.2d 1090, 2 Media L. Rep. 1175 Susannah BRIGHT, a minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 30555. In Bank

Leon Letwin, Richard Wasserstrom and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, and Richard K. Mason, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

Wise, Kilpatrick & Clayton, George E. Wise and Susan E. Anderson Wise, Long Beach, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

In this case we inquire into the right of California public school students to speak and write freely (see U.S.Const., First Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, § 2) in the school environment and examine the scope and extent of such right in relation to the authority and supervision of school officials. Specifically, we are called upon to determine whether and to what extent, in the light of section 10611 of the Education Code 1 dealing with the students' 'right to exercise free expression,' school authorities may require the submission, for approval prior to distribution on school premises, of so called 'alternative' or 'underground' newspapers produced by the students off campus. As will appear, we conclude that the pertinent statute does not authorize any such prior restraint by school officials and that rules and regulations adopted by a school district insofar as they purport to effectuate it are void.

Plaintiff Susannah Bright, in May 1974 a 10th grade student at University High School (school) in Los Angeles, was a writer for the Red Tide, a newspaper intended for distribution to high school students, but produced independently of the public school system. On Friday, May 31, 1974, plaintiff and two other students of the school, desiring to distribute the then current edition of the paper, in accordance with the rules of defendant Los Angeles Unified School District 2 (District) submitted a copy of the paper to defendant Homer Gansz, the assistant principal. Gansz noticed on the front page of the Red Tide an article entitled 'Students Fight Rules At Locke,' concerning a dress code at Locke High School which prohibited male students from wearing hats in class. A portion of the article also on the front page, under a subheading 'principal Lies' 3 raised a question in Gansz' mind as to whether the article was libelous. Accordingly, he informed the three students that he could not immediately approve distribution of the paper but would have to consult with defendant John Welch, the school principal.

Having no personal knowledge of the events described in the Red Tide article, Welch and Gansz undertook an investigation to determine the truth of the assertion that Hobbs, the Locke principal, had lied. Upon advice of the county counsel, Welch attempted to contact Hobbs, but without success, and therefore spoke with Caras, the assistant principal. Caras stated that the charges in the article were inaccurate. Welch thereupon informed plaintiff and her companions that he would have to postpone until the following Monday, June 3, any decision as to the distribution of the Red Tide.

On Monday, Welch reached Hobbs by telephone. The latter, who in the meantime had read the article in question, acknowledged that he had made the statements attributed to him but denied that they were untrue. Eventually on the advice of both the county counsel's office and the legal adviser's office, and on the basis of his discussions with Caras and Hobbs, Welch decided not to allow distribution of the Red Tide on the campus. Nevertheless he later permitted the distribution of a flyer protesting his decision and a noon protest meeting.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action on June 5, 1974. Her first amended complaint (hereafter complaint), in two counts, sought injunctive and declarative relief on the ground that the rules and regulations of defendant district, on their face and as applied, constitute an illegal prior censorship scheme, are violative of section 10611, and alternatively are violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution, and are also violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The first count sought relief for the banning of distribution of the newspaper for the alleged reason that it contained libelous material; the second count sought relief for the flat ban on the sale of underground newspapers. The parties stipulated in open court that the hearing on the preliminary injunction should be the plenary trial, decision to be made on the basis of the verified pleadings, declarations, affidavits and exhibits. No oral testimony was received and no findings of fact and conclusions of law were made. The trial court denied the preliminary injunction, discharged the order to show cause, and denied declaratory relief and damages. Judgment was entered accordingly. This appeal by plaintiff followed.

I

In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. (1968), 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, the United States Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, gave emphatic recognition to the exercise by students of the right of freedom of speech within a public school environment. 'First Amendment rights, applied in the light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' (Id. at p. 506, 89 S.Ct. at 736.) However, these rights of students must be balanced against the rights--indeed the obligations--of school authorities to administer the school and discipline the students. Thus the high court continued: 'On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.' (Id. at p. 507, 89 S.Ct. at p. 737.) Tinker then resolved the conflict between these competing rights, declaring that the student may exercise his right to freedom of expression unless the 'conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason--whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior--materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others . . ..' (Id. at p. 513, 89 S.Ct. [18 Cal.3d 456] at p. 740.) Any regulation prohibiting student expression 'would violate the constitutional rights of students, at least if it could not be justified by a showing that the students' activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.' (Id. at p. 513, 89 S.Ct. at p. 740.)

Tinker in boldly proclaiming students' freedom of speech in the school environment introduced a significant change in the control of students by school authorities and in a real sense gave voice to a different theory of education. The older and, until Tinker, the prevailing view regarded the school administration's authority as nearly absolute. For example, in 1913, a California high school student, during school hours, delivered an address to the student body in which he denounced the board of education for maintaining the school buildings as firetraps and belittled it for doing nothing to improve the safety of the school. He was expelled from school. The court in upholding the expulsion declared: 'The admitted purpose of the plaintiff's address was to belittle the defendants in their official capacity; and the whole tenor of the address was well calculated to produce not only that result, but engender as well in the minds of the students a feeling of disrespect for the defendants, and a secret if not an open hostility to their control of the student body and management of school affairs. Such being the natural tenor and tendency of the plaintiff's address, his conduct in making the same cannot be classed as anything but a species of insubordination to constituted authority, which required correction at the hands of the defendants in order that the discipline of the school might be maintained unimpaired by anything that was said and done by the plaintiff.' (Wooster v. Sunderland (1915) 27 Cal.App. 51, 55--56, 148 P. 959, 961.)

By way of contrast, the court in Tinker specifically recognized that 'personal intercommunication among the students . . . is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process.' (393 U.S. at p. 512, 89 S.Ct. at p. 739.) Moreover, this student communication, especially the expression of an unpopular view, may cause trouble and lead to disturbance, but 'our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom--this kind of openness--that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.' (Id. at pp. 508--509, 89 S.Ct. at p. 738.)

In today's world, student criticism of government, society and the school system itself constantly seeks expression in a variety of ways. One medium of this expression is the so-called 'underground newspaper' produced by students off campus without the authorization of school officials, but distributed on the school premises. Newspapers of this genre typically contain material which criticizes the school administration, challenges the principles and policies of public school education and covers controversial topics outside the curriculum--all frequently couched in strident and blunt, even earthy language. (See Letwin, Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public School Campuses in California ...

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