Brigs v. State of California ex rel. Dept. Parks & Recreation

Decision Date30 October 1979
Citation98 Cal.App.3d 190,159 Cal.Rptr. 390
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesMitzi S. BRIGGS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of California, acting By and Through the DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 44189.

Jess S. Jackson, Jr., Jackson & Gughemetti, Burlingame, Gideon Kanner, Sherman Oaks, for Briggs.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Evelle J. Younger, former Atty. Gen., Robert L. Bergman, Asst. Attys. Gen., Leonard M. Sperry, Jr., Christopher M. Ames, Richard C. Jacobs, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for State of Cal., etc.

TAYLOR, Presiding Justice.

The State of California, acting by and through the Department of Parks and Recreation (Department) appeals from a judgment in inverse condemnation awarding damages in excess of the sum of $6,000,000 to the property owner, Briggs, contending that: 1) Briggs had no cause of action for damages for inverse condemnation as a result of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission's (State Commission) denial of a permit or the Department's manifestation of an interest in acquiring the property; 2) the findings are not supported by the record and do not support the judgment; and 3) in the alternative, even if Briggs is entitled to damages for inverse condemnation, the amount awarded was excessive and an erroneous rate of prejudgment interest was applied; Briggs cross-appeals, contending that the court erred by limiting her post-judgment interest to 7 percent and failing to award her reasonably incurred litigation expenses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1036. We have concluded that the judgment must be reversed as it was predicated on the erroneous legal theory that Briggs had a cause of action for inverse condemnation; accordingly, the remaining contentions on appeal and the issues raised by the cross-appeal need not be addressed.

As we have concluded that the judgment was based on an error of law, we shall not set forth in detail the trial court's findings and conclusions. 1 We trace the factual and procedural history in the light of the evidence relevant to our discussion: Since 1963, Briggs owned the subject property, 35.6 acres of raw, undeveloped land on the coast in Monterey County (County). In October 1972, Briggs obtained building permits from the County for development of three small residential homes on the property. Prior to November 8, 1972, Briggs commenced construction on the property, including commencement of excavations for footings, and placements of concrete foundations. On March 19, 1973, she obtained two new permits for different and much larger houses upon cancellation of the earlier permits. On April 4, 1973, Briggs applied to the County for approval of a "Minor Subdivision" development on the subject property and stated in her application that the property would be used for three single family residences. The County approved Briggs' application on November 7, 1973.

On April 16, 1973, Briggs filed an application for a development permit with the Central Coast Regional Commission (hereafter Regional Commission) of the State Commission, seeking a development permit for the construction of three single family residences and accessory structures as approved by the County in March 1973; she also filed for an exemption for construction of the three residences. On May 17, 1973, William Penn Mott, Jr., then Director of Parks and Recreation of the State of California, sent to Olney Smith, Executive Director of the Regional Commission, a telegram stating: "The California Department of Parks and Recreation considers the Briggs property desirable as an addition to the existing Carmel River State Beach property." On May 18, 1973, Milton Frincke, District Superintendent of the Department of Parks and Recreation, Operations Division, District 4, executed and sent a letter to Smith stating: "We are very concerned about the possibilities of a proposed large scale development on the Briggs property, adjacent to the Carmel River State Beach. This is immediately south of Carmel Meadows. When plans are proposed, we would like to comment."

On June 18, 1973, after a public hearing, the Regional Commission passed a resolution denying Briggs' application for a permit. 2

On August 8, 1973, the State Commission denied Briggs' application for a permit, for the following reasons, as stated in its staff recommendation: "1. Open Space Use. The parcel is one of two privately-owned coastal areas between Point Lobos and the mouth of the Carmel River. The California Department of Parks and Recreation considers the property desirable as an addition to the Carmel River State Beach property. Although the State Parks Department does not have a definite commitment to purchase the property, there is clearly a need for preserving the Commission's planning options as to coastal parks in this area. Because of the manner in which the 3 homes would be spaced along the ocean bluff, construction of the homes would foreclose the possibility of acquiring either all the ocean front property or acquiring only portions and allowing the rest to be developed.

"Even if the Commission's planning process were to determine the acquisition is not desirable, it is too early in the planning process to decide that development should proceed in the manner proposed by applicant. It might be preferable to require clustered development on the portion of the property adjoining an existing subdivision, with the remainder of the property left as open space, to maintain as much as possible of the scenic qualities of the property.

"2. Inducement to Development. Although the proposed project consists only of the construction of 3 large homes, the applicant's claim of exemption states that the total development will have 2 more stages, 1 of which is a subdivision application in operation and the second of which is a planned unit development currently in the si (sic) stage. Once the 3 homes are built, the property will be foreclosed from any significant open space or recreational use along the ocean front, which will in turn on (sic) that the property will be committed to further development. The road servicing the three homes runs along almost the entire ocean frontage of the property and together with utility extensions would encourage further development" (emphasis partially added). Briggs filed no mandate action to challenge the decisions of the State Commission. 3

On September 7, 1973, Joseph Bodovitz, Executive Director of the State Commission notified Briggs that her appeal on an application for an exemption had been denied because she had not obtained building permits for the projects for which she claimed vested rights prior to the effective date of the Act, and the expenditures made were not in reliance on the plans for which building permits had been issued prior to November 8, 1972.

On September 28, 1973, William Penn Mott, Jr., executed and sent a letter to Briggs stating, in part, "in reply to an inquiry from the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission this department (Parks and Recreation) informed the Commission that It does have an interest in acquiring your property in the Carmel area And will take further steps to do so When funds are available for such purpose." (Emphasis added.) On October 31, 1973, Lt. Governor Ed Reinecke executed and sent a letter to Briggs stating, in part, that he had been in contact with Mott and that the State of California was very much interested in purchasing the subject property.

On May 9, 1974, Briggs and her attorneys met with Mott and Les McCargo of the Department. At that time, Briggs and her attorneys advised Mott that the state's conduct had prevented development and viable use of the subject property, and caused financial and economic injuries to Briggs. Briggs and her attorneys further informed Mott that unless the state gave some assurances that the property will be directly condemned then she would have to commence an inverse condemnation action, among other legal remedies. Mott then assured Briggs that the Department had an interest in acquiring her property and that it was among the top properties in the state for public acquisition. Mott also indicated to Briggs that a condition 4 of the Department's acquisition of the property was passage by the California voters of the June bond issue (State Beach, Park Recreation and Historical Facilities Bond Act of 1974) and that if this bond measure passed, the state would promptly acquire the subject property.

On May 9, 1974, after the above meeting, Mott executed and delivered a letter drafted by Briggs' attorney to Briggs, stating that the Department "intends to acquire, by negotiation or condemnation, fee title to your property above referenced if the pending ballot measure authorizing the issuance of Bonds is passed by the electorate this June, 1974. In the event said bond issuance is approved, the State Park and Recreation Will then adopt a resolution authorizing said acquisition, and We will commence appraisal procedures and we will negotiate with you to acquire said property . . . . As we have previously stated, We have been interested in acquiring this property for many years, but have been unable to do so for the sole reason that funds to acquire the same have been unavailable. If the Bond issue passes, this property will be included for prompt acquisition inasmuch as sufficient funds will then be available when the bonds are marketed" (emphasis added).

On June 4, 1974, the California electorate passed the bond issue. Thereafter on July 12, 1974, the Department passed a resolution directing, pursuant to the State Beach, Park, Recreational and Historical Facilities Bond Act of 1974, a study of a project involving an addition to the Carmel River State Beach, recommended this project, subject to the procedures of the...

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