Brink v. Canfield
| Decision Date | 17 June 1919 |
| Docket Number | 8837. |
| Citation | 187 P. 223,78 Okla. 189,1919 OK 179 |
| Parties | BRINK v. CANFIELD et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1920.
Syllabus by the Court.
The dismissal with prejudice of an action brought by a full-blood Indian heir to recover inherited allotted lands, to quiet title, and for damages on account of wrongful detention followed by an order of court denying an application to set aside such dismissal and to reinstate the action, and from which no appeal was taken, where, at the time the action was instituted, no conveyance of the lands had been made or attempted, and though thereafter and prior to the adverse order of the court a conveyance was made, and in which action the validity of the deed was neither involved nor determined may not be set up in bar of the rights of the heir of such plaintiff in a suit to which she is made a party, and in which the validity of the subsequent deed was a material issue.
Such dismissal, or any order or judgment made in the case not associated with or related to the making of a conveyance or the approval thereof, is without effect, and void for want of authority in the heir to thus divest himself of title, and for lack of power in the court to render an effective judgment, and hence is not available as a defense, either as a plea in bar or as an estoppel in a subsequent action in which the mother, who succeeded to the estate of the deceased heir, is a party.
Ordinarily mere inadequacy of consideration is not of itself a sufficient ground to warrant the cancellation of an instrument affecting real estate; yet, where the inadequacy is so gross as to shock the conscience and to furnish satisfactory and decisive evidence of fraud, it will be a sufficient ground for canceling a conveyance or contract whether executed or executory. Where, however, the inadequacy of consideration is accompanied by other inequitable incidents and shows bad faith, such as concealments, misrepresentations, and undue advantage on the part of the one who obtains the benefit, or ignorance, weakness of mind, incapacity, pecuniary necessities, and the like, on the part of the other, these circumstances, combined with inadequacy of price, will much more readily induce a court to grant relief, defensive or affirmative.
Courts regard with extreme disfavor the action of parties in procuring a recently discharged guardian to act as agent for them in procuring, from the lately emancipated minor, a deed to lands inherited by him. Even though proof of dependence on the one side and influence on the other is wanting, where it appears that the deed was procured for a price wholly disproportionate to the value of the land, the former ward being an illiterate fullblood Indian, addicted habitually to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors, unacquainted with land values, or the value of land for oil and gas purposes, discharged from guardianship but a few months before, and who was deceived as to his rights as an heir, the court will unhesitatingly grant the heir of the wronged party relief against those chargeable with such unconscionable practices.
Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, and who omits to make such inquiry with reasonable diligence, is deemed to have constructive notice of the fact itself.
Record examined, and held, that the defendants each, except C. E. R., had either actual knowledge or constructive notice of the rights and equities of J., who, as his father's heir, shared in the estate of his deceased half-sister, and are therefore not bona fide purchasers for value, entitled to protection against the heir of J. in a suit involving the validity of a conveyance by J. in his lifetime.
Error from District Court, Creek County; Ernest B. Hughes, Judge.
Action by Lolly Jack, through his guardian, John Tiger, against George W. Canfield, D. A. McDougal, L. O. Lytle, Charles J. Wrightsman, and others, with intervention by Lusanna Brink. Judgment for plaintiff Lolly Jack, and against intervener, dismissing her cross-petition with prejudice, and in favor of defendants McDougal and Lytle, and intervener brings error. Judgment for McDougal and Lytle affirmed and judgment against intervener reversed without prejudice to rights of defendants Charles J. Wrightsman and others, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
W. V. Pryor, C. B. Rockwood, and McDougal, Lytle & Allen, all of Sapulpa, for plaintiffs in error.
McGuire & Devereux and Chas. W. Grimes, all of Tulsa, for defendants in error Geo. W. Canfield, O. M. Lancaster, Chas. W. Grimes, J. H. Cacy, John Z. Cacy, Rhoda Cacy, G. M. Canterbury, Rudolph Cacy, Samuel Waller, Maurice E. Peteet, Clara A. Ryan, Walter L. Ransom, J. S. Cosden, and E. W. Sinclair.
Susie Crow, the daughter of Kernal Jack and Sina Crow, was born in the month of October, 1898, and died intestate in the month of September, 1899. After her death, her name was duly enrolled by the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes as a full-blood Creek Indian citizen, under authority of section 28 of the act of Congress approved March 1, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 861), commonly known as the Original Creek Agreement, and during the year 1905 there was selected in her right and allotted to the use of her heirs the south half of the southwest quarter and the west half of the southeast quarter of section 4, township 18 north, range 7 east, in what is now Creek county, Okl. Prior to his marriage with Sina Crow, Kernal Jack was married to Lusanna Brink, of which marriage one child, Wallace Jack, was born. Kernal Jack was also married to one Toche Grayson, by whom he had one child, the plaintiff, Lolly Jack.
Sina Crow, the mother of Susie Crow, died on or about the 15th day of August, 1899. Afterward, and during the year 1909, Kernal Jack died. Some time during the spring of 1913, Wallace Jack died. The heirs of Susie Crow on the paternal side are Lolly Jack, the half-brother of Susie Crow, and Lusanna Brink, the sole surviving heir at law of Wallace Jack, son of Kernal Jack, deceased. On February 11, 1915, Lolly Jack, claiming to be the sole surviving heir at law of Susie Crow, deceased, through his guardian, John Tiger, instituted in the district court of Creek county an action against Charles J. Wrightsman and 58 other defendants to recover possession of the lands allotted in the name of Susie Crow, for damages in the sum of $500,000, and for an accounting for the oil and gas produced and removed therefrom. Among those named as defendants were Geo. W. Canfield, Thomas Mogan, John Z. Cacy, Walter L. Ransom, G. M. Canterbury, Rhoda Cacy, Chas. W. Grimes, O. M. Lancaster, Samuel Waller, Maurice E. Peteet, and Clara A. Ryan.
Leave of court being obtained on November 16, 1915, Lusanna Brink, alleging that she was the sole and only heir at law of Wallace Jack, deceased, filed therein her plea of intervention, claiming title to the Susie Crow allotment, damages in the sum of $1,000,000 on account of oil and gas removed from the premises, and prayed for the cancellation of a quitclaim deed made by Wallace Jack during his lifetime to John Z. Cacy, and also the cancellation of certain other instruments affecting her title not necessary to set out. Upon issues joined between the original parties and those subsequently made parties to the suit, the case proceeded to trial, resulting in a judgment in Lolly Jack's favor for an undivided one-fourth interest in the lands and the oil and gas royalties, and against intervener, Lusanna Brink, McDougal & Lytle, defendants in the suit, were given a decree for a one-eighth interest in the lands and royalties accruing therefrom, on account of an attorney's contract made with them by Wallace Jack on January 22, 1913. As the only appeal prosecuted from the decree of the trial court is that of Lusanna Brink, it is unnecessary to consider the decree in other respects. No attack on that portion of the judgment in favor of McDougal & Lytle is made in the proceedings in error of Lusanna Brink in the separate appeal prosecuted by her. Nor is there longer any controversy between Lusanna Brink and Lolly Jack, as on March 27, 1917, the parties named filed in this court their stipulation that the judgment of the trial court should, as to them, be affirmed, and which stipulation was on the same day approved and judgment entered pursuant thereto.
The case here presented involves only the rights of Lusanna Brink, mother of Wallace Jack, to recover the estate that ascended to Kernal Jack upon the death of his daughter, Susie Crow, and which at his death descended to his son, Wallace Jack. The title of the maternal heirs and those claiming through and under them is involved and this day decided in case No. 8793, Geo. W. Canfield et al. v. Lolly Jack et al., 186 P. 1040. Only the title of the paternal heirs and those claiming through or under them is involved in this case. At the beginning of the case, it was contended by those adversely interested that the entire estate ascended to the grandmother, Orla or Fannie Fulsom, and aunts, Mollie Tiger and Babie Barnett, of Susie Crow and this position was insisted upon by them throughout the trial. It is now admitted that a one-half interest in her estate passed to her father, Kernal Jack, and consequently at his death, to his heirs at law. We may therefore enter upon the consideration of the case with the relationship of the parties no longer in controversy. The first question then is: Did Lusanna Brink or did her son, Wallace Jack, during his lifetime, convey her his one-fourth interest in the estate? On the part of plaintiff in error, it is insisted that he did not, while, on the other hand, the defendants in error Canfield,...
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