Brink v. J. W. Wells Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 10 December 1924 |
| Docket Number | No. 135.,135. |
| Citation | 201 N.W. 222,229 Mich. 35 |
| Parties | BRINK v. J. W. WELLS LUMBER CO. et al. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Certiorari to Department of Labor and Industry.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Comp. Laws, §§ 5423-5495) by Alfred Brink as claimant against the J. W. Wells Lumber Company as employer and the Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance Company as insurance carrier. The Department of Labor and Industry awarded compensation, and the employer and insurance carrier bring certiorari. Award affirmed.
Insisting that plaintiff employee's accidental personal injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employment, defendants, on certiorari, seek to set aside the award.
Employer's premises, devoted to its business, were enclosed by a fence, in which were at least four gates opening upon a public highway adjoining the premises on the west. There were within the inclosure a factory building and a warehouse about 125 feet apart. Leaving the warehouse where he worked plaintiff walked across the intervening space to the south door of the factory, thence across the factory building, 100 feet, to a clock, which he was required to punch at the close of the day's work. Nothing remained but to leave the premises. Opposite the space between the two buildings was a gate about 150 feet from the south door of the factory. Most of the employees used that gate to enter and to leave. There was no rule on the subject. Many of the employees commonly used other gates, including one near the southwest corner of the inclosure, through which was laid a railroad sidetrack, describing a curve within the inclosure, and terminating near the factory building. To avoid the congestion of people and vehicles about the gate first mentioned plaintiff, leaving the factory promptly, followed the sidetrack, as many other employees commonly did (a ‘usual and customary route’), intending to leave the premises by the southwesterly gate. When about 300 or 400 feet from the factory, and when very close to the warehouse in which he had worked, and before reaching the gate, he fell, and was injured.
Argued before CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ.Ray Derham of Iron Mountain, for appellants.
John J. O'Hara, of Menominee (Matt F. Bilek, of Menominee, of counsel), for appellee.
CLARK, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).
The period of going to and returning from work, while not upon the employer's premises, generally is not covered by the act. Lipinski v. Sutton Sales Co., 220 Mich. 647, 190 N. W. 705;Reed v. Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Co., 225 Mich. 164, 196 N. W. 420.
Plaintiff was on the premises of the employer, going from his work, leaving within a reasonable time, following a customary and permitted route off the premises, and in the immediate vicinity of his labor. It is a general rule that an employee, under such circumstances, is still in the course of his employment. Papinaw v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 189 Mich. 441, 155 N. W. 545; 1 Bradbury's Workmen's Compensation, 419; White v. Eastern Mfg. Co., 120 Me. 62, 112 A. 841, 16 A. L. R. 1165; 20 N. C. C. A. 539; 22 N. C. C. A. 545; 12 N. C. C. A. 659; Harper Workmen's Compensation, 46; De Mann v. Hydraulic Eng. Co., 192 Mich. 594, 159 N. W. 380;Novack v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (Minn.) 198 N. W. 290.
‘In going to and from his place of work upon the premises owned or controlled by his employer, an employee is deemed as a general rule to be engaged in the employment. * * *’ 18 R. C. L. 584.
And see 50 L. R. A. 468;Broderick v. Detroit Union Depot Co., 56 Mich. 261, 22 N. W. 802,56 Am. Rep. 382;Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co., 78 Mich. 271, 44 N. W. 270,18 Am. St. Rep. 441;Lienau v. N. W. Tel. Co., 151 Minn. 258, 186 N. W. 945.
There are exceptions, of course, such as where the employer's premises are a railroad, stretching endless miles across the country, and the accident happens at a place far removed from the actual place for employment. See Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243, where it was said:
‘* * * The employment is not limited by the exact time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and...
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