Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh
| Decision Date | 22 January 1918 |
| Docket Number | 15610 |
| Citation | 119 N.E. 451,97 Ohio St. 171 |
| Parties | Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
False imprisonment - Definition - Motive and want of probable cause - Prosecuting witness or officer - Truth or falsity of complaint - Void and voidable affidavits, processes, etc. - Exemption from liability - Judicial, administrative and executive officers - Criminal adjudication not conclusive when - Sufficiency of affidavit - Negative averments.
False imprisonment is a legal term defining a legal status known in law as an unlawful detention or illegal deprivation of one's liberty.
False imprisonment per se is not concerned with good or bad faith malicious motive or want of probable cause on the part of the prosecuting witness, or the officer causing the imprisonment. If the imprisonment was lawful, it is not the less lawful that any or all of the foregoing elements existed. These elements relate to an action of malicious prosecution, but are not essential to an action in false imprisonments.
Whether or not the complaint is true or false is of no concern in an action for false imprisonment. Such inquiry may be essential to an action in malicious prosecution. Whether or not the complaint in the form of affidavit, information or indictment is or is not sufficient in law to charge an offense is likewise per se insufficient to furnish the basis of an action in false imprisonment.
The law relating to false imprisonment classifies affidavits, informations and indictments into "void" and "voidable." The "void" class includes those setting forth facts which in no conceivable form can constitute a criminal offense; or if they might constitute an offense, the court issuing the process had no jurisdiction over such offense or the person charged with the offense. The "voidable" class includes those where a bona fide attempt has been made to charge a possible offense under the statute, but by reason of some defect or irregularity such charge is per se insufficient in law. As to such "voidable" complaint, or "voidable" processes issued thereon, there can be no false imprisonment per se.
Judges and magistrates whose courts have jurisdiction of an offense, sought to be charged in a complaint by affidavit, information or indictment, but which complaint is insufficient in law, are, on grounds of public policy, exempt from liability for false imprisonment by virtue of any criminal process issued on such complaint.
By the same public policy, the administrative or executive officer, whether he be constable, policeman, game warden, sheriff,or any other authorized officer of the state, whose duty it is under the law to serve the process of such court, is likewise exempt from any liability arising from an imprisonment by virtue of such process, which is prima facie regular.
An adjudication in a criminal cause to the effect that the complaint was insufficient in law to charge an offense is not conclusive upon the officer serving the process in an action of false imprisonment against such officer. The question of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the complaint may be inquired of anew and if such complaint be found sufficient in law that is an end to the controversy in the officer's favor, providing the process upon which the false imprisonment was based was prima facie regular.
In this case the court finds that the affidavit which led to the imprisonment of defendant in error was sufficient in law. The absence of the negative matter complained of by the defendant in error was not essential to the legal sufficiency of the charge, nor to advise him of the "nature of the accusation against him." (Hale v. State, 58 Ohio St. 676, approved and followed.)
Brinkman was deputy state fish and game warden. He presented an affidavit to Frank E. Lamb, a justice Of the peace, charging as follows:
"That on or about the 21st day of January, A. D. 1913, one Thomas Drolesbaugh did unlawfully, purposely and wilfully have in his possession a device for catching fish other than a hook and line with bait or lure, to-wit, a seine, in the inland fish- ing district of the state of Ohio, and that such offense was not committed in the presence of the undersigned deponent and further deponent sayeth not, contrary to the statutes in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio. "WILLIAM F. BRINKMAN, "Game Warden."
Upon this affidavit said justice of the peace Issued a warrant and delivered the same to said Brinkman, who made his return thereon as follows:
"I have arrested the within named Thomas Drolesbaugh and have his body now before the justice of the peace this 7th day of July, 1913."
After some continuances the case was transferred to another justice of the peace, who heard the cause and found the defendant guilty as charged. Thereupon error was prosecuted to the court of common pleas, which affirmed the judgment below. Error was prosecuted to the court of appeals, which reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas upon the ground that the affidavit did not state an offense against the laws Of the state of Ohio.
Thereupon Drolesbaugh filed his petition in the court of common pleas of Crawford county against said William F. Brinkman and Frank E. Lamb, as justice of the peace, praying for damages against them for false imprisonment. Upon trial had in the court of common pleas, verdict and judgment was rendered against the defendant Brinkman, the defendant Frank E. Lamb on motion being discharged.
Upon error to the court of appeals the judgment of the court of common pleas was affirmed, and by leave of the court error is now prosecuted here to reverse the judgments below.
Mr. Joseph McGhee, attorney general; Mr. L. D. Johnson; Mr. O. W. Kennedy, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. W. J. McLaughlin, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Edward J. Myers, for defendant in error.
This is not an action for false arrest or malicious prosecution. It is an action for false imprisonment. What is false imprisonment?
False imprisonment is a legal term and means just what the words themselves imply, a wrongful or unlawful detention or restraint of one's liberty. The question always is, Was he deprived of his liberty unlawfully?
Under the facts of the case he may have been entitled to his liberty. One may be acquitted upon the merits of the case or discharged upon some question of law, but that does not, in and of itself, constitute false imprisonment.
Under the law, Was he entitled to his liberty as against the act of the person charged with false imprisonment? This is the question to be determined by a court under due process of law.
No system of jurisprudence has yet been invented that will be infallible when administered by fallible man. Mistake and injustice will occur to the individual under any judicial system, in the application of either civil or criminal jurisprudence.
The sole question here is, Was Drolesbaugh legally deprived of his liberty by Brinkman? The points in dispute are, therefore, purely legal, and do not involve probable cause or malice. The mental attitude of Brinkman, the game warden, is wholly irrelevant.
It is admitted that the justice of the peace had jurisdiction of the class of offenses sought to be charged against Drolesbaugh. That there was a bona fide attempt to charge an offense under the laws of Ohio against Drolesbaugh is not denied. Neither is it claimed that there was any unnecessary force used in the execution of the process.
The whole contention in this case is based upon the claim that the affidavit filed before the justice of the peace, upon which he issued his process, did not charge an offense against Drolesbaugh, by reason of the fact that it did not expressly negative certain matters found in the statute.
The original charge in this case was brought under favor of Section 1426, General Code, which reads as follows:
"No person shall draw, set, place, locate, maintain or have in possession a pound net, trammel net, fyke net, set net, seine, fish trap, throw or hand line, * * * or any other device for catching fish, except a hook and line with bait or lure, in the inland fishing districts of this state, * * * but nothing herein shall prohibit an owner or person having !he owner's consent from taking or catching a fish by a trot line, bob line, Or by spearing, in that part of the stream bordering on or running through his own lands."
No claim seems to be made that there was anything in this statute ipso facto that needed to be negatived in order to state an offense. Reliance, however, is put upon Section 1433, General Code, which reads:
In the criminal case against Drolesbaugh the court of common pleas and the court of appeals both held that the affidavit was insufficient, and in the trial of the civil case that adjudication was adhered to. But in the case at bar this is not conclusive as against Brinkman. He was not a party in the criminal cause, and, therefore, said action does not stand as res adjudicata against him, but is open here for full review.
If the affidavit did state an offense under the laws of Ohio, then there is an end to the entire controversy, in favor of Brinkman.
Numerous cases have been decided by this court as to the...
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