Brinkman v. Rueggesick

• Decision Date: 30 April 1880
• Parties: BRINKMAN v. RUEGGESICK et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

71 Mo. 553

BRINKMAN

v.RUEGGESICK et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April Term, 1880.

Appeal from Gasconade Circuit Court.--HON. A. J. SEAY, Judge.

REVERSED.

This was an action brought by the sisters and brothers of Casper H. Rueggesick, deceased, to set aside his will. The defendant, Christine Rueggesick, was the sister-in-law and sole legatee, and defendant Kasten Buschmann was the executor of the will.

L. C. Krauthoff for appellants, as to the testamentary capacity of deceased, cited Horne v. Horne, 9 Ired. 99; Stevens v. Vancleve, 4 Wash. C. C. 262; 3 Wash. C. C. 580; Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555; Banks v. Goodfellow, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 567; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 350; Hovey v. Chace, 52 Me. 304, 314; Blanchard v. Nestle, 3 Denio 37; St. Leger's Appeal, 34 Conn. 434, 448; Kirkwood v. Gordon, 7 Rich. (S. C.) 474; Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. St. 191, 207; 1 Whart. & Stille Med. Jur., §§ 19, 34; 1 Jarm. on Wills, pp. 50, 53; Ray Med. Jur., p. 313, note 2; Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn. 192, 204.

Rudolph Hirzel for respondents, on the same point, cited Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 148; Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307; Young v. Ridenbaugh, 67 Mo. 574; Harvey v. Sullens, 56 Mo. 372.

NAPTON, J.

The judgment in this case must be reversed and the cause remanded, because of what we understand to be an erroneous criterion adopted by the judge, of the testamentary capacity of the testator. The views of the court who tried the case without a jury were expressed in a series of instructions, which are as follows: 1. “Although the evidence may show that the testator had many lucid intervals, yet if it appears that even in such intervals he could not manage his own affairs or transact any business, then he was wholly unable to make a will. 2. Although it may appear from the evidence that the testator could and did work on the farm, and speak in a reasonable manner concerning such occupation and his work as a farm hand, yet, if it further appear that the said testator was unable to transact any business with other parties and to make any contracts and pursue the avocations and make the transactions of a common farmer, then said testator was unable to make such will, and the same must be rejected. 3. If it appear that the testator never took charge of his own business affairs, and was incapable of doing so, and knew nothing of his means or property, and never managed his affairs, and was unable so to do, then he was incapable to make said will. 5. If the court believe from the evidence that the mind of the testator was so unsound or weak as to render him incapable of managing his affairs, it will find that the testator had not sufficient capacity to make a will. 6. Although the court may believe that no influence was exerted, at the time of making the will, upon the mind of the testator, yet if it further believe that an undue influence had been acquired over his said mind, either through confidential relations existing between him and the devisee or otherwise, and that such influence operated on the testator in the disposition of his property, it will find that the paper propounded is not his last will. 7. The record evidence introduced was proper to show the interest of Kasten Buschmann in this proceeding, and should be considered by the court in judging of the credibility of his testimony.” To the giving of each and every one of these instructions the defendants objected and excepted.

The following instruction asked by defendants was refued: “The court sitting as a jury is bound to presume that Casper H. Rueggesick was of sound mind and capable of disposing of his property by will at the time the will was executed, unless from the evidence in the cause it finds that he was insane or of unsound mind, and that the said will was made while in that condition, to which action of the court the defendants excepted.

1. CRITERION OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY.

In glancing over the multitude of cases decided on this subject, one cannot but be struck by the force of Judge Redfield's observations in chapter 4, § 15, 6 of the first volume of his treatise on wills. We have no instrument,” observes the author, “by which we can assume to measure the extent of mental capacity Each case will have to be decided upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances, and somewhat too upon the peculiar bias and theory of the trier of the fact. Hence the decisions do not bear the appearance of uniformity or consistency. It is impossible they should be consistent, when they have to be made by such a variety of courts, acting upon such contrariety of facts and circumstances. Even the decisions of the same court, or the same judge, do not always appear to others, as they seemed to themselves, to harmonize with each other in regard to questions of law or of fact, and especially the latter.” The author then proceeds to observe that, “The result of the best considered cases on the subject seems to put the quantum of understanding requisite to the valid execution of a will upon the basis of knowing and comprehending the transaction, or in popular phrase, that the testator should at the time of executing the will, know and understand what he was about. * * It is sufficient if the testator knew what he was doing and to whom he was giving his property.” And it is conceded in most of the cases that a man may be capable of making a will, and yet incapable of making a contract, or managing his estate. Ray Med. Jur., p. 313; 2 Redfield on Wills, chap. 4, § 10; Thompson v. Hyner, 65 Pa. St. 368; Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555. Assuming these positions to be correct and in accordance with previous decisions of this court, it is manifest without any detailed criticism of each instruction that the tenor of the declarations of law made by the circuit court cannot be reconciled with these views.

2. WILL: influence, when not undue.

The sixth instruction relative to undue influence is objectionable, not only because there was no evidence to sustain it, but because it asserts an untenable proposition. The mere fact that an influence exists, brought about by confidential relations, is no objection to the validity of a bequest, unless such...