Brinks v. State, 28640

Decision Date08 March 1974
Docket NumberNo. 28640,28640
PartiesWilliam G. BRINKS v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

C. Ronald Patton, Rome, for appellant.

William Brinks, pro se.

F. Larry Salmon, Dist. Atty., Rome, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

NICHOLS, Justice.

William G. Brinks was indicted, tried and convicted for armed robbery and possession of narcotics. He was arrested less than an hour after the armed robbery in what was later proven to be a stolen automobile. On the date of arraignment, the day prior to the beginning of the trial, counsel for the defendant filed a motion seeking to have the defendant transferred to the Central State Hospital for psychiatric examination and report to the court. No special plea of insanity was filed, nor was insanity relied upon as a defense on the trial.

The evidence disclosed that the defendant was placed in a lineup shortly after his arrest and was identified by the victim. Prior to the appointment of counsel the defendant admitted in an interview with a detective and an FBI agent that he committed the armed robbery and had possession of the narcotic drugs found in the automobile. A motion for new trial was filed and overruled and the present appeal filed. Held:

1. The usual general grounds of the motion for new trial are deemed abandoned inasmuch as there is no enumeration of error which raises such question or attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.

2. Under the decision of this court in Taylor v. State, 229 Ga. 536, 192 S.E.2d 249, and the cases there cited the refusal to provide a psychiatric examination of the defendant was not error.

3. The defendant does not have standing to complain of an alleged warrantless search of the stolen automobile. See Grantling v. State, 229 Ga. 746(3), 194 S.E.2d 405; Shelton v. State, 111 Ga.App. 351, 141 S.E.2d 776, and cits. The admission of evidence obtained from such automobile shows no reversible error.

4. The placing of the defendant in a lineup without the presence of counsel prior to indictment and prior to the appointment of counsel did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. See West v. State, 229 Ga. 427, 192 S.E.2d 163. The in-court identification was sufficiently independent of such lineup identification to authorize its admission in evidence. Mitchell v. Smith, 229 Ga. 781, 782, 194 S.E.2d 414.

5. Where as in this case the trial court heard evidence as to voluntariness of statements made to investigating officers out of the presence of the jury, and such evidence was again adduced in the presence of the jury, it was not error to admit evidence of such statements since a finding was authorized that the presence of counsel was intelligently waived after the defendant was advised of his right to have counsel present and the statements were voluntarily made.

6. Where as in this case counsel for the defendant announces that the defendant will make an unsworn statement, instruction by the court to the defendant in the presence of the jury as to his right to make an unsworn statement is not a comment on the defendant's failure to be sworn. As was held in Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703(2), 177 S.E.2d 79: 'The mere fact that the jury is made aware that the defendant is making an unsworn statement does not result in reversible error. See Waldrop v. State, 221 Ga. 319(7), 144 S.E.2d 372; Hammond v. State, 225 Ga. 545, 546, 170 S.E.2d 226.'

7. Code Ann. § 59-718.1, provides: 'At any time during the trial of a civil or criminal case, either before or during jury deliberation, the judge may, in his discretion, allow the jury to be separated and the members thereof dispersed under appropriate instructions, except in capital cases. (Ga.L.1972, p. 622.)' This provision was enacted at the 1972 Session of the General Assembly and approved by the Governor on March 30, 1972. Under the provisions of the Act of 1968 (Ga.L.1968, p. 1364 as amended; Code Ann. § 102-111) su...

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20 cases
  • Chenault v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 9, 1975
    ...737, 124 S.E.2d 638; Taylor v. State, 229 Ga. 536(1), 192 S.E.2d 249; Coffee v. State, 230 Ga. 123(1), 195 S.E.2d 897; Brinks v. State, 232 Ga. 13(1), 205 S.E.2d 247. Code Ann. § Appellant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity raised only the general issue of the guilt of appellant inc......
  • McCorquodale v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1974
    ...in the property seized. His girlfriend did have such possessory interest and she consented to the search and seizure. See Brinks v. State, 232 Ga. 13, 205 S.E.2d 247 and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 As to the clothing obtained from the defendant the e......
  • Wisdom v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 2, 1975
    ...interest in the premises searched or any legitimate expectation of privacy as to the property seized in the search. See, Brinks v. State, 232 Ga. 13(3), 205 S.E.2d 247, where it was held that the defendant has no standing to complain of an alleged warrantless search of a stolen automobile a......
  • Tate v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 18, 1980
    ...Ga. 165(1), 190 S.E.2d 61; Cash v. State, 231 Ga. 285(3), 201 S.E.2d 625; Mathis v. State, 231 Ga. 401(6), 202 S.E.2d 73; Brinks v. State, 232 Ga. 13(4), 205 S.E.2d 247. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we find the trial court did not err in permitting the in-court identificati......
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